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Abstract 
Forests in developing countries have the potential to contribute to global efforts to 
mitigate climate change, promote biodiversity and support the livelihoods of rural, local 
people. Approximately one-fourth of such forests are under the control of local 
communities, which primarily manage forests for subsistence and to meet their livelihood 
needs. The trend of bottom-up community control is increasing through the adoption of 
decentralization reforms over the last 40 years. In contrast, the United Nations has 
introduced the top-down program, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) for the conservation and enhancement of forest carbon and the 
sustainable management of forest in developing countries.  REDD+ incentivizes forest-
managing communities to sequester carbon and reduce emissions. REDD+ has created 
hope for managing forests to mitigate climate change and has created fear that the new 
initiative may not be effective and may not ensure continuing forest-managing 
community benefits. However, little research has been conducted to answer these 
concerns. By taking nationally representative data from Nepalese community-managed 
forests (“forest commons"), I bring insights into whether and how these forests can 
contribute to REDD+ initiatives, particularly as they relate to carbon sequestration, 
biodiversity, equity in benefit sharing and collective action.    
My results indicated the highly variable carbon and biodiversity in the forest plots across 
the country, depicting the availability of space for additional growth in carbon storage 
and biodiversity conservation. My results also reflect the complex and varied 
relationships of carbon with different indices of biodiversity at the national level, across 
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geographic and topographic regions, and in forests with varying canopy covers. Weak 
positive relationships between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation 
indicate the possibility of synergies between carbon-forestry and biodiversity 
conservation. I also found that the formal community forestry program (CFP) has clearly 
positive impacts on biodiversity conservation and household-level equity in benefit 
sharing and a negative impact on carbon sequestration at the national level. However, 
disaggregated results of impacts of CFP on biodiversity, carbon and equity across 
geography, topography, forest quality and social groups display mixed results i.e., either 
positive or negative or neutral. I also identified that different drivers of collective action 
have different (i.e., positive, neutral, and negative) associations with carbon 
sequestration, which either supports or challenges established knowledge. In aggregate, 
my research indicates the potential of contribution by forest commons, and specially the 
CFP, to global environmental initiatives such as REDD+. It suggests that targeted, 
dedicated policies and programs to increase carbon sequestration, biodiversity 
conservation and foster equity and collective actions are critical. In addition, my results 
also contribute to the growing literature on socio-ecological implications of forest 
commons that demonstrated the need of interdisciplinary research to understand human-
nature relationships in the changing context.     
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background  
1.1 Introduction to the research  
Climate change is one of the contemporary, pressing and serious threats to socio-cultural 
and economic wellbeing of people and environmental security of the earth. This 
is interlinked with another global challenge: biodiversity loss (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005). To address such environmental challenges and part of socio-
economic issues, the global community has put in place agreements such as the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD). These initiatives clearly recognize the importance of tropical 
forests, a major terrestrial carbon sink and biodiversity hotspot, to sequester and store 
carbon and conserve biodiversity (Clark et al., 2001; Mittermeier et al., 2004; Pan et 
al. 2011; Parmentier et al. 2007; Philips et al. 1998).   
Over a billion local forest users (those living within or in close proximity to forests) 
control approximately 15.5% of global forests, and the trend of community control is 
increasing as a result of decentralization reforms, particularly in tropical, developing 
countries (Charnley & Poe, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008; Rights and Resource Initiative, 
2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008). Both the UNFCCC and the CBD recognize the community-
controlled forest (“forest commons”) as a vehicle for effective forest management. In 
forest commons, equity in benefit sharing constitutes an important part of motivation for 
forest-managing communities, so as to manage forest commons in such a way that lead to 
reduced social conflict and environmental degradation (e.g., Andersson & Agrawal, 
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2011; Boyce, 1994) and increased economic and ecological outcomes (McDermott, 
2009). Equity becomes more important when the international forestry programs 
incentivize local forest-managing communities. For instance, equity is critical in 
the United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation, conservation and enhancement of forest carbon and sustainable 
management of forest in developing countries (REDD+), as it is implemented at the 
community level. REDD+ values “forest” as an economic commodity i.e., carbon (Arsel 
& Buscher, 2012; Mcafee, 2012). It affects historical and contemporary forms of forest 
resource distribution and appropriation (e.g. Fairhead et al., 2012).  Researchers and 
policy makers have identified poor forest policies and communities’ institutional 
practices as the most pressing cause of deforestation and forest degradation (D&D) in 
tropical, developing countries (Corbera et al., 2010; Woodwell & Ullsten, 2001; World 
Bank, 2004;). Beyene et al. (2013) reported that the institutional practices of forest-
managing communities are one of the most important determinants of carbon 
sequestration. 
Scientists, policy makers and practitioners have identified forest-based mitigation as one 
of the effective options to limit climate change. However, there is an acute shortage of 
empirical, evidence-based knowledge that informs practical policies, management plans 
and incentive mechanisms at national and local scales. For instance, inadequate empirical 
knowledge of the relationship between carbon sequestration and biodiversity 
conservation in tropical forests (Midgley et al., 2010; Szwagrzyk & Gazda, 2007; Talbot, 
2010; Thompson et al., 2011) raises questions about the potential contribution of 
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biodiversity conservation to carbon sequestration and vice versa, particularly in the 
REDD+ agreement processes (Miles & Dickson, 2010; Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity [SCBD], 2011). Accurate and precise knowledge of the relationship 
between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation improves understanding of 
the effects of forest management activities on carbon storage and ecosystem functioning 
(Woodall et al., 2011) and promotes biodiversity conservation and carbon storage 
simultaneously (Gardner et al., 2012; Midgley et al., 2010; Miles & Dickson, 2010; 
Sharma et al., 2010; Strassburg et al., 2010). 
Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) suggested that the mere implementation of forest commons 
does not guarantee both carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation; rather there 
could be either synergy and/or tradeoffs in achieving these two outcomes. Gautam et al. 
(2002), Pandey (2015) and Thapa-Magar & Shrestha (2015) have reported the 
possibilities of carbon sequestration in Nepalese community forestry, a form of formal 
and popular forest commons. Acharya (2004) demonstrated the loss of biodiversity and 
Shrestha et al. (2010) reported the possibilities of biodiversity gain or loss in in Nepalese 
community forestry. Such inconclusive knowledge prevents forestry actors from knowing 
the effectiveness of the forest commons in storing carbon and conserving biodiversity and 
thereby limiting the possibility of innovative, productive management of forests.   
Scientists, policy makers and practitioners are not able to resolve the issue of equity in 
the forest decentralization and REDD+ development process, primarily due to inadequate 
knowledge (e.g., Adhikari, 2005; Agarwal, 2001; Iversen et al., 2006; Lamichhane & 
Parajuli, 2014; Mahanthy et al., 2009; Thoms, 2008). Different factors affect equity such 
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as wider societal processes (Hobley, 2007), economic and cultural power relations (Bist, 
1991), power of decision-making and resource access (Persha & Anderson, 2014), and 
economic growth and commercialization processes (Beck & Nesmith, 2001). However, 
empirical knowledge about the implications of such factors in equity is highly contextual 
and not sufficient.   
Studies have identified inconclusive and conflicting results about the implications of 
decentralization policies and institutions on local socio-ecological systems, including 
collective actions and carbon sequestration. One challenge is due to different disciplinary 
understandings
1
 of institutional practices (e.g., Durkheim, 1995; Mauss, 1969; Pareto, 
1935; Trent et al., 2003) that implant confusion and contradiction among scientists, 
hindering their ability to make adequate theoretical and empirical advances. The debates 
regarding the potential contribution of decentralized forestry in REDD+ indicates the 
need for interdisciplinary research. Empirical studies with better and smarter socio-
ecological data combined with robust analytical techniques are needed to conclusively 
evaluate linkages of policies and institutions of forest commons with biodiversity 
conservation and carbon sequestration (e.g. Beyene et al., 2013). For instance, panel 
socio-ecological data and the analysis that controls the effects of confounding variables 
or endogeneity would be helpful in this regard.  
                                                          
1
 Different academic disciplines interpret institutional analysis differently such as (i) economists refer to it 
as ways of thinking that have a direct impact on behaviors (Pareto, 1935); (ii) sociologists refer to it as the 
laws or the family evolve over time (Durkheim, 1995); (iii) anthropologists refer to it as the identification 
of hidden forms of power that institute behaviors and organizational procedures (Mauss, 1969); and (iv) 
public governance experts refer to it as implementing policies (Trent et al., 2003). 
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My research adds critical knowledge on how forest commons function to yield ecological 
and socio-economic outcomes and contribute to climate change mitigation. I assessed the 
ecological, socio-economic and institutional dynamics of Nepalese forest commons that 
are critical to make REDD+ effective. I used survey and perceptions data of nationally 
representative random samples of 130 forest commons (both forest and communities) and 
1300 households (10 in each community) in Nepal. Nepalese forest commons offer a 
unique learning ground to bring wide ranges of socio-economic and ecological issues into 
the analysis, as Nepal hosts a wide range of geographic locations, climatic patterns, forest 
types, socio-cultural practices, economic statuses, and policy and institutional provisions. 
Also, Nepal provides a long history of forest commons including approximately 40 years 
of formal decentralization efforts, where > 42% of the country’s population is directly 
engaged in the management of forest commons (Department of Forest [DoF], 2015).     
I assessed the relationship between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation in 
forest commons. Identifying this relationship helps increase understanding of the 
potential synergy and/or tradeoff between REDD+ and CDB initiatives, and therefore 
provides guidance to policy makers and forest commons managers. I also examined the 
effectiveness of formal community forestry on carbon sequestration and biodiversity 
conservation by using a robust analytical method - a quasi-experimental, matching 
method. I specifically answered the following questions: Does community forestry 
increase plant species diversity and carbon storage in the community forests, and if so, to 
what extent? I identified the answers for such questions for the national level and across 
geographic regions and forest qualities.  
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I also examined the impact of formal community forestry on equity in benefit sharing at 
the household level using a robust matching method. I identified such impacts for the 
overall national level and across social groups and geographic regions. In addition, I 
examined the relationships between collective action drivers and carbon sequestration. 
By using a multivariate regression analysis, I identified the key collective action drivers 
and examined their potential associations with carbon sequestration. Finally, I discussed 
the results in view of scientific understanding of ecological and socio-economic aspects 
of forest commons and their potential implications for policies and programs, and in 
particular, the REDD+ initiative. 
The dissertation is organized in 6 Chapters as follows: Chapter One provides a broader 
context for the research, particularly in relation to climate change negotiation, role of 
forests in climate change mitigation, REDD+ initiatives, forest commons, Nepal as 
research site, and the research objectives. Chapter Two investigates the relationship 
between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation (paper 1). Chapter Three 
examines the effectiveness of formal community forestry programs on carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity conservation (paper 2). Chapter Four examines the 
effectiveness of formal community forestry programs on household level equity in 
benefit sharing (paper 3). Chapter Five explores and examines the collective action 
drivers in relation to their association with carbon sequestration (paper 4). Finally, 
Chapter Six outlines the overall synthesis of the research.   
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1.2 Climate change negotiation and issues  
Climate change has been one of the most complex, uncertain, pressing and serious 
contemporary threats to the socio-cultural and economic wellbeing of people and 
environmental security of the earth. A rapid and dramatic change in the world’s climatic 
parameters, temperature and precipitation, has occurred since the industrial revolution. 
Recent decades have been the hottest throughout history, and precipitation has become 
more unpredictable. A range of human activities such as the use of fossil fuels, change in 
land use, increase in industrialization, and modernization in agriculture and livestock 
farming that emit greenhouse gases (GHGs) have caused increased global warming, 
resulting into unprecedented climate change (UNFCCC, 2007a).    
The global community has promoted climate change negotiation as the top, mainstream 
political agenda at the international level, particularly through the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. The UNFCCC has 
recently agreed to the stabilization of the global atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) level 
at 450 parts per million and limiting temperature increases, relative to the pre-industrial 
period, to below 2
0
C as guiding targets to reduce climate change risks, impacts and 
damages (Mein-shausen et al., 2009; Pachauri, 2007; UNFCCC, 2015). It has agreed on a 
range of major strategic and cross-national collaborative actions on mitigation, 
adaptation, financing, technology development and capacity building to combat climate 
change.  
Reducing climate change risks through cross-national collaborations demands 
consideration of crucial social processes, in which different actors with often diverse and 
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conflicting interests interact and coordinate at different levels (UNFCCC, 2007a). Actors’ 
interests diverge and conflict partly due to the inequalities in carbon footprints and long-
term differential impacts of climate change across countries. Divergent and conflicting 
interests result in challenges to framing climate change and to devising ways to address 
it. The debates about causes, consequences, timing, trajectory and remedies of climate 
change continue at different levels (Cammack, 2007). There are inadequate effective 
public discussions about climate change remedies (Giddens, 2008) and the outcomes of 
negotiations have rather slowly been trickling down to national and local levels. As yet 
there are no adequate substantive policy and action frameworks to offer a coherent and 
consistent path to cope with the long-term challenges of climate change. Climate change 
remains one of the most difficult issues to manage (Dessler & Parson, 2006), despite 
[isolated] efforts of different actors (Cammack, 2007). 
One of the major challenges in finding appropriate solutions to climate change is 
knowledge gaps in understanding the dynamic relationships among science, economy, 
society, culture and practices at global, national and local scales. To fill such knowledge 
gaps, actors such as scholars, policy makers, planners, technologists, financial experts, 
and development specialists have chosen science to be the important agenda setter for 
climate change negotiations. Consequently, climate sciences and global discourses have 
become key in rendering climate governable (Tanner & Allouche, 2011; Webb, 2011) 
i.e., recognizing climate as a domain of problem and turning it into a coherent, technical 
and manageable object of governance that is amenable for regulation and interventions 
through technical expertise and management (Lovbrand & Stripple, 2011).  
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The roles of scientific expertise in climate change negotiations are being contested 
(Lovbrand, 2014). A distinct and independent international body, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emerged to contribute to climate negotiations through 
the UNFCCC processes. The IPCC consists of internationally accepted principles, norms 
and decision-making procedures and engages a large network of scientists, experts and 
governments for assessing, producing, synthesizing, evaluating and legitimizing expert 
knowledge on climate change (Biermann, 2002). However, some actors have raised 
concerns of legitimacy and credibility of the IPCC, particularly relating to developing 
countries’ distrust in the cognitive and normative homogeneity of dominant epistemic 
communities,
2
 (Lahsen, 2004) and have raised questions about whether the processes it 
follows are fair, inclusive and unpartisan (Mitchell et al., 2006). Considering the well-
documented disparity in the production of science among developed countries (Karlsson 
et al., 2007), IPCC has been criticized for feeding northern research agendas and norms 
into global decision-making while neglecting the environmental concerns of the 
developing countries (Jasanoff & Martello, 2004). The preference of, and reliance on, 
scientific knowledge limits the role of indigenous knowledge (Hiraldo & Tanner, 2011) 
within developing countries in the climate negotiation process. The experts’ ability to 
deliver available information in a useful format has also been debated as the facts, 
theories, models and causal beliefs they share are questioned. The concerns related to 
legitimacy and credibility of the IPCC may create gaps leading to impractical policies 
                                                          
2
 Epistemic community is a network of knowledge-based experts with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area. 
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such as resource and technology transfer to developing countries without proper 
understanding of their resource base, governance, and socio-cultural values and practices.  
The dominant voices in the international climate negotiations and debates are coming 
from the industrialized countries, particularly those of scientists, international policy-
makers, intellectual elites and influential international [environmental] organizations. 
This is particularly true as international and domestic playing fields and players are not 
even (Kakonen et al., 2014). The lack of economic power and international political 
influence of developing countries significantly constrains their opportunities and 
capacities to contribute to shaping global climate governance (Dryzek & Stevenson, 
2011). Developing countries are not able to bring innovations to international 
deliberations due to their limited capacity and differences in socio-cultural values in 
relation to the more formal institutional culture of international negotiation processes. 
Rather, developing countries adopt donor-driven climate change policy narratives, draw 
on science-dominated expert knowledge to which they have limited access, and interpret 
climate change as an easily governable issue (Kakonen et al., 2014). 
International environmental negotiations continue to be riddled with controversies 
regarding the fair distribution of costs, resources and responsibilities (Prost & Camprubi, 
2012). The efforts to address climate change could be a threat multiplier if less attention 
is given to the issue of discriminatory and exploitative power relations and social 
inequalities that exist at international, national and local scales. This is particularly true in 
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the context of elite capture
3
 of resources, resource constraints, conflicts and poor 
governance that exacerbate existing inequalities and drive those with poor adaptive 
capacity into deeper conditions of vulnerability to shocks and stresses (Polack, 2008).  
1.3 Climate change mitigation strategy and forest management  
Climate change mitigation primarily identifies and adopts sustainable paths of emissions, 
which can be achieved through switching to low-carbon energy sources (e.g., renewable 
and nuclear energy) and expanding carbon sinks (e.g., forests and others) (UNFCCC, 
2007b). A wide range of actions that reduce or prevent GHG emissions have been 
identified such as using new technologies and renewable energies, making older 
equipment more energy efficient, changing management practices or consumer behavior, 
conserving and managing forests, reducing waste and inefficiency, and adopting labor-
intensive activities (UNFCCC, 2007a). Some of these mitigation actions, including 
forest-based actions, possess the “public good”4 nature and demand collective actions for 
proper management (UNFCCC, 2007b). Reforms in regulatory, economic, and 
technological aspects and capacity building can facilitate collective action. Regulatory 
reform includes formation and enforcement of policies and institutions. Economic 
measures create incentives, and technological innovations offer more efficient and 
                                                          
3 
Elite capture is a situation when resources (e.g., economic, political, educational) transferred for the 
benefit of the larger population are usurped by a few individuals of superior status.  
4
 A public good is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. They are subject to excessive use resulting in negative 
externalities. Such externalities are often closely related to the "free-rider" problem. Therefore, such goods 
may be under-produced, overused or degraded. However, they can be better managed by converting them 
into other types of goods such as club good, private good and/or common good by introducing proper 
policy, institution and/or incentive.    
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effective means of production. Capacity building offers knowledge and skill in adopting 
climate-friendly actions.  
Forests can be both carbon sinks and sources (Dixon et al., 1994) and therefore have 
implications for climate change mitigation. They reduce ambient CO2 levels by 
sequestering atmospheric carbon into biomass through photosynthesis. Forest 
management measures may sequester atmospheric carbon and improve forest ecosystem 
productivity. Forests also sequester soil organic carbon (Brown & Pearce, 1994) through 
the process of biomass decomposition and therefore reduce emissions. An estimated total 
of 638 Gigaton of carbon is stored in global forests in 2005 (UNFCCC, 2011). About 
80% of carbon is stored above ground (Kirschbaum, 1996; Saatchi et al., 2011), despite 
the effects of fragmentation, deforestation and forest degradation (D&D) (Scheller & 
Mladenoff, 2008). Old growth forests can continue to be a net sink of carbon (Luyssaert 
et al., 2008). Most forests have the potential to become old growth and store carbon 
(Harmon, 2001). Due to active management and recovery from past disturbances, 
temperate and boreal forests are net sinks of carbon (Dixon et al., 1994a).  
Land-use change contributes 17.4% of global anthropogenic emissions, particularly CO2 
– the most abundant GHG (IPCC, 2007). The emissions from land use change continue to 
escalate and its global dynamics and regulations are inadequately understood (Houghton 
et al., 1992). The dynamics of terrestrial carbon flux is influenced by several factors such 
as vegetation succession (Harmon, 2001), photosynthesis (Collatz et al., 1991), 
ecosystem respiration (Parton et al., 1993; Ryan, 1991), disturbances (Crutzen & 
Andreae, 1990), erosion (Stallard, 1998), herbivory (McNaughton et al., 1989) and 
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biomass removal (Houngton & Hackler, 2000). Land use change usually results from a 
combination of proximate factors, underlying causes and other factors involving 
individuals, community groups, corporations, government agencies and development 
projects (Geist & Lambin, 2002). Proximate causes include land-use change for 
agriculture, logging and infrastructure development that directly remove forest cover. 
Underlying causes include economic, policy, institutional, technological, cultural and 
demographic factors that influence land-use decisions (Trexler & Haugen, 1995) but are 
beyond the control of deforestation agents. Other factors include environmental factors, 
biophysical drivers and social trigger events. 
Almost all forest-based emissions are reported either from burning or from 
decomposition of above-ground biomass in tropical countries where D&D is prevalent. 
Much of the deforested area is converted into low carbon intensive new agriculture or 
pasture lands, which often replace degraded agricultural lands that may or may not be 
capable of supporting tree cover for carbon sequestration (Brown, 1993; Dale et al., 
1993). Forest degradation that occurs through damage to residual trees and soil from poor 
logging practices, log poaching, fuelwood collection, overgrazing, and anthropogenic fire 
also results in a significant loss of biomass carbon (Brown et al., 1991; Food and 
Agriculture Organization [FAO], 1993; Flint & Richards, 1994; Goldammer, 1990).  
Scientists and environmental organizations have put forward several arguments with 
empirical and/or logical supports either to include or to exclude forest in the climate 
change mitigation program. Including forest in a mitigation program can be advantageous 
from both environmental and socio-economic perspectives. Forests can significantly 
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reduce emissions, remove CO2 from the atmosphere, improve soil quality and increase 
biodiversity (Batjes & Sombroek, 1997). Several studies have indicated that D&D is 
marginally profitable, therefore the forest-based mitigation program could be one of the 
cheapest options in climate policy (Kindermann et al., 2008; McKinsey & Company, 
2009; Stern, 2006). Forest management has the potential to reduce emissions quickly 
with policy and institutional reform as shown in the case of forest decentralization, and it 
may not require expensive and time-taking technological innovations (Angelsen & 
Atmadja, 2008). Forests are equally important to achieve socio-economic co-benefits 
(e.g., McDowell, 2002; Sombroek et al., 1993), including conservation of ecosystem 
services and biodiversity, and reduction of poverty.   
Future forest carbon cycling trends could be attributable to uncertain losses and regrowth 
associated with global climate and land-use change. Management of forests merits 
consideration in climate change mitigation strategies. If managed properly, forests have 
the potential to: (i) lessen carbon emissions by protecting and conserving the carbon 
pools in existing forests; (ii) create carbon sinks by expanding carbon storage capacities, 
increasing the area and/or carbon density of native forests, plantations and agroforests, 
and by increasing the total pool of wood products; and (iii) substitute fossil fuels with 
fuelwood from sustainably managed forests, short-lived wood products with long-lived 
wood products, and energy-expensive materials with wood (Dixon et al., 1991; Grainger, 
1988; IPCC, 1992; Nilsson & Schopfhauser, 1995; Trexler & Haugen 1995; Winjum et 
al., 1992a, 1992b).  
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Global efforts to stabilize the concentration of GHGs <450 ppm in the atmosphere could 
practically be impossible without including forests in mitigation strategies. Therefore, 
after long deliberations on potential pros and cons, the UNFCCC decided to include 
forest management in its climate change mitigation program. Consequently, the 
UNFCCC developed the REDD+ program. REDD+ placed forests squarely within 
climate change mitigation options and made forests governable in a new way by framing 
them as crucial carbon stocks. An increasing number of tropical countries now perceive 
REDD+ as a potential solution and source of funding to fight against the persistent 
problems of D&D, biodiversity loss and poverty, and they are therefore engaged in 
REDD+.  
1.4 REDD+ features, opportunities and issues  
The UNFCCC developed the REDD+ program to incentivize the contributions of 
tropical, developing countries to reducing emissions from D&D and conservation and 
enhancement of carbon through sustainable management of forests. The idea behind 
REDD+ is to encourage forest management by financing forestry activities to maintain 
existing, and/or generate additional, carbon stocks (Kanowski et al., 2011). It would 
involve billions of dollars, perhaps significantly greater than that currently available for 
biodiversity conservation, to improve forest management (Eliasch, 2008). Such finances 
are available to carry out different activities that reduce D&D, conserve and enhance 
forest carbon, and manage forests sustainably.   
Several globally-developed, sophisticated and science-based requirements and standards 
such as ensuring additionality, controlling leakages, maintaining permanence, and 
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ensuring social and environmental safeguards are introduced to make REDD+ a 
successful program at national and local levels. The concept of additionality emphasizes 
crediting only real emission reductions caused due to the REDD+ program. Controlling 
leakage means trees saved within the REDD+ project area or country do not lead to more 
trees being harvested elsewhere. The idea of permanence demonstrates that any tree 
saved now and credited for carbon sequestration will not be felled for a specified number 
of years. Social safeguards are primarily introduced to respect national sovereignty of 
participating countries in governing and managing forest resources and to ensure the 
forest rights of, and distribute the payments equitably to, forest dependent poor, 
vulnerable, marginalized, and/or indigenous peoples. Environmental safeguards demand 
maintaining ecological integrity and conserving forest biodiversity in line with the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and other national policies. Several 
transparent, scientific and reliable monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems 
are visualized to help monitor the extent and level of REDD+ achievements by estimating 
accurate forest carbon stocks (Maniatis et al., 2011; Miles & Dickson, 2010) and 
assessing the status of safeguards. 
REDD+ is accepted as a cheaper, quicker, significant and win-win strategy to halt land-
use changes, reduce D&D and increase carbon sequestration (Angelsen & Atmadja 2008; 
Toni 2011). It would include significantly larger forest area than the area currently 
receiving conservation efforts (Harvey et al., 2010). It has potential to deliver enormous 
benefits for carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation through the protection of 
species-diverse forests (Gardner et al., 2012; Harvey et al., 2010). 
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REDD+ is seen as a unique opportunity to foster collaboration between developed and 
developing countries to address global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity 
loss and poverty, simultaneously. It allows developed countries opportunity and 
flexibility to adopt emission offset options.  It increases unconventional forestry 
investment in developing countries (Eliasch, 2008). Such investments may bring myriad 
opportunities to improve forest governance and bolster global conservation efforts 
(Wollenberg & Springate-Baginski, 2010), promote low carbon paths to development, 
generate livelihoods, and fight against persistent problems of poverty. REDD+ may 
provide an opportunity for local communities to revisit existing policies, institutions and 
practices of forest commons, so as to make them more effective, efficient and equitable. 
It also provides developing countries an opportunity to contribute to climate change 
mitigation, which otherwise, particularly in the Kyoto protocol, was not visualized. 
Social and environmental safeguards of REDD+ have generated considerable hope in the 
UNFCCC and CBD processes (CBD, 2011), and among conservation science 
communities (e.g. Busch et al., 2011; Harvey et al., 2010; Stickler et al., 2009; Strassburg 
et al., 2009). The UNFCCC considered three principles, including “do no harm” to 
natural forests, maintain long-term ecological integrity of forests, and secure net-positive 
impacts for biodiversity, in the environmental safeguards development process (CBD, 
2010). “Do no harm” intends to reduce the risk of conversion of natural forests and the 
displacement (leakage) of D&D to areas of lower carbon but high biodiversity value. 
Ecological integrity, by taking lessons from landscape ecology and the ecosystem 
approach (Gardner et al., 2009), aim to ensure the permanence of forest carbon stocks 
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and functional significance of biodiversity (Diaz et al., 2009; Thompson et al., 2009). 
Positive biodiversity aims for achieving economies of scale and delivering additional 
benefits for biodiversity (Miles & Kapos, 2008).  
REDD+ may add to the tensions related to the climate finance (e.g. Gupta, 2009; 
Stadelmann et al., 2010). Several design-related issues such as fitting REDD+ within the 
overall UNFCCC processes, developing financing approaches (e.g., voluntary market, 
compliance market or fund-based) and choosing crediting baselines for financing (e.g., 
input-based approach or performance-based approach) are still unresolved. Concerns may 
be raised that if forest-based offset becomes cheaper and fungible with clean technology, 
carbon markets may be distorted negatively affecting the development of clean 
technology. For example, Bosetti et al., (2011) showed that REDD+ may reduce 
investments in cleaner energy technologies over the next four decades by a maximum of 
10%. 
Scholars have pointed out that REDD+ may undermine the overall value of the forest. 
For instance, REDD+ tends to overemphasize forests as “carbon sinks,” and that can lead 
to adverse effects to existing multi-purpose forest management practices of communities 
(Caplow et al., 2011). It may overlook livelihood-related outcomes for local communities 
(Campbell 2009; Coomes et al., 2008; Putz & Redford, 2009) and gradually alienate local 
people from resource access in the future (Phelps et al., 2010b). However, Karsenty & 
Ongolo (2012) argued that concern about the marginalization of forest communities 
appears to be unjustified in many countries where the capacity of the state is limited by 
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various crisis-linked situations (e.g., post-conflict, institutional instability and ethnic 
tensions). 
Different scholars have explicitly indicated that REDD+ may not be beneficial or rather 
may be harmful in certain ways. The trade-offs between local livelihoods, biodiversity 
conservation and carbon sequestration caused by REDD+ are highly uncertain (Corbera 
& Brown, 2010; Hiraldo & Tanner, 2011). REDD+ is not going to necessarily help local 
community-managed forests (Ostrom, 2010). For instance, REDD+ has now created the 
notion of “global forests,” moving local forests away from their local physical and 
cultural contexts and integrating them with global carbon markets and strong governance 
(Eliasch, 2008).  
On the basis of knowledge drawn from historical forest management practices, 
particularly the creation of protected areas that alienate local people from resources 
(Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau, 2006), different challenges and issues are brought into 
attention while developing the REDD+ program. Some of these issues are related to (i) 
defining and meeting requirements and standards of REDD+ at the local level; (ii) 
defining and ensuring ownership and tenure security of forestland, forest resources and 
carbon; (iii) enhancing capacity of the forestry actors; (iv) transforming and balancing de 
jure and de facto power relations of actors; (v) maximizing carbon sequestration while 
meeting immediate forest product needs; and (vi) maintaining equity and justice in 
benefit sharing. Reflecting from different REDD+ pilot projects, scholars have indicated 
issues related to the governance of forests. For instance, Peskett et al. (2011) and 
Thompson et al. (2011) indicated that REDD+ does not fully acknowledge the links 
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among political, economic, technical, ecological, and social issues in governing tropical 
forests. Rather, it would destabilize forest governance (Bluffstone et al., 2013) and 
exacerbate the persistent efforts of governments and corporations to exert increasing 
control over forests, leading to reverses in recent trends of forest devolution, thereby 
reducing community autonomy and wellbeing (Lovera, 2009; Phelps et al., 2010b). 
Khatri (2012) and Ratsimbazafy et al. (2011) indicated the possibility of subtle 
recentralization of forest governance power by the state forest authority and negative 
implication for forest-dependent poor from REDD+.  
Taking the case of a REDD+ pilot project in Nepal, Paudel et al. (2011) and Upreti et al. 
(2011) showed that REDD+ may either reinforce existing conflicts or induce new ones in 
the management of forest commons. They also reported concerns related to implementing 
REDD+ standards and monitoring carbon sequestration and emissions from the forest 
commons. Particularly, the emergence of new functions and agencies in carbon 
monitoring may affect motivation, commitment, action and power dynamics of 
communities in forest management. Compounding these issues with the social 
heterogeneity and discriminatory power relations among community members may result 
in inequity in benefit sharing. These dynamics affect the overall processes and outcomes 
on forest commons and REDD+ in the long run.  
REDD+ involves contextualization, complexity and uncertainty that may lead to both 
tradeoffs and synergies in the outcomes. Major parts of complexities and uncertainty are 
contingent on several factors, including viewing the forest as different resources (e.g., 
carbon reservoir, natural resource and home for different species and/or people), 
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designing REDD+ features, and formulating policies and institutions at local, national 
and international levels. Scholars have further identified a range of factors to make 
REDD+ a successful program.  For instance, Luintel et al. (2013) identified that 
availability of capable human resources at national and grassroots levels is crucial; Cotula 
and Mayers (2009) highlighted that effective governance, clear property rights and secure 
tenure of forests are pre-requisites; and Agrawal et al. (2011) recommended the 
collaborative efforts and use of lessons from past forestry, agriculture, biodiversity and 
development policies. In addition, robust forest and emission databases, proper policy 
framework and institutional set up, and co-benefits are crucial factors for the success of 
REDD+. Allowing flexibility in designing REDD+ projects at different levels (e.g., 
national, project and nested levels) is crucial for effective, efficient and equitable 
outcomes. Effectiveness demonstrates the level of emissions reductions against the plan. 
Efficiency shows the cost of emission reductions. Equity highlights whether benefits and 
costs are distributed fairly among forest managing communities.    
1.5 Forest commons features, outcomes and issues  
Ostrom (1990) reviewed age-old customary practices and local institutions, and 
theoretically and empirically demonstrated the great potential of local communities to 
manage forest commons sustainably. Over a billion people are using approximately 18% 
of forests globally (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Dietz & Henry, 2008; White & Martin 
2002), among which approximately 15.5% are under the control of communities (Rights 
and Resources Initiatives [RRI], 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008). Community-controlled 
forests (“forest commons”) have a wide range of crucial features that make them unique 
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and successful in achieving developmental goals, at least at the local level. They 
represent forests that are held in common and owned collectively or by the state or a legal 
entity but not privately. They are physically accessible to all members of a community 
and therefore likely to be under the most pressure from land use change. Ranges of legal 
and customary forest commons with locally acceptable access, use and management 
practices are present worldwide. Such forest commons are variously named community 
forestry, collaborative forest management, joint forest management, leasehold forestry, 
participatory forestry, buffer zone forestry, social forestry, and village forestry. Despite 
the difference in name, they primarily embrace the basic idea of engaging local 
communities in the management of forest resources, albeit different forms and degrees. 
These models of forest commons translate into the practice based on either legal or 
customary rules. 
Forest commons primarily builds on traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and bottom-
up planning approach. As TEK is derived from socially different groups of people based 
on age, sex, caste, ethnicity, education, regions of settlement and occupation (Spoon, 
2011), forest commons may benefit from wide range of knowledge held in common. 
Environmental problems, such as tragedy of commons, may not be avoided through 
conventional approaches such as by state/external control or by market but could be 
addressed by developing local common property institutions in certain conditions 
(Ostrom, 1990), indicating the importance of TEK in conservation. Even simple TEK 
about plant and animal include knowledge about their habitats and therefore provide clue 
to understand overall ecosystem and to address complex conservation problems (Lee, 
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1993). TEK is helpful to increase the diversity of ecological and cultural capitals upon 
which local people can draw environmental resources for their livelihoods even in the 
time of unanticipated change (Berkes & Folke 1994; Turner et al., 2003).  It is extremely 
important in managing ecological systems while improving productivity through semi-
domestication, domestication, cultivation, controlled firing, mulch preparation and 
reforestation (Posey, 2008 [1985]). It has also been important for understanding 
ecological hazards, reducing disaster risk, mitigating vulnerability (Lauer, 2012). 
The objective of forest commons management is to supply tangible products and 
functional services needed for consumptive and non-consumptive uses at the local scale. 
The local communities are the primary stakeholders for the management and use of forest 
commons. They are better suited to, and therefore do, develop the forest management 
plan and locally-suitable criteria, indicators and standards for assessing ecological and 
socio-economic impacts of forest management. They use national forest management and 
biodiversity conservation frameworks as references to design and execute forest 
management plans and monitor activities at the local scale. They possess rights to govern, 
manage and use forest resources and to access management services as and when needed. 
The role of government forestry institutions is primarily confined to policy formulation, 
technical support, capacity building, and monitoring. The communities enjoy all or part 
of benefits derived from forests on the basis of legal and/or customary arrangements. 
Resource and cost sharing mechanisms and processes are normally prepared considering 
several factors such as legal provisions, community needs, resource condition and 
availability, and historical practices.  
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The formal decentralization of forest commons is becoming a more popular, dominant 
strategy for conservation of biodiversity, reduction of D&D, enhancement of local 
livelihoods and democratization of the forestry sector in developing countries (Brown et 
al., 2002; Johannes, 2002; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Nurse & Malla, 2006).  The trend of 
forest decentralization is increasing (RRI, 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008). Governments 
transfer forest rights to forest-managing communities through decentralization policy 
reforms in tropical, developing countries (Charnley & Poe, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008; 
Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Forest rights can be differentiated into access, withdrawal, 
management, exclusion and alienation rights (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Often these 
rights are defined nationally and locally considering the forest conditions, national forest 
management priorities and community needs. The formal forest commons are associated 
with democratization of resource access, poverty alleviation, and forest resource 
sustainability (Pulhin, 2000). They also attract funding support from international non-
governmental organizations (FAO, 1993; Sharma & Rowe, 1992).  
Forest commons have been instrumental to gaining multiple outcomes from forests 
(Chazdon, 2008; Nepstad et al., 2006; Ranganathan et al., 2008). They provide key forest 
products to well over a billion people (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Dietz & Henry, 2008) 
and livelihood benefits to more than half a billion poor people in the world (Eliasch, 
2008; World Bank, 2004). They offer the best prospect for environmental sustainability, 
particularly through revitalization of degraded forest ecosystems, sustainable 
management of forest resources, poverty reduction, inclusion of poor and marginalized 
people, promotion of community development and institutional strengthening in rural 
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areas (Chapagain & Banjade, 2009; Gautam et al., 2002; Kanel, 2004; Luintel et al., 
2009; Luintel, 2006; Mahat, 2009; Pokharel et al., 2007; Yadav et al., 2003). They spread 
over large areas and offer opportunities to support carbon sequestration and biodiversity 
conservation beyond the remotely located conventional conservation areas. They provide 
space to improve the relationships between different groups of people in the community. 
For instance, local communities organized in community forestry in Nepal have been 
able to transform the hegemonic, discriminatory and unjust forest-based social relations 
to some extent (Luintel et al., 2009; Pokharel et al., 2007). Such communities have been 
largely practicing good forest governance (Pokharel et al., 2007).  
Forest commons conserve, manage and sequester carbon by slowing D&D, increasing 
forest area and/or carbon density, promoting plantations and agroforestry, and increasing 
the transfer of biomass carbon into products (e.g., long-lived wood products and biofuels 
that can be used instead of fossil-fuel). Their governance frameworks, time-tested 
institutional practices, and abilities of forest management could be effective institutional 
vehicles for REDD+ implementation that sequesters carbon and achieves co-benefits at 
the local level. Through the management of forest commons, local communities could be 
mobilized effectively in creating awareness in adopting energy efficient technology and 
expanding tree-plantations in agricultural land so as to reduce emissions and sequester 
carbon. Such communities could devise locally suitable, practical methods to support 
forest-dependent poor with required resources (e.g., Pokharel et al., 2006).    
Different issues exist in the management of forest commons. For instance, Nepalese 
community forests are managed passively (Yadav et al., 2003). Inequity, gender 
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discrimination and elite capture of resources and decision-making processes are prevalent 
in forest-managing communities (Agarwal, 2001; Banjade et al., 2004; Luintel & Timsina 
2007; Luintel 2006; Malla et al., 2003; Persha & Anderson, 2014). Conflicts between 
different actors are increased due to ambiguity in forest property rights. The forest 
property rights in Nepal are shaped by discriminatory, exploitative and unjust historical 
social relations of power (Luintel & Chhetri, 2008). Bribery has been a driving factor for 
forest product trade (Paudel et al., 2006). The weak enterprising capacity of forest-
managing communities compounded with inadequate policy, financial and technical 
supports limits better utilization of economic opportunities derived from forest commons 
(Kunwar et al., 2009). Forest-managing communities may reduce biological diversity by 
favoring and/or clearing particular species (Huettner, 2012). These issues may hinder the 
environmental sustainability and social harmony in the long run.  
Primary objectives of forest commons and REDD+ may not be matched perfectly. They 
may either conflict and/or complement each other. Therefore, the REDD+ outcomes in 
forest commons may imply trade-offs and/or synergies depending on the resource, policy 
and institutional contexts (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). There are not adequate studies to 
understand such potential synergy and tradeoff between both initiatives.  
1.6 Forest commons and REDD+ in Nepal 
Nepal covers a total of 147,148 square kilometers and is broadly divided into three 
geographic regions: the high Himalaya (16%) to the north, the middle hills (68%) and the 
plain land, Terai, (17%) to the south. The altitudinal range varies from 73 - 4848m from 
the mean sea level, providing an opportunity for diverse geo-climatic zones from tropical 
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to alpine regions. Legally, 40.36% (5.96 million hectares) of land is categorized as forest 
in Nepal (Department of Forest Research and Survey [DFRS], 2015). While Nepal 
occupies 0.1% of the Earth’s land, it harbors >3% and >1% of the world’s known flora 
and fauna, respectively (Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation [MoFSC], 2014). It 
hosts about 118 ecosystems and 35 forest types (Stainton, 1972). More than two-thirds of 
the population live in the rural areas and have subsistence agricultural economies where 
forest constitutes an integral part of their livelihoods. Approximately 77% of energy in 
the country is supplied as fuelwood majority of which come from the forest and 
contribute to one of the major sources of emissions in Nepal (Water and Energy 
Commission Secretariat, 2010).  
Nepal has a long history of customary and formal forest commons management. It was an 
early leader in initiating formal community forestry, an innovative program involving 
local communities in forest management (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001). The Nepalese 
government started experimenting with community forestry from the mid-1970s and fully 
developed and implemented a concrete program in the early 1990s. The Nepalese 
government and international environmental organizations started providing support to 
local communities for the protection and management of forests. Now, community 
forestry has been one of the most prioritized, popular and extensive forestry programs to 
revitalize the degraded forests in the hills and fulfill the demand of subsistence forest 
products in the rural areas. The hill region of the country was prioritized for community 
forestry due to communities’ dependence on, and willingness to protect, forests; 
existence of traditional management practices; inability of government forestry staff to 
  
28 
 
protect and manage forests; deteriorating forest conditions; little value for commercial 
use and public revenues; and financial and technical support of international development 
communities (Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; World Bank, 2001). Nepalese community 
forestry have been contributing to the environmental sustainability, particularly through 
revitalization of degraded forest ecosystems, sustainable management of forest resources, 
poverty reduction, inclusion of poor and marginalized people, promotion of community 
development and institutional strengthening in rural areas (e.g., Chapagain & Banjade, 
2009; Gautam et al., 2002; Kanel, 2004; Luintel et al., 2009; Luintel, 2006; Mahat, 2009; 
Pokharel et al., 2007; Yadav et al., 2003). 
Community forestry directly engages ~12 million people (~42% of the population) in the 
management and consumptive uses of >1.8 million hectares (~1/3) of forest (Department 
of Forest [DoF], 2015). In addition, many communities are traditionally, informally 
engaged in the management of forests. The community forestry policy legally recognized 
local forest-managing communities by forming and registering the community forest user 
groups (CFUG). The CFUG is an autonomous and self-organizing public body having 
perpetual succession for forest management that can acquire, possess, transfer or manage 
property (Ministry of Law and Justice [MoLJ] 1995, 1993). The communities managing 
forests are formally or legally entitled to own, access, manage, use and sell (including 
setting pricing) all the resources of community forests (except wildlife and minerals) as 
per the self-prepared and DFO-approved forest management plan. Such legal, 
institutional arrangements made community forestry an indispensable strategy for any 
international environmental initiatives managing local forests such as REDD+. The 
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diversities in terms of characteristics of forests and communities have created 
opportunities to carry out varieties of research related to environmental and socio-
economic outcomes of forest commons management.  
The Nepalese government is a party to the UNFCCC and has been officially taking part 
in REDD+ readiness activities to capacitate itself to implement forest carbon projects. It 
prepared a Readiness Preparation Proposal (RPP), a roadmap for developing and 
implementing regulatory and programmatic strategies for REDD+ in a participatory way 
involving governmental and non-governmental organizations, civil society, communities 
and donors (MoFSC, 2010b). The Nepalese government has now been developing 
REDD+-sensitive forest policies, programs, institutions, databases, and capacity. The 
new forest sector strategy 2015 has made provisions for payment of ecosystem services 
and paved the way for REDD+ projects. The Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation 
(MoFSC) has created a “REDD Implementation Centre (REDD-IC)” to organize REDD+ 
initiatives in the country. The REDD IC is taking the lead in formulating REDD+ 
strategy including clarifying carbon ownership, strengthening institutional mechanisms, 
creating mechanisms for efficient MRV of carbon sequestration and safeguard systems, 
equitable benefit sharing and practical safeguards. Recently, the MoFSC decided to carry 
out a REDD+ pilot project in the western and central Terai of the country.  
Different organizations such as civil societies, national and international non-
governmental organizations, donors and development partners have been supporting the 
REDD+ initiative in Nepal. For instance, the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF) is supporting the country's overall REDD+ readiness. The United 
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Nations-REDD (UN-REDD) is providing capacity-building support in policy 
development. The government of Finland has been assisting in the Forest Resource 
Assessment. The governments of Finland, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States of America have been assisting in a range of forestry development 
projects and REDD+ initiatives. Local development partners and national civil societies 
are closely working with international environmental organizations to create awareness 
and build capacity of forest-managing communities. Luintel et al. (2013) demonstrated 
the need and possibility of partnership and collaboration between actors to build capacity 
for REDD+ at the local level so that the forest-managing communities are able to manage 
the forest to increase carbon storage and co-benefits.   
A range of challenges have appeared to meeting REDD+ standards in Nepal. Such 
challenges include the lack of adequate and dedicated policy framework, limited 
competency of stakeholders, inadequate attention to the local ecological conditions and 
communities’ socio-economic requirements in the planning process, and lack of 
provision for local people’s free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Also, national 
forestry professionals voice the concern that REDD+ incentives may perhaps be too weak 
to address the drivers of D&D. The drivers of D&D in Nepal, particularly in the plainland 
Terai region, are historical, cultural and socio-political in nature and therefore complex to 
address (Paudel et al., 2014).  
1.7 Research approach and objectives  
I took an interdisciplinary and cross-scale approach to accomplish my research. This 
interdisciplinary approach helps better elucidate the linkages between local ecological 
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and socio-economic systems (Berkes & Folke, 1998). Understanding socio-ecological 
linkages are crucial to help manage forest resources, particularly in the context of a 
changing climate. I used contemporary, cross-scale information and their linkages to 
accomplish this research. Specifically, I took data from the forest commons, forest-
managing communities and households, and discussed the findings in relation to national 
policies and programs that are often guided by international environmental initiatives. 
Such an approach helps bring local perspectives into national and global climate change 
policy initiatives and vice versa.   
My research is located on the fundamental premise of human-forest interactions in the 
context of emerging global environmental challenges. The central focus of my research is 
to examine the conditions of forest commons and communities’ practices, so as to 
develop a better understanding of how they are likely to respond to REDD+ in Nepal. My 
aim is to examine how local ecological conditions and communities’ institutional 
practices affect outcomes of forest commons management in view of REDD+. More 
specifically, I addressed the following four objectives.  
Objective # 1: Examine the relationship between carbon sequestration and biodiversity 
conservation in forest commons 
To achieve objective # 1, I assessed forest carbon stocks, biodiversity and their 
relationships. Such assessments are important to understand the current forest 
conditions and the possible future-forest scenario in relation to carbon and 
biodiversity. I used standard allometric equations to estimate carbon and biodiversity. 
I applied statistical tools, correlations and regressions, to estimate the strength and 
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direction of relationships and the unbiased coefficients, respectively. I carried out 
such assessments at the national level and across management regimes, geographic 
regions, topographic regions and forest qualities, so as to gain disaggregated and 
comparative pictures. I critically discussed the empirical results in relation to 
theoretical expectations, other studies, and potential implications in policy and 
management in view of REDD+.  
Objective # 2: Examine the effectiveness of formal community forestry on carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity conservation 
To achieve objective # 2, I examined the effects of formal community forestry on 
carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. I used a robust analytical quasi-
experimental method i.e., the matching method to estimate the effect of community 
forestry against non-community forestry. I carried out analyses at the national level 
and across geographic regions, topographic regions and forest qualities. I critically 
discussed the empirical results in relation to theoretical expectations, other studies, 
and potential implications in policy and management in view of REDD+. 
Objective # 3: Examine the effectiveness of formal community forestry on equity in 
benefit sharing at the household level.  
To achieve objective # 3, I used a robust matching method to estimate the effect of 
community forestry on equity against that of non-community forestry. I carried out 
analyses at the national level and across geographic regions and social groups. I 
critically discussed the empirical results in relation to theoretical expectations, other 
studies, and potential implications for policy and management in view of REDD+. 
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Objective # 4: Examine the relationships between collective action drivers and carbon 
sequestration.  
To achieve objective #4, I examined relationships between collective action drivers 
and carbon sequestration. I examined such relationships by identifying key collective 
actions drivers and using a multivariate regression analysis to estimate their 
contribution to carbon sequestration. Finally, I discuss the results of the study in the 
context of scientific contributions and implications for the REDD+ initiative. 
Achieving these objectives helps understand critical dimensions of linkage between forest 
commons and REDD+. While carbon constitutes the core interest of REDD+ program, 
biodiversity is the major, unavoidable co-benefit. Similarly, equity constitutes one of the 
critical components of incentive structure, which is the key of REDD+ mechanism. The 
impacts of formal community forestry program on biodiversity, carbon and equity 
provide crucial knowledge on what modality of forest commons are effective and 
therefore should be promoted. The understanding of collective action drivers in relation 
to carbon storage would signal the areas for specific attention in view of REDD+ in view 
of REDD+.          
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Chapter 2:  Biodiversity and Carbon in the Nepalese Forest Commons: Implications 
for Global Environmental Initiatives   
2.1 Introduction 
Climate change and biodiversity loss are two interlinked, contemporary environmental 
crises of global magnitude, each posing serious risks to human wellbeing and ecosystem 
function (Metz et al., 2007; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). To address 
climate change and biodiversity loss, the global community has put in place agreements 
such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). These initiatives recognize the 
importance of forests, particularly as they contribute to carbon storage and biodiversity 
conservation, as ecosystem services.  They highlight the importance of forest 
management and forest health monitoring at the national scale.  They also prioritize the 
management of tropical forests, which are both major terrestrial carbon sinks and 
biodiversity hotspots (Clark et al., 2001; Mittermeier et al., 2004; Pan et al., 2011; 
Parmentier et al., 2007; Philips et al., 1998). 
Balvanera et al. (2006), Hooper et al. (2005) and Tilman (2001) reported the positive 
correlation between biodiversity and ecosystem performance, including carbon 
sequestration. Greater biodiversity provides more functional variations of biotic 
communities, buffers against environmental fluctuations, and fosters the stabilization of 
ecosystem processes (Schlapfer et al., 1999; Schwartz et al., 2000). Biodiversity also 
provides insurance against the loss or poor performance of some species (Folke et al., 
1996). Biodiversity generally includes species with higher growth rates and adaptive 
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capacity to withstand diverse environmental conditions (Fridley, 2001) and accumulates 
higher carbon (Caspersen & Pacala, 2001). The relationships between biodiversity and 
carbon depend on the nature of ecological processes in the particular ecosystem. For 
instance, complementarity in utilizing different resources such as through niche 
partitioning and facilitation may allow different species to increase overall productivity in 
less stressful habitats, while dominant species may competitively exclude other species in 
more productive habitats (Loreau & Hector, 2001; Paquette & Messier, 2011; Warren et 
al., 2009). Such relationships vary across time and space due to spatial heterogeneity and 
disturbance regimes (Cardinale et al., 2000). 
There is inadequate empirical knowledge regarding the relationships between 
biodiversity and carbon, particularly in tropical forests (Midgley et al., 2010; Szwagrzyk 
& Gazda, 2007; Talbot, 2010; Thompson et al., 2011). Such gap of empirical knowledge 
hinders environmental scientists’ ability to inform policy makers regarding the potential 
contributions of biodiversity conservation to carbon sequestration and vice versa.  Such 
hindrance has appeared in the international environmental agreement processes such as 
the United Nations program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation, conservation and enhancement of forest carbon and sustainable 
management of forests in developing countries (REDD+). For example, the Secretariat of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity [SCBD] (2011) and Miles and Dickson (2010) 
raised concerns that REDD+ would displace deforestation of diverse forests and convert 
natural forests into less diverse plantations, respectively.  
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Assessment of the relationships between biodiversity and carbon supports efforts to better 
understand the effects of various forest management activities on carbon storage and 
ecosystem functioning (Woodall et al., 2011). Accurate and precise knowledge of the 
relationships between biodiversity and carbon in different forest types at national and 
regional scales is a prerequisite to promoting biodiversity conservation and carbon 
storage simultaneously (Gardner et al., 2012; Midgley et al., 2010; Miles & Dickson, 
2010; Sharma et al., 2010; Strassburg et al., 2010). 
I assessed biodiversity and carbon relationships using data from 620 nationally 
representative random sample plots in Nepalese forest commons (e.g., both formally 
decentralized community forest (CF) and open access forests protected by the 
government but used by the local communities (NCF)). Nepal harbors over three percent 
and one percent of the world’s known flora and fauna, respectively, despite a 0.1% share 
of the Earth’s land (Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation [MoFSC], 2014). High 
biodiversity is attributed to its location at the crossroads of the Indo-Malayan and 
Palearctic biogeographic regions and the wide range of geographic and climatic 
diversities (Stainton, 1972). It is topographically divided into three regions: the high 
altitude Himalaya (16%), the middle hills (68%) and the lowland plains referred to as 
Terai (17%). Approximately 23 million people depend on 5.8 million ha of forest for 
ecosystem services such as forest products and watershed services. More than 12 million 
people are directly engaged in the management and consumptive uses of forests, which 
poses challenges and creates opportunities for biodiversity conservation and carbon 
storage. 
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I estimated the tree and shrub biodiversity (hereafter called biodiversity) and Above 
Ground Tree and Sapling Carbon (AGTSC) for forests overall and across altitudes, slopes 
and canopy covers. I also identified species in which most of the AGTSC are 
concentrated. Further, I clarified how and under what circumstances biodiversity can 
serve as a useful indicator for AGTSC. I tested three hypotheses: (i) Plot-level 
biodiversity and AGTSC were strongly, positively correlated at national scales and across 
altitudes, slopes and canopy covers; (ii) Plot-level biodiversity and AGTSC were more 
strongly correlated in highly productive forests (i.e., lower altitudes, lower slopes and 
closed canopies) than less productive forests (i.e., higher altitudes, higher slopes and open 
canopies). Finally, I discussed the study results in relation to emerging global 
environmental policy, particularly carbon forestry (i.e., REDD+.)  
2.2 Research site, design and analytical model  
The data presented are part of an ongoing multi-disciplinary research project funded by 
the World Bank and jointly implemented by Portland State University and ForestAction 
Nepal (Bluffstone et al., 2015). The primary aim of the project was to assess the potential 
synergies and/or tradeoffs between Nepalese forest commons and REDD+.  
2.2.1 Data sources and sampling methods 
ForestAction researchers and I jointly conducted a pilot survey in 2012 to estimate the 
required number of sample plots. We selected 45 sample plots from nine community 
forests (CFs) across physiographic regions to capture the most heterogeneity possible in 
plot basal area, a proxy of forest biomass. We deployed a field team to measure the 
diameter at breast height (DBH) of trees and saplings and estimated the basal area for 
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each plot. Considering variance of basal area, we calculated the number of required 
sample plots for 10% error and 95% confidence level using the standard formula (2.1) 
(Saxena & Singh, 1987).   
N = Cv
2
t
2
/E
2…………………………….(2.1) 
Where N = Required number of sample plots; 
Cv = Coefficient of variation, s/µ (s= standard deviation and µ= sample mean); 
E = Standard error, s/√n (n= sample number); 
t = Value of student-t distribution for (n-1) degrees of freedom and 95% 
confidence level 
We estimated that a total of 325 plots were required for sampling in the CF. Sample plots 
were distributed in 65 CFs, which were selected from the random samples chosen for a 
national CF impact study conducted by the Nepalese government during 2010-2012. 
ForestAction recruited a team of 25 Nepalese field researchers with whom I closely 
worked to collect the data. Each of the field researchers had undergraduate degrees in 
forestry (12) and graduate degrees in social science (13), and ForestAction trained them 
to conduct forest surveys, forest inventories and household surveys.  
As the size of CF varies, we allocated between 3-7 sample plots in each forest based on 
the quintile distribution of forest size. As forest size in the hills and Terai markedly 
differ, we considered different quintile ranges for the hills and Terai (Table 2.1).  
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Table 2.1 Distribution of sample plots in community forests. 
Quintile     
distribution 
Forest size (ha) Sample 
plots/forests 
No. of 
forests 
No. of 
plots 
Hill Terai 
1
st
 quintile < 18 < 113 3 13 39 
2
nd
 quintile 18 - 64 113 - 154 4 13 52 
3
rd
 quintile 64 - 91 154 - 335 5 13 65 
4
th
 quintile 91 - 183 335 - 526 6 13 78 
5
th
 quintile ≥ 183 ≥ 526 7 13 91 
 
The field team selected 65 non-CFs in such a way that they were as similar as the CFs in 
a variety of characteristics. Such plots were close but not next to CFs to avoid being used 
simultaneously by the same people. The field team carried out forest boundary surveys 
using Geographic Positioning System (GPS), prepared forest maps on graph paper and 
estimated forest area. The maps of CF that were in the forest operational plan were also 
copied on the graph paper so as to divide areas into smaller grid cells. To identify the 
sample plot, the cells were selected randomly, and X and Y coordinates of the center of 
selected cells were identified. The coordinates were then fed into a GPS unit to locate the 
plots in the forests. Due to differences in non-CF size, it was possible to allocate 295 
plots following forest size criteria and standards given in Table 2.1. The distribution of 
sample plots is given in Figure 2.1. 
  
 
4
0
 
 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of sample plots 
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A circular plot with a radius of 8.92m was selected for collecting environmental data and 
measuring trees (>5cm diameter at breast height [DBH]), which is suitable for moderate 
to dense vegetation and is widely used (MacDicken, 1997).  Using the same center, 
second and third plots with radiuses of 5.64m and 1m were established to measure 
saplings (1-5cm DBH) and count seedlings (Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2 Size and shape of sample plot 
 
The team measured height and circumference of each tree and sapling using a clinometer 
and linear tape, respectively. Vernacular names of species were recorded and the data on 
canopy, slope, altitude, aspect, soil color, soil depth, fire occurrence, forest 
encroachment, forest product collection, soil erosion and grazing were also collected. In 
addition, forest area and management regime, households using the forest, and distance 
of forest from the road and district headquarters were collected. All the information was 
collected from February to May 2013. Some data such as households in the CF user 
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group was used from the CF impact study conducted by the Nepalese government in 
2010, for which I trained field enumerators and conducted preliminary data analysis.          
2.2.2 Description and preparation of data variables 
I focus on AGTSC, because it provides information about the location of carbon sources 
and sinks and allows partial estimation of carbon storage and emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (Houghton, 2005; Ketterings et al., 2001). Recent 
studies using estimates of AGTSC have indicated a growing potential for tropical forests 
to serve as carbon sinks (Baker et al., 2004; Lewis et al., 2009; Pan et al., 2011; Philips et 
al., 1998).  
I used equations (2.2) and (2.3) proposed by Chave et al. (2005) to estimate Above 
Ground Biomass (AGB), which is prepared using a large global dataset of trees across 
different climatic conditions. Equations (2.2) and (2.3) are used to estimate AGB in dry 
(<1500mm average annual rainfall) and moist forests (1500-4000mm average annual 
rainfall), respectively. These equations are used by several researchers and are 
recommended by the Nepalese government (MoFSC, 2010a). Approximately 5% of my 
sample plots were in dry forests. 
AGB (kg) = 0.112*( D
2
H)
0.916
 …………………………... (2.2)  
AGB (kg) = 0.0509* D
2H ………………………………..(2.3) 
where, 
 = Specific gravity of wood (g cm
-3
); 
D = DBH; 
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H = Tree height 
I used species-based wood specific gravity recommended by Jackson (1994) to calculate 
biomass. Where such information was unavailable, I used general values derived from 
average specific gravity of associated species (same genus and family) within a forest 
type (Baker et al., 2004; MoFSC, 1988; Ngugi et al., 2011).     
I used Nepal-specific biomass equations developed by Tamrakar (2000) to estimate the 
green biomass of individual saplings. I converted the green biomass into dry biomass 
multiplying by species-wise fractions or the average of associated species identified in 
the literature. I used the fractions 0.627, 0.613, 0.58, 0.57, 0.545, 0.517, 0.5 and 0.45 for 
Quercus species, Lyonia ovalifolia, Pinus roxburghii, Alnus nepalensis, Schima wallichii, 
Shorea robusta, Terminalia tomentosa and Pinus wallichiana, respectively (Bhatt & 
Tomar, 2002; Jain & Singh, 1999; Kataki & Konwer, 2002; Shrestha et al., 2006; 
Wihersaari, 2005). For unidentified species, or where wood density information was not 
available for the species, genus or family, I used the overall mean wood density obtained 
from the database of species compiled for this study (Baker et al., 2004). Finally, I 
converted AGB into carbon stock multiplying by 0.50 (International Panel on Climate 
Change [IPCC], 2007).    
I checked the names of all tree and shrub species for orthography and synonymy. I 
calculated plot-wise biodiversity indices to reflect different salient features: species 
richness (S) to account for the number of species present, Shannon Wiener index (H’) to 
account for S and abundance of species, effective number of species (e
H’
) to account for S 
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and H’ in an unbiased and easily interpretable form, and Shannon equitability index 
(ESW) to account for the evenness of species.  
I calculated S by simply counting the number of species present in a plot. Using equation 
(2.4), I calculated H’, which positively correlates with the number and evenness of 
species and takes a value of zero when there is only one species and a maximum value 
when all species are present in equal abundance (Mohan et al., 2007). 
H’= − ΣSi=1 pi ln pi  …………………………………………….. (2.44)  
where, S = Species richness;   
i = Individual species; 
pi = Individuals of one species (n) divided by the total number of individuals of 
all species in the plot (N);  
Σ = Sum of the calculations 
By using equation (2.5), I transformed H’ to eH’, which is the number of species present if 
all species were equal in abundance. This transformation is an unbiased estimate of 
diversity (Beck & Schwanghart, 2010) that reduces inaccuracies when comparing 
diversity among plots (Jost, 2006). It measures the diversity in units of number of species 
making it relatively easy to interpret. 
 e
H’
= e
H’
 …………………………. (2.5)  
where, e = natural log 
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I calculated the ESW, which normalizes H’ to a value between 0 and 1 (1= evenness) for 
each plot by using equation (2.6): 
ESW = e
H’
/lnS ………………………………………….. (2.6) 
where,        ln = Natural log 
2.2.3 Specification of analytical models  
2.2.3.1 Assessment of forest carbon and biodiversity  
I assessed the current forest and tree characteristics, including AGTSC and biodiversity, 
using descriptive statistics. I disaggregated biodiversity and AGTSC on the basis of 
altitude, slope and canopy, as they are important aspects to account for forest health and 
management decisions (Table 2.2). Looking at the overall altitudinal distribution of 
sample-plots i.e., from 75m to 2775m from mean sea level and the general change in 
vegetation with altitude, I disaggregated altitudes into 6 categories by 500m class. 
Similarly, as the sample plots fall from 0 - 60
0
 slopes, which has implications for forest 
type, structure and composition, I categorized forests into 5 groups of 10
0
 classes. As 
there were few plots > 40
0
, these very steeply-sloped plots are all in one class. For 
canopy, I followed the general practice of using 4 categories. 
Table 2.2 Altitude, slope and canopy cover classes  
Class  Altitude (m) Slope (degree) Canopy (%) 
1 < 500 < 10 0 - < 25% 
2 500 - < 1000 10 - 20 25 - < 50% 
3 1000 - < 1500 20 - 30 50 - < 75% 
4 1500 - < 2000 30 - 40 75 - 100% 
5 2000 - < 2500 > 40  
6 2500 - < 3000   
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I also identified the high AGTSC contributing species and analyzed their share.  
2.2.3.2 Relationships between carbon and species diversity  
I estimated the Pearson correlation between different biodiversity indices (i.e., S, H’, eH’ 
and Esw) to assess the strength of their relationships. I also estimated the Pearson 
correlation between biodiversity indices and AGTSC to assess the direction and strength 
of their relationships. These relationships were analyzed for overall forests and forests 
across altitudes, slopes and canopies. I divided forests into lower (< 1000m) and higher 
(≥ 1000m) altitudes, lower (< 150) and higher (≥ 150) slopes, and open (< 50%) and 
closed (≥ 50%) canopies. I also developed regression models using AGTSC as the 
dependent variable and different biodiversity indices as independent variables controlling 
average tree DBH, average tree height, tree density, forest area, altitude, slope and 
canopy to assess the significance of biodiversity indices (i.e., to estimate the unbiased 
coefficient.) The models were selected on the basis of Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AIC). Finally, I checked diagnostics for each model by looking at residual plots and 
confirmed that the assumptions of the model were not violated. A relatively flat line of 
residual versus fitted values indicated the linearity of residuals. Most of the residuals look 
normal except at the upper end. I calculated Cook’s Distance, which confirmed that no 
observations showed a strong influence in the model and no outliers were detected. A 
relatively flat line of standardized residuals versus fitted values showed a constant 
variance, indicating homoscedasticity (i.e., the variance of residuals does not change as a 
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function of X.) Finally, the values of Variance Inflation Factors for each variable were 
between1.05 – 4.23, indicating a lack of multicollinearity.  
2.3. Results and analyses  
2.3.1 Current status of carbon and biodiversity 
The current status of different forest attributes related to forest location, management, 
disturbances and trees are presented (Table 2.3). A total of 264 (57.4%) plots were in the 
Terai region. The mean time required for two-way travel from the forest to the nearest 
roadhead was shorter than to the district headquarters, indicating easier access to 
transportation than to the management support from district forest offices (DFOs) that are 
usually located at the district headquarters.  
Altogether, 324 species were recorded. The mean plot S, H’, eH’, Esw- were 4.54 ± 0.11, 
3.67 ± 0.09, 0.99 ± 0.02, and 0.32 ± 0.01, respectively. Given the small plot size, S, H’ 
and e
H’ 
seemed to be moderately diverse while Esw was relatively low. The 155 plots 
within the upper quartile of e
H’ 
estimates had five times higher mean e
H’
 (6.89 ± 0.30 Mg 
ha
-1
) compared to the 155 plots within lower quartile of e
H’ 
estimates (1.21 ± 0.08 Mg ha
-
1
), indicating a high degree of variation in biodiversity among plots.   
A total of 98.34 ± 4.19 Mg ha
-1
 AGTSC was recorded. The 155 plots within the upper 
quartile of AGTSC estimates had 18 times higher mean carbon (244.19 ± 16.45 Mg ha
-1
) 
compared to the 155 plots in the lower quartile of the AGTSC estimates (11.09 ± 1.25 
Mg ha
-1
), indicating high AGTSC variation across plots. Those plots had a higher mean 
e
H’
 (4.15 ± 0.37) compared to the plots in the lower quartile of the AGTSC estimates  
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(2.81 ± 0.33), indicating a difference of e
H’
 between plots with higher and lower AGTSC. 
Only 45 plots in the upper quartile of e
H’ 
fell in the upper quartile of AGTSC estimates, 
indicating not all biodiverse forests have higher levels of AGTSC.  
Table 2.3. The status of forest, tree, disturbance, management, AGTSC and species diversity.  
Continuous and ordinal variables are presented as means ± standard errors (95% confidence interval) of the 
mean; dichotomous variables are presented as percentages.  
Variables (units) Overall forest 
(N=620) 
 Variables (units) Overall forest 
(N=620) 
Forests exist in the hill (yes/no) 264 (42.5%)  Tree density (no. ha
-1
) 570.11 ± 18.14 
Forests exist in Terai (yes/no) 356 (57.5%)  Sapling density (no. ha
-1
) 491.73 ± 22.04 
Altitude (m) 
748.20 ± 25.20 
 Regeneration density (no. 
ha
-1
) 
323164 ± 13692 
Slope (degree) 15.40 ± 0.53  Total biomass (Mg ha
-1
)  196.67 ± 8.37 
Forest area (ha) 127.70 ± 27.92  AGTSC (Mg ha
-1
) 98.34 ± 4.19 
Moisture gradient (1-5= low-
high) 
3.38 ± 0.05 
 S 
4.54 ± 0.11 
Forest fire (yes/no) 179 (28.9%)  H’ 0.99 ± 0.02 
Average tree height (m) 11.60 ± 0.22  e
H’
 3.67 ± 0.09 
Average tree DBH (cm) 21.11 ± 0.47  Esw 0.32 ± 0.01 
Canopy cover (%) 49.70 ± 0.93    
 
 
A disaggregated e
H’
 and AGTSC across altitudes, slopes and canopies is given in Figure 
2.2 (a-i). A decreasing trend in mean AGTSC was observed with increasing altitude or 
slope and with a decline in canopy. Standard errors (SE) and percent SE of mean AGTSC 
also increased as the altitude or slope increased albeit in different rates. 
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Figure 2.3 Average e
H’
 and AGTSC with standard error bars. 
Standard bars represent uncertainties at 95% confidence interval for each altitude, slope and canopy classes 
as shown in the x-axes by their corresponding mid-points. 
 
The 95% confidence intervals of the mean e
H’ 
across altitudes and slopes overlap, 
indicating statistical plausibility of having the same mean values of e
H’
. Sizes of SE 
increase with altitudes or slopes, except in the1500-2000m altitude class and in the 20-
30
0
 slope class, indicating increased uncertainty in higher altitudes and slopes. The 95% 
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confidence intervals of e
H’ 
overlap in 25 - < 50%, 50 - < 75% and 75 - 100% canopy 
classes (except 0 - < 25% canopy class), indicating the statistical plausibility of having 
same mean e
H’
.   
I found that 84% of AGTSC is available in 10 (3%) dominant species, indicating a highly 
skewed AGTSC distribution across species (Table 2.4). Each species in Table 2.4 
contributed > 1% of total AGTSC. Shorea robusta, Terminalia tomentosa and Pinus 
roxburghii jointly contributed the most: > 74%, > 80% and > 51% in overall and lower 
and higher altitudes respectively. While Shorea robusta and Terminalia tomentosa are 
major contributors to AGTSC in lower altitudes, Pinus roxburghii, Shorea robusta and 
Schima wallichii contributed the most in higher altitudes.  
Table 2.4 Contribution of AGTSC in different forests by species.  
All the values are given in the percentage.  
SN Species National < 1000m 
altitude 
≥ 1000m 
altitude 
1 Sal (Shorea robusta) 57.01 69.25 16.48 
2 Saj (Terminalia tomentosa) 9.12 11.08 2.65 
3 Jamun (Syzigium cumini) 1.10 1.36 0.24 
4 Sissoo (Dalbergia sissoo) 0.88 1.09 0.19 
5 Bot dhangero (Lagestroemia parviflora)  1.36 1.50 0.90 
6 Pinus roxburghii 8.39 1.19 32.21 
7 Chilaune (Schima wallichii) 3.66 1.55 10.67 
8 Katus (Castanopsis indica) 0.89 0.19 3.22 
9 Gurans (Rhododendrom arboretum) 0.50 0.00 2.14 
10 Utis (Alnus nepalensis) 0.99 0.01 4.22 
 
2.3.2 Relationships between biodiversity and carbon  
The relationships between S, H’, eH’ and Esw were examined by analyzing the Spearman 
correlation coefficients (Table 2.5). Most of these biodiversity indices are strongly, 
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positively correlated with each other. However, the strength of correlation varies. A 
general trend was observed that the Esw is moderately correlated with S and e
H’
.  
Table 2.5 Correlations among different biodiversity indices.  
All correlation coefficients have p-values < 0.001. 
Biodiversity indices S H’ eH’ Esw 
      S 1    
      H’ 0.83 1   
      e
H’
 0.96 0.78 1  
      Esw 0.60 0.87 0.63 1 
 
Spearman correlations between biodiversity and AGTSC were complex and variable. The 
correlations of S, H’ and eH’ with AGTSC were weakly positive or insignificant (Table 
2.6) and the correlations varied in strength across altitudes, slopes, canopies and 
biodiversity indices. For instance, the correlations between AGTSC and S or e
H’
 are 
significant at all categories of forests. Such correlations at open canopy forests are 
relatively higher followed by lower altitude, higher slope, overall forest, lower slope, 
higher altitude and closed canopy.  correlations are insignificant at higher altitudes. The 
correlations between AGTSC and H’ are relatively lower than the correlations between 
AGTSC and S or  e
H’
, being insignificant in case of higher altitude and open and closed 
canopies. Similarly, AGTSC is insignificantly correlated with Esw.   
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Table 2.6 Correlations of AGTSC with different biodiversity indices.  
P-values of coefficients are given in the parentheses. Bolded correlation coefficients are significant at a 
0.05 level of significance. The sign “-” denotes an inverse relationship. 
Forest type S H’ e
H’
 Esw 
Overall forest 0.22 (0.000) 0.10 (0.009) 0.26 (0.000) - 0.03 (0.447) 
Lower altitude (<1000m) 0.26 (0.000) 0.11 (0.028) 0.29 (0.000) - 0.03 (0.598) 
Higher altitude (≥1000m) 0.18 (0.011) 0.13 (0.057) 0.20 (0.005) - 0.01 (0.884) 
Lower slope (<15 degree) 0.21 (0.000) 0.10 (0.089) 0.26 (0.000) - 0.01 (0.852) 
Higher slope (≥15 degree) 0.26 (0.000) 0.15 (0.006) 0.28 (0.000) - 0.02 (0.659) 
Closed canopy (≥50%) 0.13 (0.018) 0.03 (0.584) 0.18 (0.001) - 0.06 (0.289) 
Open canopy (<50%) 0.30 (0.000) 0.15 (0.013) 0.33 (0.000)   0.02 (0.777) 
 
The regression models using AGTSC as a dependent variable and S, H’, eH’ and Esw as 
independent variables controlling average tree DBH, average tree height, tree density, 
forest area, altitude, slope and canopy depicted the significance of such indices. S has 
positive, unbiased, significant coefficients in the overall forest (6.76) and e
H’
 has positive, 
unbiased, significant coefficients in lower altitudes (9.49), lower slopes (9.55) and closed 
canopies (9.50) (Table 2.7). Esw has negative, unbiased, significant coefficients in overall 
forest (-58.30) and forests in lower altitudes (-49.81), lower slopes (-54.48) and higher 
slopes (-264.64). No biodiversity indices were significant in explaining AGTSC in high 
altitudes and open canopies, indicating no relationship existed. The H’, slope and canopy 
cover were not significant in explaining variations in AGTSC in overall forest and forests 
across altitudes, slopes and canopies.   
  
   
  
5
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Table 2.7 Regression models.  
I used the AGTSC as dependent variable. I presented standard errors in the parentheses along with coefficients. Only significant coefficients are reported. 
All models have p-value < 0.001.  
Model 
attributes  
Overall forest Lower altitude           
( < 1000 m) 
Higher altitude         
( > 1000 m) 
Lower slope      
( < 15 degree) 
Higher slope     ( 
≥ 15 degree) 
Closed canopy          
( ≥ 50%) 
Open canopy      
( < 50%) 
Intercept  -79.03***  
(11.38) 
-93.45***  
(14.31)   
-92.19*** 
(13.75) 
-86.55*** 
(17.39) 
-49.94*** (12.74) -191.6***       
(17.94) 
-43.80*** 
(12.80) 
S 6.76*** (1.59) …. …. …. …. …. …. 
H’ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 
e
H’
 …. 9.49*** (2.41) …. 9.55** (3.01) …. 9.50*** (1.87) …. 
Esw -58.30**(21.52) -49.81
.
 (25.69)  …. -54.48 . (29.91)  -264.64***(45.14) …. …. 
Average DBH 3.15*** (0.43) 2.52***  (0.58) 4.57*** (0.68) 2.24** (0.68) 4.48***  (0.65) 5.00*** (0.56) 1.56* (0.61) 
Average height 4.93*** (0.91) 6.43***  (1.30) 2.96**   (1.13) 6.12*** (1.53) 4.48*** (1.21) 7.81*** (1.21) 4.66**(1.30) 
Tree density 0.06*** (0.01) 0.06***  (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.02) …. 0.09*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 
Forest area 0.11*** (0.02) 0.11***   (0.02) …. 0.12*** (0.02) …. 0.07*** (0.02) 0.14*** (0.03) 
Altitude  -0.01* (0.005) …. …. …. …. -0.02** (0.01) -0.01. (0.008)  
Slope  …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 
Canopy cover …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 
Degree of 
freedom  
612 406 203 270 338 337 270 
Adjusted R
2
  0.4780 0.4784 0.4223 0.4682  0.3722 0.5772 0.4381 
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: “***”= 0.001; “**”= 0.01, “*”= 0.05 and “.”= 0.1 level of significance.  
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2.4 Discussion  
2.4.1 Assessment of carbon and biodiversity 
The AGTSC estimate is comparable with Nepal’s recent field-based regional studies 
(e.g., Baral et al., 2009; Gurung et al., 2015; Pandey et al., 2014) and a secondary data-
based national study (Oli & Shrestha, 2009). As expected, the AGTSC is higher than the 
IPCC default value of biome average (90 Mg ha
-1
) and some studies of similar Indian 
forests  (e.g., Chaturvedi et al., 2011; Haripriya, 2000). On the contrary, the AGTSC is 
markedly less than the secondary data-based estimates of Asian moist forests (e.g., 264 
Mg ha
-1
) (Houghton, 2005). 
Differential AGTSC estimates across altitudes, slopes and canopy covers reflect the 
variation in site quality, climatic factors, topographic conditions, and past disturbances. 
As altitude and slope increases, soil erosion increases, retarding tree growth rate; average 
temperature drops for longer periods resulting in a shorter growing season; and incidence 
of past disturbances such as forest fire and loss of forest cover (Eckholm, 1975) lowered 
the base AGTSC. The increased AGTSC as the canopy cover increases is a reflection of 
forest productivity where both vertical and horizontal spaces of forest are better utilized.  
The variations in the plot level AGTSC indicate the potential to increase carbon storage 
in Nepal’s forest through appropriate management interventions. This indication is 
supported also by Thapa-Magar and Shrestha (2015), who demonstrated that the forest 
carbon stock in mid-hill Shorea robusta forest proportionally increased with management 
duration at the rate of 2.6 Mg ha
-1
yr
-1
 and by Pandey et al. (2014), who report that forest 
carbon stock positively changed by 25% from 2010 to 2012 in 104 CF. Well-managed 
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forests provide better site, space and nutrients for remaining trees and saplings for their 
enhanced growth that compensates for the removed biomass (Lung & Espira, 2015; 
Taylor et al., 2008). 
Plot level variations of biodiversity estimates across altitude, slope and canopy cover 
indicate the existence of a wide range of variables simultaneously affecting the 
distribution of biodiversity. Higher variances on e
H’ 
in higher altitudes and higher slopes 
may be due to greater uncertainties and more variation in local factors (e.g., microclimate 
or diverse edaphic conditions.) The lower level of variation across altitudes does not 
follow an earlier study that indicated species diversity in natural growth varied with 
altitude, with higher diversity in lower altitudes compared to higher altitude forests 
(Swamy et al., 2000). Increased mean e
H’
 with increases in canopy cover reflects the 
existence of multi-layer canopies and better utilization of vertical and horizontal spaces in 
the forest. The higher percentage of variance in e
H’
 in the open canopy is due to the 
higher level of anthropogenic disturbances and the availability of gaps in the forest floor, 
which provide space for more species to regenerate (Sapkota et al., 2009). 
A highly skewed AGTSC, with most carbon in a few species, lowered the influence of 
biodiversity on AGTSC. In the case of carbon forestry, forest management could apply 
silvicultural activities in such a way that keep only high carbon-yielding species, putting 
other ecologically important species at risk. Such a forest management approach may 
result in a less resilient ecosystem and reduce livelihood and economic opportunities for 
forest-managing communities. Forest-managing communities prefer economically viable 
species at the expense of other species (e.g., Acharya, 2004; Harrison & Paoli, 2012; 
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Venter et al., 2009) that provide a conducive environment by facilitating nutrient cycling 
and conserving moisture for economically viable or high carbon sequestrating species. 
Eventually, many species could be disturbed through either ecological processes or 
management interventions, and the forest or particular species could be threatened.  
2.4.2 Relationships between carbon and biodiversity 
The biodiversity indices have shown varied relationships with AGTSC. For instance, the 
S and e
H’
 showed a clear positive but weak relationship with AGTSC in overall forest and 
forests in lower altitudes, lower and higher slopes, and closed and open canopies based 
on correlation and/or regression coefficients. This finding resembles earlier studies 
showing weak positive correlations between biodiversity and carbon (e.g., Nadrowski et 
al., 2010; Potvin et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2009). This finding also indicates the 
possibility of dominant interspecific complementarity rather than interspecific 
competitive exclusions in such forests. A clear positive relationship of S and e
H’
 with 
AGTSC indicates the possibility of increasing the carbon stock by maintaining or 
increasing the number and abundance of species.  
Esw showed an insignificant correlation with all categories of forests. However, clear 
significant negative regression coefficients of Esw with AGTSC in overall forest and 
forests in lower altitudes and lower and higher slopes indicate the increased evenness of 
species could imply decrease in the carbon in these forests. However, no relationship 
between Esw and AGTSC in higher altitudes and closed and open canopy forests indicate 
the possibility of no impact of evenness of species on carbon forestry.  
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These variations in the relationships between different indices of biodiversity and carbon 
in forests across altitudes, slopes and canopies reflect the existence of a complex network 
of interactions between wide ranges of co-varying abiotic and biotic environmental 
factors. Such factors affect different dimensions of biodiversity and AGTSC. For 
instance, soil quality, drainage and topography strongly influence the relationships 
between biodiversity and carbon (Healy et al., 2008).  
2.4.3 Relevance of findings in global environmental initiatives and future research 
The possibility to increase carbon storage reveals a forest’s potential to contribute to 
emerging global environmental initiatives that aim to mitigate climate change such as 
REDD+. This potential can best be harnessed using field-based methods of carbon 
measurement, which may estimate higher carbon than the IPCC default value and thereby 
better incentivize communities that engage in forest management.    
The skewness of carbon towards a few species indicates a critical need for an effective 
biodiversity safeguard approach in carbon forestry. The positive relationships between 
AGTSC and biodiversity, particularly S and e
H’
 in overall forest and forests in lower 
altitudes, lower slopes and closed canopies, indicate the possibility of synergy between 
biodiversity conservation and carbon forestry. These indicate the relevance of number 
and abundance of species to climate change policies. In light of the studies by Gibson et 
al. (2011) and SCBD (2009) that show that the conservation of primary and mature 
forests maintains higher levels of AGTSC and biodiversity simultaneously, my findings 
indicate that bringing more natural and mature forests under a REDD+ regime may 
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contribute to both biodiversity conservation and carbon storage in overall forest and 
forests in lower altitudes, lower slopes and closed canopies.  
Insignificant correlations of S and e
H’
 with AGTSC in higher altitude forests indicate the 
lack of synergy between biodiversity conservation and carbon forestry. This finding 
warrants that carbon forestry neglecting biodiversity conservation may lead to neither 
tradeoff nor synergy with the number and abundance of species. The negative and/or 
neutral associations of Esw with AGTSC clearly indicate the need to target both 
biodiversity and carbon in forest management for their conservation and storage, 
respectively.   
These findings clearly indicate that policy makers, planners and managers may need to 
clarify which of their interests in biodiversity (i.e., components of biodiversity such as 
species richness, abundance or evenness) are of prime importance. If the interest is 
species richness and abundance, carbon forestry may not be a challenge but of minimal 
support. However, if species evenness is also a target of biodiversity conservation, then 
carbon forestry may need to accommodate the interest of biodiversity evenness 
exclusively. In such a case, efficient tradeoffs between biodiversity conservation and 
carbon sequestration could be the better target for future forest management, which can 
partly be achieved by incorporating both carbon and biodiversity in a spatial planning 
process (Thomas et al., 2013). Strassburg et al. (2009) also indicate that additional gains 
in biodiversity conservation are possible, without compromising the effectiveness of 
carbon sequestration, if carbon forestry takes biodiversity distribution into account. 
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The high variabilities of biodiversity, AGTSC and their relationships warrant further in-
depth studies to understand their dynamics (e.g., Day et al., 2013; Thompson et al., 
2012). There is a need to analyze the changes in biodiversity and carbon over time at 
different scales and management regimes to gain better knowledge about biodiversity and 
carbon dynamics. Novel biodiversity indices such as functional and evolutionary 
diversities may help refine understanding of relationships between biodiversity and 
AGTSC. Studies on adaptive capacity of forest and impacts of management modalities on 
species composition, forest structure and growth are also crucial in enhancing 
understanding of biodiversity and carbon relationships.   
The AGTSC and biodiversity estimates are conservative as I used only the trees and 
saplings that were ≥ 5cm DBH for AGTSC and only tree and shrub species for 
biodiversity. These estimates of carbon may need to be revised for the purpose of 
incentivizing forest-managing communities under REDD+. However, because these 
underestimations are expected to impact all plots in equal proportion, the analysis of the 
relationship between AGTSC and biodiversity is consistently affected. Estimates of both 
biodiversity indices and AGTSC captured the uncertainties derived from plot variation. 
Within-plot variation, errors associated with the allometric equations, and uncertainties 
arising from sampling design and inferences to large landscapes might have influenced 
estimates.   
2.5 Conclusion  
In the context of mounting concerns about sustainable environmental health, my 
assessments of forest biodiversity, carbon and their relationships bring critical insights for 
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researchers, policy makers and practitioners at global, national and local levels. Nepal’s 
forests have potential for carbon storage and biodiversity conservation, and REDD+ is 
critical for fighting climate change and promoting biodiversity as envisioned by the 
UNFCCC and CBD, respectively. As carbon and biodiversity fluctuate across altitude, 
slope and canopy cover, they are critical factors for planning and implementing forestry 
projects. The comparable carbon with other local and regional field studies and the higher 
carbon than the IPCC biome average demonstrate possibilities of greater incentives for 
forest-managing communities through carbon forestry if field-based methods are used for 
carbon measurement.  
As the dynamics of biodiversity, carbon and their relationships are complex, calculating 
accurate and fully reliable estimates are challenging when using one-time cross-sectional 
data. However, my study indicates the possibility of weak synergies between carbon-
forestry and biodiversity conservation in Nepal’s forests, although there could be neutral 
relations and/or tradeoffs in some cases. These possibilities indicate that policy makers 
and forest managers need to adapt their forest management decisions in light of local 
environmental factors to make the REDD+ and CBD effective. Particularly, planning and 
implementation of REDD+ need especial attention in the provisioning and 
implementation of effective biodiversity safeguards. Dedicated policy and institutional 
arrangements, careful and site-specific planning of silvicultural activities, and proper 
implementation and periodic monitoring of forestry projects are required to ensure 
synergy between carbon and biodiversity outcomes and thereby promote climate 
mitigation, biodiversity conservation and other ecosystem services in the long run. A 
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national forest inventory system may need to be established to periodically collect 
required information that helps promote future studies and planning.   
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Chapter 3: An Assessment of Causal Effects of Nepal’s Community Forestry 
Program on Biodiversity Conservation and Carbon Storage  
3.1 Introduction 
Over a billion local people control ~15.5% of global forests and the trend of community 
control is increasing (Rights and Resource Initiative [RRI], 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008). 
Most of such local control of forests is in tropical, developing countries. Tropical forests 
host 34 global biodiversity hot spots, constitute 40% of terrestrial biomass carbon and 
emit 17% of global anthropogenic emissions (Mittermeier et al., 2004; Pan et al., 2011), 
and therefore the role of local communities in proper management of tropical forests for 
biodiversity conservation and carbon storage is imperative. By recognizing the role of 
local communities, governments in most tropical countries have been transferring various 
forest rights (e.g., access, use, management, alienation, governance, and due process and 
compensation) to the local communities through decentralization policy reforms over the 
last 40 years (Charnley & Poe, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008). These governments and 
other forestry actors expect that this decentralized forestry has a positive impact on forest 
health and communities’ livelihood.  
Considering these facts, global environmental initiatives of biodiversity conservation and 
carbon storage such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, Conservation and enhancement of 
forest carbon and sustainable management of forest in developing countries (REDD+) 
recognized the community-controlled forest as a vehicle for effective forest management. 
The National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans, which the Parties need to prepare 
to fulfill the commitment of CBD, recognize the inevitable role of local communities in 
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conservation. For instance, Nepalese biodiversity strategies recognize the need for full 
and effective participation, knowledge and innovations, and cooperation and 
collaboration of indigenous and local communities in the management of biodiversity 
(Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation [MoFSC], 2014). REDD+ initiatives also 
prioritize the need for indigenous and local communities’ full and effective participation 
in managing local forests through the provisioning of safeguards. Free, prior and 
informed consent of local communities are imperative for the effective implementation of 
REDD+.  
One popular form of decentralized community-controlled forest management, the 
community forestry program (CFP), legally provides opportunities to local communities 
for the management and use of forest resources to support local livelihood, environment 
and economy (Brown et al., 2002; Nurse & Malla, 2006). It is recognized as a major 
accomplishment in natural resource management and credited with successfully curbing 
deforestation and protecting forests while supporting local livelihoods (Agrawal & 
Ostrom, 2008; Gautam et al., 2002; Pokharel et al., 2007). However, naive 
implementation of CFP does not guarantee biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration, as past studies show potential for both synergy and tradeoffs in achieving 
these two outcomes depending on contexts and management interventions. For instance, 
Nepal’s CFP revitalized the degraded forests in the hills (Chapagain & Banjade, 2009; 
Gautam et al., 2002), which might have led to increased biodiversity conservation and 
carbon sequestration, However, communities’ use of biomass might have decreased 
biodiversity and carbon (Shrestha et al., 2010). By taking the case of two community 
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forests in Nepal, Acharya (2004) found that communities often carry out species-
preferred silvicultural practices leading to reduction in plant species diversity. By 
conducting a study of 11 community forest user groups for three years, Yadav et al. 
(2003) argued that communities manage the forest “passively” i.e., prioritizing 
conservation rather than carrying out appropriate silvicultural practices to increase the 
productivity of forests. Bhattarai (2006) indicated that Nepal’s Forest Policy 2000 
discriminated in the implementation of CFP between the hill and plain-land, (i.e., Terai), 
discouraging Terai communities in managing forests sustainably. In contrast to these 
studies, by taking cases of landscape-level community forests, Pandey (2015) and Thapa-
Magar and Shrestha (2015) recently collected the carbon data and demonstrated the 
evidence that Nepal’s CFP has potential to increase carbon sequestration over time.    
Increasing and/or maintaining credibility, legitimacy and acceptability of CFP 
necessitates rigorous empirical evaluations of its impacts. Evaluations of CFP in 
biodiversity conservation and carbon storage are now particularly important to 
empirically examine the contribution of the CFP in the CBD and REDD+. So far, despite 
small-scale, localized studies showing positive impacts of CFP on communities’ 
livelihoods and revitalization of degraded forests (e.g., Luintel et al., 2009; Pokharel et 
al., 2007), there are not adequate empirical studies at larger scales evaluating its 
environmental impacts, particularly on biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). This knowledge gap prevents stakeholders 
from predicting the effectiveness of the program and therefore limits the possibility of 
innovative, productive management of forests that help address the new, global 
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environmental concerns of biodiversity loss and carbon emissions. Beyene et al. (2013) 
indicated the need for empirical studies with better and smarter data (e.g., more variables 
and observations at multiple points of time) combined with robust analytical techniques 
to conclusively evaluate linkages of CFP with biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration. It is critical to analyze empirical evidence of CFP effects in biodiversity 
conservation and carbon sequestration in order to inform future research, policies and 
management.  
Nepal has a long history of CFP that offers a unique, suitable ground to carry out research 
about the effects of CFP in biodiversity conservation and carbon storage (Agrawal & 
Ostrom, 2008; Pokharel et al., 2007). Specifically, I addressed the following research 
questions: 1. Did the CFP increase plant species diversity? and 2. Did the CFP enhance 
carbon storage in community forests? To answer these questions, I used cross-sectional 
data collected in the year 2013 from nationally representative random samples of 
community forest (CF) and corresponding non-CF (NCF) and followed rigorous 
analytical processes. One challenge in evaluating CFP was to derive an appropriate 
counterfactual condition such as: What would have happened in the absence of the 
program? As the CFP areas were seldom distributed randomly across the country, 
overcoming potential selection bias was critical. I addressed this problem by use of a 
quasi-experimental, matching method. I identified confounding variables (“confounders”) 
affecting the assignment of forest into the CFP and controlled those confounders through 
a matching process, which is a trusted and satisfactory technique that helps mimic 
randomized experiments (Hansen, 2004). The matching method helped develop a 
   
66 
 
counterfactual control group allowing me to use existing data from NCF and providing 
information on what would have happened to biodiversity conservation and carbon 
storage in the absence of CFP (Pattanayak, 2009).  
By using only matched samples, I estimated the average treatment effect on treated 
(ATT) i.e., the average effect of CFP on biodiversity (ATTb) and average effect of CFP 
on carbon (ATTc). As national-level estimates may mask a great deal of variation in the 
effectiveness of CFP across the country, I estimated ATTb and ATTc across geographic, 
topographic and geo-political regions and forest qualities. The identification of CFP 
effects across regions and forest qualities provides critical and specific information to 
policy makers, planners, managers and researchers to design their future courses of action 
so as to balance the local cost of CFP with local and global benefits. I also explored 
whether, where, and to what extent the ATTb and ATTc persist by testing their sensitivity 
to bias as driven by unobserved covariates. 
This research makes several contributions in the context of the acute shortage of 
empirical knowledge regarding the effects of CFP on biodiversity conservation and 
carbon sequestration. By providing the first rigorous evidence, it adds to the scarce 
literature to broaden and deepen scientific understanding of the effects of CFP (e.g., 
Bluffstone et al., 2015; Chapagain & Banjade, 2009; Gautam et al., 2002). It may inform 
researchers, policy makers and practitioners for future research design, policy 
formulation and action-plan preparation in Nepal and beyond, which are particularly 
important as many tropical countries have already decided, and are now preparing, to 
adopt carbon-focused forestry (e.g., REDD+). In such forestry practices, biodiversity 
   
67 
 
conservation has also been one of the critical objectives, as depicted in the safeguard 
provisions, which is in line with the provisions made in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). My research found heterogeneous effects of CFP across regions and 
forest qualities in carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. These results 
provide critical information to governments to design targeted, appropriate plans across 
regions and forest qualities and improve CFP outcomes.  
3.2 Context of the community forestry program in Nepal  
Nepal covers a total of 147,148 square kilometers and is broadly divided into three 
geographic regions: the high Himalaya (16%) to the north, the middle hills (68%), and 
the Terai (plain lands; 17%) to the south. The altitudinal range varies from 73-4,848m 
from the mean sea level, providing an opportunity for diverse geo-climatic zones from 
tropical to alpine regions. Legally, 39.6% (5.8 million ha) of land in Nepal is forested 
(Department of Forest Research and Survey [DFRS], 1999). While Nepal occupies 0.1% 
of the Earth’s land, it harbors >3% and >1% of the world’s known flora and fauna, 
respectively (MoFSC, 2014). It hosts about 118 ecosystems and 35 forest types (Stainton, 
1972). More than two-thirds of the population live in rural areas and have subsistence 
agricultural economies where forest constitutes an integral part of their livelihoods. More 
than three-fourths of energy in the country is supplied from the forest, which contributes 
to one of the major sources of emissions in Nepal.  
The Nepalese government nationalized all the Nepalese forests, particularly those 
distributed to elites by earlier governments, through the enactment of the Private Forest 
Nationalization Act 1957, to control environmental degradation and increase national 
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revenue. The state’s monopoly on national forests was further reinforced by necessary 
legal and institutional arrangements. However, the government was not able to slow 
deforestation and forest degradation, and most of the forest remained as open access 
commons where a phenomenon known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’5 (Hardin, 1968) 
appeared. Consequently, conservationists, scientists, and administrators expressed 
growing alarm about the rapid deterioration of the Himalayan environment in the late 
1960s and 70s (e.g., Eckhholm, 1975). Gradually, local communities became interested 
in the protection and management of local forests so as to sustain their subsistence forest 
product needs (Gilmour & Fisher, 1991), and the Nepalese government and international 
environmental organizations, where possible, started providing support to local 
communities for the protection and management of forests.   
Nepal was an early leader in initiating CFP as an innovative program involving local 
communities in forest management (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001). Building on local 
communities’ traditional practices of forest management, the Nepalese government 
started experimenting with CFP in the mid-1970s and fully developed and implemented a 
concrete program in the early 1990s. The formal CFP has been one of the most 
prioritized, popular and extensive forestry programs in Nepal to revitalize the degraded 
forests in the hills and fulfill the demand of subsistence forest products in the rural areas. 
Thus far, local communities have been managing forests for timber, fuelwood, non-
timber forest products, medicine and soil conservation. Yadav et al. (2003) reported that 
                                                          
5
 Tragedy of the commons represent a deteriorating situation of a shared-resource system, where individual 
users act independently and rationally to maximize their own benefits without considering the sustainability 
of the resource. 
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the CF in Nepal are primarily managed “passively” i.e., focusing on the protection and 
conservation of forests and restricting the harvest of forest products. Bhattarai (2001) 
reported the existence of different innovative practices of forest protection at the 
community level (e.g., fencing, fines, rotational patrolling, and cash and/or in-kind 
contributions), which are intended primarily to strengthen collective action and reduce 
deviant behavior of members.   
Nepal’s CFP provides unique, complex and dynamic environments that both create 
opportunities and pose challenges for biodiversity conservation and carbon storage by 
directly engaging ~12 million (~40%) of the population in the management and 
consumptive uses of ~1.8 million ha (~one-third) of forests (Department of Forest [DoF], 
2015). The CFP legally recognized local forest-managing communities, community 
forest user groups (CFUG), as an autonomous public body having perpetual succession 
for forest management that can acquire, possess, transfer or manage property (Ministry of 
Law and Justice [MoLJ], 1993). The CFUG is entitled to own, access, manage, use and 
sell (including setting pricing) all the resources of CF (except wildlife and minerals) as 
per the self-prepared and DFO-approved forest management plan. Such legal institutional 
arrangements made CFP an indispensable strategy for any international environmental 
initiatives that need local forest management such as CBD and REDD+.   
The Nepalese government prioritized the hill region of the country for the CFP due to 
communities’ dependence on and willingness to protect forests; existence of traditional 
management practices; inability of government forestry staff to protect and manage 
forests; deteriorating forest conditions; little value for commercial use and public 
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revenues; and financial and technical support of international development communities 
(Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; World Bank, 2001). The government has maintained its control 
and has been reluctant to hand over forests to communities in the Terai due to high 
commercial value and revenue potential of forests in the region (Bhattarai, 2006; Gilmour 
& Fisher, 1991). Rather, the government delineated, gazetted and managed the large 
contiguous forests in the Terai as national forests (MoFSC, 2000). The focus of the 
government in Terai forest management was on timber production from the often 
dominant natural Shorea robusta forest (Banjade et al., 2011). The illegal logging and 
cross-border smuggling of Shorea robusta timber has long been an informal source of 
income for forest bureaucracy (Paudel et al., 2006). Only small to medium sized, barren 
forests in the vicinity of the settlement were handed over to communities in the Terai.  
3.3 Research site, design and analytical model  
The data presented are part of an on-going multi-disciplinary research project funded by 
the World Bank and jointly implemented by Portland State University and ForestAction 
Nepal (Bluffstone et al., 2015). The primary aim of the project is to assess potential 
synergies and/or tradeoffs between Nepalese forest commons and REDD+.  
3.3.1 Sampling methods and research sites 
A pilot survey was conducted in 2012 to estimate the required number of sample plots. I 
selected 45 sample plots from nine community forests (CFs) across physiographic 
regions to capture the greatest possible heterogeneity in plot basal area, a proxy of forest 
biomass. I deployed a field team to measure the diameter at breast height (DBH) of trees 
and saplings and estimated the basal area for each plot. Considering variance of basal 
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area, I calculated the number of required sample plots for 10% error and 95% confidence 
level using the standard formula (3.1) (Saxena & Singh, 1987).   
N = Cv
2
t
2
/E
2…………………………….(3.1)  
Where,  
N = Required number of sample plots; 
Cv = Coefficient of variation, s/µ (s = standard deviation and µ= sample mean); 
E = Standard error, s/√n (n = sample number); 
t = Value of student-t distribution for (n-1) degree of freedom and 95% 
confidence level. 
A total of 325 plots were estimated to be required for sampling in the CFs. Sample plots 
were distributed among the 65 CFs, which were selected from the random samples 
chosen for a national CF impact study conducted by the Nepalese government during 
2010 - 2012. ForestAction Nepal recruited a team of 25 Nepalese field researchers with 
whom I closely worked to collect the data. Each of the field researchers had 
undergraduate degrees in forestry (12) and graduate degrees in social science (13), and 
ForestAction Nepal trained them to conduct forest surveys, forest inventories and 
household surveys  
As the size of CF varies, we allocated between 3-7 sample plots in each forest based on 
the quintile distribution of forest size. As the forest size in the hill and Terai markedly 
differ, we considered different quintile ranges for hill and Terai (Table 3.1).  
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Table 3.1 Distribution of sample plots in community forests. 
Quintile     
distribution 
Forest size (ha) Sample 
plots/forest 
Number 
of forests 
No. of 
plots Hill Terai 
1
st
 quintile <18 <113 3 13 39 
2
nd
 quintile 18-64 113-154 4 13 52 
3
rd
 quintile 64-91 154-335 5 13 65 
4
th
 quintile 91-183 335-526 6 13 78 
5
th
 quintile ≥183 ≥526 7 13 91 
 
The field team selected 65 non-CFs in such a way that they were similar to the CFs in a 
variety of characteristics. Such plots were close but not next to CFs to avoid being used 
simultaneously by the same people. The field team carried out forest boundary surveys 
using Geographic Positioning System (GPS), prepared forest maps on graph paper and 
estimated forest area. The maps of CF that were in the forest operational plan were also 
copied on the graph paper so as to divide areas into smaller grid cells. To identify the 
sample plot, the cells were selected randomly, and X and Y coordinates of the center of 
selected cells were identified. The coordinates were then fed into a GPS unit to locate the 
plots in the forests. Due to differences in non-CF size, it was possible to allocate 295 
plots following forest size criteria and standards given in Table 3.1. The distribution of 
sample plots is given in Figure 3.1. 
    
 
 
7
3 
 
Figure 3.1 Distribution of sample plots 
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A circular plot with a radius of 8.92m was selected for collecting environmental data and 
measuring trees (> 5cm diameter at breast height [DBH]), which is suitable for moderate 
to dense vegetation and used widely (MacDicken, 1997).  Using same center, second and 
third plots with radiuses of 5.64m and 1m were established to measure saplings (1-5cm 
DBH) and count seedlings, respectively (Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2 Size and shape of sample plot 
 
The team measured height and circumference of each tree and sapling by using 
clinometer and linear tape, respectively. Vernacular name of each species were recorded 
and the data on canopy, slope, altitude, aspect, soil color, soil depth, fire occurrence, 
forest encroachment, forest product collection, soil erosion and grazing were collected for 
each plot. Data on forest area and management regime, number of households using the 
forest and distances of forest from the nearest roads and district headquarters were also 
collected. Data was collected from February to May 2013. Some data such as households 
in the CF user group was used from the CF impact study conducted by the Nepalese 
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government in 2010 for which I trained field enumerators and conducted preliminary data 
analysis.   
Sample plots were distributed in the tropical, sub-tropical and temperate climatic zones of 
42 (out of 75) districts across the country. The majority of studied CFs (63%) are in the 
hills. This reflects the higher number and area of CFs in the hills i.e., ~ 87% CFs 
covering ~ 80% CF area are in the hills (DoF, 2015). A range of different types of natural 
as well as plantation forests, ranging from approximately 80m to 2800m altitude (average 
748.20 ± 25.20m) from the mean sea level and 0 - 60 degree slope (average 15.40 ± 0.53 
degree) were sampled. The mean time required traveling to and from the forest to the 
nearest road-head (i.e., less than half day) is shorter than traveling to the district-
headquarters (i.e., more than half-day), indicating easier access to transportation than to 
the management support from district forest offices (DFOs) that are usually located at the 
district head-quarters. 
The average moisture gradient, reflected primarily by aspect, is modest. While the 
average size of overall forest is 127.70 ± 27.92 ha, average size of forest per household is 
0.82±0.30 ha. More detailed statistics are given in Table 3.2.   
Table 3.2 The status of forest, tree, disturbance and management of sampled forests.  
Continuous and ordinal variables are presented as means ± standard errors of the mean; dichotomous 
variables are presented as N (%). Mann-Whitney test for continuous variables and proportion test for 
dichotomous variables were carried out to test the difference between CF and NCF. Bolded p-values 
(p<0.05) indicate significant differences between CF and NCF. 
Variables and their measurement units Overall forest 
(N=620) 
CF 
(N=325) 
NCF 
(n=295) 
P-
values 
Forest location and area     
Forests exist in the hills (yes/no) 264 (42.5%) 205 (33.1%) 59 (9.6%) <0.001 
Forests exist in Terai (yes/no) 356 (57.5%) 120 (19.4%) 236 (38.1%) 0.004 
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Variables and their measurement units Overall forest 
(N=620) 
CF 
(N=325) 
NCF 
(n=295) 
P-
values 
Time required for 2-way travel to and 
from road  (1-3 = <2 hours to a day) 
 
1.41±0.03 
 
1.48±0.05 1.33±0.04 
 
0.058 
Time required for 2-way travel to and 
from district headquarters (1-3 = <2 hours 
to full day) 
 
2.45±0.05 
 
2.59±0.07 
2.28±0.06 
 
0.002 
Altitude (m) 748.20±25.20 981.67±33.77 485.13±31.69 <0.001 
Slope (degree) 15.40±0.53 20.37±0.68 9.87±0.71 <0.001 
Forest area (ha) 127.70±27.92 148.96±44.17 106.44±33.71 <0.001 
Per household forest area (ha) 0.82±0.30 0.90±0.27 0. 47±0.32 <0.001 
Moisture gradient (1-5 = low-high based 
on aspect) 
3.38±0.05 3.14±0.07 
3.65±0.07 
<0.001 
Forest disturbances     
Presence of forest fire (yes/no) 179 (28.9%) 75 (23.1%) 104 (35.3%) 0.058 
Presence of fodder collection (yes/no) 379 (61.1%) 165 (50.8%) 214 (72.5%) 0.002 
Presence of grazing (yes/no) 309 (49.8%) 126 (38.8%) 183 (62.0%) 0.001 
Presence of fuelwood harvesting (yes/no) 430 (69.4%) 208 (64.0%) 222 (75.3%) 0.082 
Presence of timber harvesting (yes/no) 266 (42.9%) 135 (41.5%) 131 (44.4%) 0.679 
Presence of encroachment (yes/no) 40 (6.5%) 19 (5.8%) 21 (7.1%) 0.708 
Presence of soil erosion (yes/no) 158 (25.5%) 78 (24.0%) 80 (27.1%) 0.615 
Presence of wildlife herbivory (yes/no) 408 (65.8%) 210 (64.6%) 198 (67.1%) 0.709 
Forest management      
Years of forest user group formation (no.) 11.2±0.20 10.10±0.26 12.43±0.28 <0.001 
Households of forest users (no.) 295.82±101.09 295.80±182.70 295.85±88.44 0.496 
Existence of forest operational plan 
(yes/no) 
388 (62.6%) 325 (100.0%) 
63 (21.4%) 
<0.001 
Existence of forest management rules 
(yes/no) 
516 (83.2%) 325 (100.0%) 
192 (65.1%) 
<0.001 
Existence of community protection of 
forest (yes/no) 
 
549 (88.5%) 
 
325 (100.0%) 224 (75.9%) 
 
<0.001 
Existence of provisions of penalties for 
culprits (yes/no) 
 
542 (87.4%) 
 
325 (100.0%) 217 (73.6%) 
 
<0.001 
Tree attributes     
Average tree height (m) 11.60±0.22 11.17±0.29 12.13±0.34 0.047 
Average tree DBH (cm) 21.11±0.47 19.62±0.57 22.84±0.77 0.009 
Forest attributes     
Canopy cover (%) 49.70±0.93 48.66±1.21 51.09±1.43 0.105 
Tree density (no. ha
-1
) 570.11±18.14 629.17±27.75 503.46±22.40 0.002 
Sapling density (no. ha
-1
) 491.73±22.04 512.92±35.67 471.19±25.07 0.640 
Regeneration density (no. ha
-1
) 32316.84± 
1369.32 
29661.93± 
1965.02 
35420.49± 
1896.97 
 
<0.001 
Presence of Shorea robusta (yes/no) 350 (56.5%) 145 (44.6%) 205 (69.5%) <0.001 
Broadleaved-conifer forest gradient                       
(1= broadleaved, 2= mixed, 3= conifer) 
 
1.39±0.02 
 
1.53±0.03 1.22±0.03 
 
<0.001 
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Variables and their measurement units Overall forest 
(N=620) 
CF 
(N=325) 
NCF 
(n=295) 
P-
values 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index-
NDVI
1
, 1989 (0=bare, 1=green) 
0.2942±0.0022 0.2945±0.0030 
0.2938± 
0.0032 
0.388 
Proportion of households living in the 
village for at least 2 generations  
 
0.748±0.011 
 
0.821±0.014 0.668±0.017 
 
<0.001 
Proportion of ethnic population 0.416±0.012 0.437±0.019 0.394±0.015 0.107 
Proportion of poor population  0.376±0.009 0.372±0.012 0.382±0.014 0.600 
1
NDVI is a widely used and important tool that measures "greenness" of vegetative cover based on 
remotely sensed data. It is directly related to energy (visible light in the red band) absorption by plant 
canopies (chlorophyll) for use in photosynthesis, which correlates to denser vegetation (Myneni et al., 
1995; Sellers, 1985). A cloud free Landsat 5 image of November 1989 was used to calculate NDVI, as it 
gives information about the quality of forests just before the CFP was begun, crucial information to 
estimate the unbiased effect of CFP on carbon and biodiversity. The equation: NDVI = (NIR - Red)/(NIR + 
Red) was used to calculate the NDVI, where NIR= near-infrared (band 4) and Red= visible red light (band 
3). (Charles Maxwell, PhD student at The School of the Environment, PSU calculated NDVI). 
3.3.2 Variable selection and measurement  
3.3.2.1 Treatment and control variables 
The implementation of a formal CFP is the treatment variable. Local communities and/or 
government opt into CF status, and therefore the data are observational and non-random. 
On the other hand, the non-implementation of CFP, specifically the NCFs, are the control 
variable. The resources of the NCFs are formally owned by, and management 
responsibilities are vested on, the government. However, they remain open access, and 
local communities may protect and use forest resources, particularly non-timber forest 
products, for fulfilling subsistence needs.  
3.3.2.2 Outcome variables 
The effective number of species (e
H’
) and the Above-Ground Tree and Sapling Carbon 
(AGTSC) are two outcome variables. I used the e
H’
 (i.e., the numbers of species present if 
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all species were equal in abundance) to assess biodiversity, as it is an unbiased estimate 
of diversity that reduces inaccuracies when comparing diversity among plots (Jost, 2006). 
It measures biodiversity, considering both species richness (S) and abundance, in units of 
the number of species making it relatively easy to interpret.  
I checked names of all tree and shrub species for orthography and synonymy. I calculated 
S by simply counting the number of species present in a plot. To estimate e
H’
, I calculated 
the Shannon-Weiner Index (H’) using equation (3.2) and transformed it using equation 
(3.3). H’ is positively correlated with the number and evenness of species and takes a 
value of zero when there is only one species and a maximum value when all species are 
present in equal abundance (Mohan et al., 2007).  
H’ = − ΣSi=1 pi ln pi  …………………………………………….. (3.2)  
Where, S = Species richness;   
i =Iindividual species; 
pi = Individuals of one species (n) divided by the total number of 
individuals of all species in the plot (N);  
Σ = Sum of the calculations. 
e
H’
= e
H’
 ……………………………………………...…………. (3.3)  
Where, e = Natural log 
The AGTSC provides information about the location of carbon sources and sinks, 
particularly providing an estimation of major carbon storage in forests and potential  
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emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (Houghton, 2005; Ketterings et al., 
2001). Recent studies, using estimates of AGTSC, have indicated the growing potentials 
of tropical forests to serve as a carbon sink (Lewis et al., 2009; Pan et al., 2011).  
I used equations (3.2) and (3.3) proposed by Chave et al. (2005) to estimate Above-
Ground Biomass (AGB), which is prepared by using a large dataset of trees across 
different climatic conditions of global sites. Equations (3.2) and (3.3) are used to estimate 
AGB in dry (< 1500mm average annual rainfall) and moist forests (1500 - 4000mm 
average annual rainfall), respectively. These equations are used by several researchers 
and recommended by the Nepalese government (MoFSC, 2010a). Approximately 95% 
and 5% sample plots in my study were classified as moist and dry forests, respectively. 
AGB (kg) = 0.112 * (D
2
H)
0.916
 ………………….………. (3.2)  
AGB (kg) = 0.0509 * D
2H ………………………………..(3.3) 
Where, 
 = Specific gravity of wood (g cm
-3
); 
D = DBH; 
H = Tree height. 
I used species-based wood specific gravity recommended by Jackson (1994) to calculate 
biomass. Where such information is unavailable, I used a general value derived from 
average specific gravity of associated species (same genus and family) within a forest 
type (Baker et al., 2004; Ngugi et al., 2011). I used Nepal-specific biomass equations 
developed by Tamrakar (2000) to estimate the green biomass of individual saplings, 
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which is converted into dry biomass by multiplying by species-wise fractions or 
calculating an average of the associated species identified in the literatures. I used the 
fractions 0.627, 0.613, 0.58, 0.57, 0.545, 0.517, 0.5 and 0.45 for Quercus species, Lyonia 
ovalifolia, Pinus roxburghii, Alnus nepalensis, Schima wallichii, Shorea robusta, 
Terminalia tomentosa and Pinus wallichiana, respectively (Bhatt & Tomar, 2002; Jain & 
Singh, 1999; Kataki & Konwer, 2002; Shrestha et al., 2006; Wihersaari, 2005). For 
unidentified species, or where wood density information was not available for the 
species, genus or family, I used the overall mean wood density obtained from the 
database of species compiled for this study (Baker et al., 2004). I converted AGB into 
carbon stock by multiplying by 0.50 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
[IPCC], 2006).    
3.3.2.3 Confounding variables  
Because communities opted into CFP, or the government persuaded communities to 
participate, there are a number of confounding variables, or confounders, that affected 
treatment status and/or outcomes. Confounders may inflate errors in ATTb or ATTc 
estimates (Heinrich et al., 2010). I controlled the confounders in the matching process 
that helps identify the best matches between CF and NCF plots so as to minimize error. 
Matching helped me develop a counterfactual control group, which allowed me to use 
select existing data from NCF plots and provided information on what would have 
happened to biodiversity conservation and carbon storage in the absence of CFP 
(Pattanayak, 2009). 
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On the basis of the literature (see Section 3.2) and consultation with experts and 
community members, I identified 16 observable confounders determined by nature and 
communities. On the basis of my data, the identified confounders and their relationships 
with the CFP assignment is analyzed for overall forest and forests across altitudes, slopes, 
geo-political regions (i.e., hill and Terai) and canopies (Table 3.3) and briefly discussed 
below. If the treatments were randomly assigned, the coefficients should be statistically 
insignificant. 
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Table 3.3 Observed confounders and their relationships with CFP assignment.  
The model of relationship is generated using the probit model considering probability of forest selected under CFP as the dependent variable and 
confounders as independent variables. The coefficients and the p-values in parentheses are reported. A blank space indicates that the concerned 
confounder is not used in the model to achieve matching in the particular forest category. 
 
Confounders Overall 
forest 
Lower 
altitude 
(<1000m) 
Higher 
altitude   
(≥ 1000m) 
Lower 
slope       
(< 15
0
) 
Higher 
slope       
(≥ 150) 
Terai Hill  Open 
canopy 
(< 50%) 
Closed 
canopy  
(≥ 50%) 
Intercept  -0.1051  
(0.127)    
-0.3224 
(0.000)   
-0.2165 
(0.536)   
-0.3526  
(0.013)   
0.218  
(0.009)    
-0.3522 
(0.001)   
0.9589 
(0.000)    
-0.2128 
(0.086)   
-0.0704  
(0.520)   
Forest area  0.0000 
(0.951)    
0.0000  
(0.946)    
…. 0.0005 
(0.005)    
0.0000 
(1.000)    
0.0000 
(0.948)    
…. …. 0.0008 
(0.000)   
Forest size per household  …. …. -0.0228  
(0.630)   
…. …. …. 0.0333  
(0.223)    
0.0559  
(0.010)    
…. 
Travel time to nearest road  0.0036  
(0.889)    
…. -0.0156  
(0.653)   
0.1442 
(0.015)    
-0.0683  
(0.069)   
0.1295  
(0.005)   
…. 0.0074  
(0.835)    
0.0155  
(0.653)    
Travel time to district 
headquarters 
…. 0.0725 
(0.001)    
…. …. …. …. -0.0130 
(0.602)   
…. …. 
Slope  -0.0000  
(0.999)   
- 0.0000  
(0.989)   
-0.000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
-0.0000  
(0.989)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
Altitude  0.0000  
(0.997)   
0.0000  
(0.996)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(0.998)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(0.997)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
Moisture gradient  0.0000  
(0.992)   
0.0000  
(0.982)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(0.984)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
-0.0000  
(1.000)   
Broadleaved-conifer gradient 0.1515 
(0.000)    
…. -0.0949  
(0.074)   
…. 0.0910  
(0.066)    
…. -0.0742  
(0.106)   
0.1848 
(0.000)    
0.2209 
(0.000)    
Presence of Shorea robusta  0.0000  
(0.985)   
0.0000  
(0.979)   
…. 0.0000  
(1.000)   
-0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(0.978)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
-0.0000  
(1.000)   
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Confounders Overall 
forest 
Lower 
altitude 
(<1000m) 
Higher 
altitude   
(≥ 1000m) 
Lower 
slope       
(< 15
0
) 
Higher 
slope       
(≥ 150) 
Terai Hill  Open 
canopy 
(< 50%) 
Closed 
canopy 
(≥ 50%) 
Presence of soil erosion 0.0000  
(0.918)   
0.0000  
(0.883)   
…. 0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(0.869)   
-0.0000  
(1.000)   
- 0.0000  
(1.000)   
-0.0000  
(1.000)   
NDVI 1989 -0.0127  
(0.270)    
-0.0148  
(0.214)   
0.3724  
(0.375)    
-0.1936 
(0.001)   
-0.2388 
 (0.012)   
-0.0065  
(0.312)   
-0.4148 
(0.221)   
0.2112  
(0.010)    
-0.3927  
(0.020)   
Years of communities 
conserving forest 
0.0000  
(0.985)   
0.0165 
(0.000)    
…. 0.0210  
(0.000)    
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0192 
(0.000)    
….  ….  …. 
Number of forest user 
households 
0.0000  
(0.270)   
0.0000  
(0.214)   
…. 0.0001  
(0.145)    
0.0004  
(0.012)    
0.0000  
(0.312)   
…. …. 0.0000  
(0.510)   
Proportion of households living 
in the village for at least 2 
generations 
0.5127  
(0.000)    
0.3224  
(0.000)   
1.1900  
(0.000)    
0.4654  
(0.000)    
0.4785  
(0.000)    
0.2126  
(0.014)    
…. 0.5333  
(0.000)    
0.3881 
(0.000)    
Proportion of ethnic population 0.0000  
(0.999)   
0.3002  
(0.000)    
0.0000  
(1.000)   
-0.0257  
(0. 128)   
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.2804  
(0.005)    
0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.1064  
(0.241)    
-0.0000  
(1.000)   
Proportion of poor population 0.0000  
(0.996)   
0.0000  
(0.993)   
-0.2708  
(0.066)   
…. 0.0000  
(1.000)   
0.0000  
(0.993)   
0.1870  
(0.150)    
-0.3284 
(0.009)  
-0.0000  
(1.000)   
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Forest area: Forest area had significant positive effect on the expected log odd of a forest 
to be selected under CFP; each additional hectare of forest adds to expected log odds of 
0.0005 in lower slopes and 0.0008 in closed canopies. Similarly, the expected log odd of 
a forest being selected under CFP is increased by 0.0559 in open canopies if the size of 
forest per household is increased by one hectare. This is reasonable as the local 
communities prefer larger-sized (and larger per household) forest for provision of more 
resources, and also the government has a policy of designating forests according to the 
communities’ willingness and capacity to manage (MoLJ, 1995).  
Distance from road and district headquarters: As two-way travel time from forest to 
nearest road increases by 2-2.5 hours, the expected log odds of a forest to be selected 
under CFP increases by 0.1442 in lower slopes and 0.1295 in Terai. Similarly, a 2-2.5 
hours increase for two-way travel from forests to district head-quarters increases the 
expected log odds of a forest to be selected under CFP in lower altitudes by 0.0725. 
These results indicate that the government prioritized inaccessible forests for CFP as they 
were less connected with markets and had less revenue potential (Gilmour & Fisher, 
1991).   
Forest composition and quality: As forest composition shifts from broadleaved to mixed 
or mixed to conifer-dominated, the expected log odd of forest to be selected under CFP 
increases by 0.1515 in overall, and by 0.1848 and 0.2209 in open and closed canopies, 
respectively. These data reflects that most of the plantations that were handed over to 
communities were dominated by Pinus roxburghii (Campbell & Bhattarai, 1983; Gilmour 
et al., 1990; MoFSC, 1988). The greenness of the forest as measured by NDVI 1989 has a 
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significantly negative effect on the expected log odd of forest being selected under CFP. 
Each additional unit of index reduces the expected log odd of forest to be selected under 
CFP by 0.1936, 0.2367 and 0.3947 in lower slopes, higher slopes and closed canopies, 
respectively. This reflects the preference of the government to hand over degraded forests 
to communities (Kanel & Shrestha, 2001). However, the result of 0.2112 positive 
expected log odd in open canopies may be due to the handover of relatively good quality 
forests that perhaps became degraded. Some good quality forests were handed over to the 
communities due to communities’ willingness and ability to manage as well as political 
pressure and willingness of DFO. Initially, DFOs were interested in gaining trust from 
local communities by demonstrating that they were willing to hand over good quality 
forests. 
Management history: Each additional year that communities managed/protected a forest 
before the commencement of CFP raises the expected log odds of participating in the 
CFP in lower altitudes, lower slopes and Terai by 0.0165, 0.0210 and 0.0192, 
respectively. The government prioritized traditionally managed forests for CFP, as they 
increase the probability of the success of the program. Forest-dependent communities in 
the vicinity of forests that were cohesive in nature were prioritized for CFP (Gilmour & 
Fisher, 1991).  
Community attributes: Each proportion of household living for ≥2 generations in a 
community has 0.2126 to1.19 positive effects on the expected log odds of participation in 
the CFP in all categories of forest except hill. Non-migrated communities likely follow 
traditional subsistence livelihood strategies based on agriculture and forest resources and 
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therefore are interested in CFP participation. In lower altitudes, each additional 
proportion of ethnic household in a community has a 0.3002 positive effect on the 
expected log odd of participation in the CFP. Ethnic homogeneity increases the 
cohesiveness of communities and therefore is positively associated with better collective 
actions in managing forests (Tachibana et al., 2001). Nepalese ethnic communities have 
their own, locally suitable forest governance and management (e.g., protection, 
harvesting and use) practices that have been proven effective. Each additional proportion 
of poor households in a community has a 0.1708 and 0.3284 negative effect on the 
expected log odds of participation in the CFP in higher altitudes and open canopies, 
respectively. This could be due to the communities’ limited awareness and capacity to 
bear organizing and management costs.   
According to my data, some of the confounders such as altitude, slope, moisture, soil 
erosion, presence of Shorea robusta and number of forest users’ households are 
insignificantly related to the assignment into the CFP. However, these confounders are 
important criteria for decision making during the initial years of CFP, and therefore I kept 
them in the analytical models.  
3.3.3 Specification of analytical models  
3.3.3.1 Addressing confounding through matching 
Because my study is observational, the principal problems in the estimation of ATTb and 
ATTc are identifying counterfactual conditionals and dealing with confounding, 
particularly due to selection bias. Selection bias arises when the location of CFP is not  
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randomly selected, and CF plots differ from NCF plots for reasons other than their status 
as CF or NCF per se. Differences of CF and NCF confounders depict their effects on e
H’ 
and AGTSC even if the CFP had no effect. Therefore, confounders need to be controlled 
to identify counterfactuals so as to make matched plots as good as random or statistically 
equivalent. Matched CF and NCF plots allow comparing to achieve unbiased measures of 
ATTb and ATTc.  
I used a two-step method, nonparametric matching and analysis, for identification of 
counterfactuals and estimation of the ATTb and ATTc. Matching, an ex post identification 
technique, reduces selection bias and generates a comparable set of NCF observations by 
controlling observed confounders (Ho et al., 2007; Imben, 2004; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1983; Sekhon, 2011). Appropriate matching asymptotically balances observed 
confounders by removing bias (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). However, there is no 
consensus on exactly how matching ought to be done, how to measure the success of the 
matching procedure, and whether matching estimators are sufficiently robust to 
misspecification (Heckman et al., 1998).  
Matching reduces selection bias only if assumptions of ‘conditional independence or 
unconfoundedness’ and ‘common support’ are met (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
Conditional independence means that CFP status is independent of the confounders. 
Matching techniques control the selection bias fully if all confounders determining CFP 
assignment are used, which is rare in practice as there are likely to be unobservable 
confounders. This is a strong assumption as it makes CF and NCF plots comparable and 
has to be justified by the data at hand. The “common support condition” refers to two 
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important conditions: positive probability (i.e., existence of positive probability of being 
both CF and NCF for each value of covariate) and overlap condition (i.e., finding 
adequate comparable matches that help reduce model dependence).   
I developed matching and propensity score models by including 10 to 14 observed 
confounders that affect the assignment into CFP, e
H’
 and AGTSC (Table 3.3). As the 
confounders were measured at both plot and forest levels, I applied a mixed-effect probit 
model to estimate propensity scores and fed these into the matching model. I found 
almost all variances (>99%) of random effects were attributed to forest level effects. The 
fixed effects of confounders are discussed in section 3.3.2.3.  
I used ≤ 0.25 standardized mean difference (SMD) as a cut-off point, a common 
numerical balance diagnostic criterion to check whether the matching is satisfactory and 
acceptable, for matching adjustment (Rubin, 2001). The SMD expresses the standardized 
bias and is similar to an effect size relative to the variability observed and estimated by 
dividing difference in mean outcomes between CF and NCF plots by standard deviation 
of outcome among CF plots. Reducing SMD minimizes overt bias due to measured 
covariates in the ATTb and ATTc estimates (Imai et al., 2008; Rubin & Thomas, 1996).   
I matched CF and NCF plots based on observed confounders by using the MatchIt 
package of R 3.2.2 (Ho et al., 2007). I used the matching with replacement approach, 
allowing each selected NCF plot to be matched to ≥ 1 CF plots, as it is a good option for 
the highest degree of balance and the lowest conditional bias (Abadie & Imbens, 2006; 
Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). I used genetic matching, a multivariate matching that optimizes 
the confounding balance between CF and NCF plots by automating the process of finding 
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good matches using an evolutionary search algorithm (Diamond & Sekhon, 2013). This is 
a generalization of propensity score and Mahalanobis distance matching (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1985), which minimizes balance measures by using p-values. The Mahalanobis 
metric is considered a useful tool for determining similarities between CF and NCF plots 
even when there are several, correlated confounders (Mahalanobis, 1936; Rubin, 1980). 
In my dataset, I found that genetic matching was the best-suited algorithm to balance the 
maximum number of confounders bringing the SMD below the acceptable limit 
(Appendix A). As the post-matching SMD for confounders is less than 0.25 standard 
deviations and the average SMD across all covariates range from 0.08 – 0.17. I was able 
to find a sufficient number of NCF plots that are similar to CF plots based on the 
covariates included in the matching process. In some cases, it was not possible to bring 
SMD down to ≤ 0.25 for some confounders while keeping as many covariates as 
possible. However, I included some of those confounders in the matching models, as they 
contributed positively in achieving overall balance. A total of 18 - 52% of NCF plots are 
matched with CF plots in overall forest and across altitudes, slopes, geo-political regions 
and forest canopies. The average ratios of matched NCF to CF plots ranges from 1:2.8 to 
1:4.6 across forest categories.  
3.3.3.2 Comparing biodiversity and carbon  
The ATTb and ATTc are estimated based on the average difference of e
H’ 
and AGTSC 
between matched CF and NCF plots. As tests of average difference rely on the 
distributions of such differences, I checked whether the distributions are normal by using 
graphical plots (e.g., histogram and qq plot) and the Shapiro-Wilk test. I found that 
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differences were not normally distributed and therefore a t-test was not possible. 
However, because data were independently collected and randomized through the 
matching process, I used a pairwise Wilcoxon signed rank sum test to identify the 
[median] ATTb and ATTc by deducting NCF values from CF values.  
3.3.3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Matching methods are not robust against “hidden bias” arising from the existence of 
unobserved confounders that simultaneously affect assignment to CFP and outcomes. 
The legitimacy of matching is based on the assumption that the assignment to CFP is 
ignorable only when all the confounding covariates are employed in the analysis 
(Thoemmes & Kim, 2011). Testing this assumption is empirically impossible as 
measuring all confounders is practically not possible. Therefore, sensitivity analysis is 
essential to help understand the robustness of research findings to potential hidden bias.  
Following the model of sensitivity analysis approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002, ch. 
4) and using the sensitivitymv package in R 1.3, I explored how sustainable my ATTb 
and ATTc estimates are in view of potential effects of unobserved confounders. I 
quantified the degree to which a key model assumption, that CFP assignment is 
effectively random conditional on the matches, must be violated in order for my results to 
be reversed. I estimated how strong the effects of unobserved confounders on the CFP 
would have to be to change the probability of assignment to CFP that significantly 
change my ATTb and ATTc estimates. I used a sensitivity parameter, gamma (Γ), that 
shows critical levels of hidden bias as a quantity of difference in the odds of CFP 
assignment for two individuals with the same observed confounders but that diverge on 
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unobserved confounders. A higher Γ implies that the estimated ATTb and ATTc results 
are robust against a greater potential selection bias, while a low Γ implies that even a 
mild selection bias could make the estimate insignificant (where Γ= 1 indicates that no 
hidden bias exists). I determined the smallest value of Γ that will change the p-value of 
the “true” ATTb or ATTc to a non-significant level (>0.05). When the p-value exceeds 
0.05, the Γ value indicates the CF to NCF odds ratio at which ATTb or ATTc estimates 
are sensitive to hidden bias. Since the sensitivity analysis for insignificant ATTb and 
ATTc is not meaningful, I computed critical level of hidden bias only for the significant 
CFP effects (Hujer et al., 2004).  
3.4 Effect of Community Forestry Program 
3.4.1 Effect of community forestry program in biodiversity conservation  
The ATTb depicted the varied estimates and levels of sensitivity of the effect of the CFP 
on e
H’ 
across forest categories (Table 3.4). CF and NCF plots in the overall forest, lower 
and higher slopes, open canopies and Terai are significantly non-identical (p<0.05). The 
positive differences in the ATTb in those forests indicate significant positive effects of the 
CFP on e
H’
. The estimated ATTb in the overall forest, lower slopes, higher slopes, open 
canopies and Terai are 0.65, 0.60, 0.67, 0.88 and 0.73, respectively. The sensitivity 
analyses showed that these results can be nullified by the influence of unobserved 
confounders if the odds ratios of CF to NCF are changed by 1.24, 1.18, 1.36, 1.45 and 
1.26 in overall forest, lower slopes, higher slopes, open canopies and Terai, respectively. 
In lower altitudes, the result showed that CF and NCF plots are identical and therefore the 
ATTb is insignificant (p>0.05).  
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Results showed CF and NCF plots in higher slopes are non-identical (p<0.05). The 
negative ATTb in those forests indicate a significant negative effect of the CFP on e
H’
. 
The estimated ATTb in higher slopes is -0.51. Sensitivity analysis showed that results can 
be nullified by the influence of unobserved confounders even if forest plots are fully 
randomized. Results in lower altitudes, closed canopies and hills showed that CF and 
NCF plots are identical and therefore ATTb is insignificant (p>0.05).  
Table 3.4 Average effect of CFP on e
H’ 
and sensitivity analysis by forest category. 
Columns 2 and 3 depict the number of CF/NCF plots and average SMD of confounders before and after 
match across forest categories. Columns 4, 5-6 and 7 depict the ATTb, lower and upper confidence levels 
of ATTb and p-values, respectively. The last 2 columns provide information about the sensitivities of 
estimated results to the unobserved confounders. For sensitivity estimation, trimming was carried out at 2.5 
times the median of the absolute matched difference, which is analogous to a trimmed mean that trims 5% 
of outliers from each tail. As there is no need, I did not calculate the hidden bias for insignificant CFP 
effects. 
Forest 
category 
No. of 
CF/ 
NCF 
Average 
SMD of 
observed 
confounders 
(before/afte
r 
 
match) 
ATTb Hidden bias 
Point 
estimate 
Lower 
confid
ence 
limit-
95% 
Upper 
confid
ence 
limit-
95% 
p-
value 
 Critical 
level of 
bias (Γ) 
P- 
value 
Overall forest 325/70 0.40/0.11 0.65 0.31 1.00 0.000  1.24 0.052 
Lower 
altitude 
170/60 0.37/0.21 0.38 -0. 14 0.90 0.151    
Higher 
altitude 
155/28 0.24/0.08 -0.51 -0.98 -0.04 0.031  1 0.998 
Lower slope 89/28 0.39/0.11 0.60 0.08 1.14 0.024  1.18 0.052 
Higher slope 236/56 0.26/0.17 0.67 0.27 1.07 0.001  1.36 0.052 
Terai 120/43 0.36/0.13 0.73 0.20 1.22 0.008  1.26 0.052 
Hill 205/41 0.16/0.10 -0.29 -0.71 0.17 0.201    
Open canopy 149/41 0.42/0.09 0.88 0.39 1.36 0.001  1.45 0.053 
Closed 
canopy 
176/53 0.39/0.13 0.33 -0.04 0.07 0.072    
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These ATTb estimates mask variations in the effectiveness of effects of CFP on e
H’
 across 
forest categories. The 95% confidence interval (CI) across forest categories indicates that 
there is no difference in the ATTb in overall forest, lower slopes, higher slopes, open 
canopies and Terai. Open canopies have higher CF to NCF odds ratios, narrower CI and 
lowest SMD (average = 0.09, range = 0.02-0.24), indicating ATTb that is less sensitive to 
hidden bias, with the more precise ATTb estimate and the better match between CF and 
NCF plots reflecting a more robust ATTb estimate. 
3.4.2 Effect of community forestry policy intervention in carbon  
The ATTc depicted varied estimates and levels of sensitivity of the effect of CFP on 
AGTSC across forest categories (Table 3.5). CF and NCF populations in lower slopes 
and open canopies are non-identical (p<0.05). The positive ATTc in those forests indicate 
significant positive effects of CFP on AGTSC. The estimated ATTc is 25.51 t ha
-1
 in 
lower slopes and 25.84 t ha
-1
 in open canopies. The sensitivity analysis showed that these 
results can be nullified by the influence of unobserved confounders if odds ratios of CF to 
NCF are changed by 1.10 and 1.66 in lower slopes and open canopies, respectively.   
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Table 3.5 Average effect of CFP on AGTSC and sensitivity analysis by forest category. 
Columns 2 and 3 depict the number of CF/NCF plots and average SMD of confounders before and after 
match across forest categories. Columns 4, 5-6 and 7 depict the ATTc, lower and upper CI of ATTc and p-
values, respectively. The last 2 columns provide information about the sensitivities of estimated results to 
the unobserved confounders. For sensitivity estimation, trimming was carried out at 2.5 times the median of 
the absolute matched difference, which is analogous to a trimmed mean that trims 5% of outliers from each 
tails. As there is no need, I did not calculate the hidden bias for insignificant CFP effects. 
Forest 
category 
No. of 
CF/ 
NCF  
Average 
SMD of 
observed 
confounders 
(before/after 
 
match) 
ATTc   Hidden bias  
Point 
estimate 
Lower 
confid
ence 
limit-
95% 
Upper 
confid
ence 
limit-
95% 
p-
value 
 Critical 
level of 
bias (Γ) 
P 
value 
Overall forest 325/70 0.40/0.11 -15.11 -26.35 -3.49 0.012  1 0.982 
Lower altitude 170/60 0.37/0.21 11.21 -7.42 31.02 0.243    
Higher altitude 155/28 0.24/0.08 -22.81 -37.41 -9.39 0.001  1 0.999 
Lower slope 89/28 0.39/0.11 25.51 0.98 55.14 0.041  1.10 0.053 
Higher slope 236/56 0.26/0.17 -17.72 -30.93 -4.22 0.010  1 0.989 
Terai 120/43 0.36/0.13 5.87 -15.88 32.80 0.585    
Hill 205/41 0.16/0.10 9.76 -1.48 22.04 0.089    
Open canopy 149/41 0.42/0.09 25.84 12.22 41.36 0.000  1.66 0.051 
Closed canopy 176/53 0.39/0.13 -2.93 -18.06 12.11 0.694    
 
Results showed CF and NCF plots in the overall forest and higher slopes are non-
identical (p<0.05). The negative ATTc in those forests indicate a significant negative 
effect of the CFP on AGTSC. The estimated ATTc in overall forest is -15.11 t ha
-1
 and in 
higher slopes is -17.72 t ha
-1
. Sensitivity analysis showed that results can be nullified by 
the influence of unobserved covariates even if forest plots are fully randomized. In lower 
altitudes and Terai, results showed that CF and NCF plots are identical and therefore 
ATTc are insignificant (p>0.05).       
These ATTc estimates mask variations in the effectiveness of effects of CFP on AGTSC 
across forest categories. The 95% CI across forest categories indicates that the ATTc in 
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 the overall forest is lower than in lower slopes, open canopies and Terai. Also, the ATTc 
in the overall forest is not different from higher slope forest within a 95% CI. Similarly, 
ATTc in lower slopes and open canopies do not differ within a 95% CI. However, open 
canopies have higher CF to NCF odds ratio, narrower CI than lower slopes and lowest 
SMD (average = 0.09, range = 0.02-0.24), indicating that the less sensitive ATTc is to 
hidden bias, the more precise the ATTc estimate and the better match between CF and 
NCF plots reflecting a more robust ATTc estimate.    
3.5 Discussion  
At the national level, my results clearly illustrate that the CFP has a positive effect on e
H’ 
and a negative effect on AGTSC. However, the CFP has mixed and differential (positive, 
negative and no) net effects on e
H’
 and AGTSC across altitudes, slopes, geographic 
regions and canopy covers. For instance, the CFP has a significantly positive effect on 
biodiversity conservation in overall forest and forests in higher and lower slopes, Terai 
and open canopies while it has a significantly negative effect in higher altitudes and no 
significant effects in lower altitudes, hills and closed canopies. In terms of carbon stocks, 
the CFP has significantly positive effects in lower slopes and open canopies while it has 
significantly negative effects in overall forest and forests in higher altitudes and higher 
slopes and no significant effects in lower altitudes, Terai, hill and closed canopy. These 
variations in ATTb and ATTc might reflect different forest management and silvicultural 
practices of communities across the country. Different forest management practices are, 
principally, encouraged by the CFP to suit local context. Under the broader management 
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guidelines, local forestry technicians prepare and the district forest officers approve the 
forest operational plan for each community forests separately.    
My ATTb estimates reflect findings from earlier studies. While significant positive ATTb 
reflects the contribution of CFP in revitalizing degraded forestlands (Gautam et al., 2002; 
Luintel et al., 2009), significant negative ATTb indicates the reduction of biodiversity in 
CF likely due to the communities’ preference for valuable species and selective 
harvesting (Acharya, 2004) and higher pressure in the CFs. The biodiversity of CF 
depends on context and communities’ efforts in conservation and their use of biomass 
(Shrestha et al., 2010). Because communities manage forests for subsistence goods and 
services of which choice of species constitutes a major part, the results reflect a wide 
variety of locally targeted, specific forest management and conservation actions carried 
out by individual communities. It also reflects that the policy and programmatic 
frameworks for biodiversity conservation that were in place may have been too broad, 
failing to provide locally suitable, practical guidelines to the communities and DFO staff. 
For instance, Nepalese biodiversity strategy plans have provided space to local 
governments and other line agencies (e.g., agriculture offices, national park and wildlife 
reserve authorities, soil conservation offices, non-governmental organizations, etc.) for 
decision-making. However, such line agencies might not have comprehensive knowledge 
and/or appropriate human resources for decision making and planning for biodiversity 
conservation.  
My ATTc estimates reflect unexpected and complex results that confirm and also 
contradict the earlier findings of Bluffstone et al. (2015), which concluded that the CFP 
   
97 
  
effect on carbon is not significant. The result of ATTc may need to be viewed in the 
context of basic objectives and management practices in CF, disturbance regime, base 
carbon stock and spillover effect of CFP on NCF, all of which might not have been well 
captured in the observed confounders. As degraded forests were handed over to the 
communities, they primarily managed forest “passively” i.e., focusing on conservation 
and conservative use of forest products (Yadav et al.; 2003), limiting the productivity and 
carbon stock potential of forests. As extraction of timber and other woody forest products 
from CFs is legal, the carbon stored in CFs reflects only that retained after harvesting. 
Base-carbon affects biological and physical potential of forest to sequester carbon. For 
instance, low carbon may constrain the biological potential of carbon sequestration but 
provides physical space to store additional future carbon. Also, NCFs in the vicinity of 
communities could have mimicked CFP with an aim to demonstrate their commitment to 
forest management and persuade DFOs to designate those forests as CFs in the future. 
Community and household surveys carried out as part of this research reflect that 80% of 
communities have written rules and >60% of households engage in forest management in 
NCFs. 
The possibilities of positive, negative or no contributions of CFP to both ATTb and ATTc 
demonstrate the need for a review of CFP particularly in view of the CBD and REDD+. 
While the positive effects on ATTb and ATTc indicate the worthiness of continuation of 
the program, the neutral and negative ATTc in some CFs signals the need for greater 
policy, management, monitoring and motivational support to communities managing 
forests under CFP.  
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Differential ATTb and ATTc in different categories of CFs clearly indicate the 
inadequacy of evaluating the effect of CFP at a national scale to identify local effects. 
Different results across geographical regions suggest that rather than a “cookie-cutter 
approach” or “one size fits all approach” to forest management, adaptive and area-
specific policies and programs are critical for promoting biodiversity conservation and 
sequestering greater amounts of carbon. Such policies and programs need to provide 
communities with practical guidance for adopting locally suitable management options. 
This finding challenges the government’s current efforts toward CFP that promote 
homogenous policy and program irrespective of geographic and topographic regions and 
forest qualities. For instance, the same CFP is applicable for natural and plantation 
forests, large and small-sized forests, forests in high-hill, mid-hill and Terai and open-
canopy and closed canopy forests.    
It is less clear whether estimated ATTb and ATTc in different categories of forests are 
driven by different factors and/or differing degrees of bias. These results point to the need 
for future research that helps explore why CFP is effective in some areas but ineffective 
in others, how communities interpret and apply CFP, and what motivational and capacity 
building supports to communities are needed. Such research would contribute to 
amending current the CFP to make it more compatible with the CBD and REDD+. In the 
context of inadequacy of systematic database systems instituted in Nepal (and perhaps in 
many tropical countries), creating national and landscape level databases is critical to 
advance future studies.  
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My research adds to the slowly growing literature of impact evaluations of community-
based conservation policy (e.g., Bluffstone et al.; 2015; Pandey et al. 2014; Thapa-Magar 
& Shrestha; 2015). First, my study employs a robust method to reduce bias in estimates 
and strengthens the claim that I have measured the causal effects of Nepal’s CFP. 
Second, this is one of the pioneer studies of its kind investigating the impact of CFP on 
biodiversity and carbon. Finally, in contrast to the more common focus on aggregate 
deforestation and poverty outcomes of conservation programs, I responded to recent calls 
emerged due to introduction of REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2007b; UNFCCC, 2015) to better 
tailor impact evaluations by examining outcomes on biodiversity conservation and carbon 
storage. 
The estimation of ATTb and ATTc is invariably difficult although matching based on a 
large number of confounders helps overcome difficulties. Certain levels of imbalance in 
the observed confounders still exists, although SMD is brought below an acceptable cut-
off point, resulting in increased variations in ATTb and ATTc estimates. As there are 
multiple, applicable matching algorithms with certain pros and cons, and tradeoffs need 
to be made in choosing matching techniques, there is room for questions on the quality of 
matching. The use of only SMD as a criterion to check the acceptability of the match 
balance may also be considered a limitation of my analysis. Also, despite the execution of 
sensitivity analysis, analytical and communicative complexities are prevalent in my 
results as they are sensitive to the possibility of spurious variation driven by the effect of 
unobservable confounders. Unobservable confounders may include the existence of 
strong leaders and communities’ motivation affecting the probability of assignment to the 
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CFP, carbon sequestration and/or biodiversity conservation. Also, the estimated results 
do not reflect the bias induced by biological (e.g., life form, species, growth rate, wood 
density and stage of life cycle), and ecological (e.g., successional stage, species 
composition, disturbance regime) factors. 
3.6 Conclusion  
Using cross-sectional data and robust analytical methods for evaluating ATTb and ATTc 
estimates, I demonstrate the existence of positive, neutral and negative effects of CFP 
nationally, across geographic, topographic, and geo-political regions and in different 
forest qualities. Specifically, the CFP in lower slopes and open canopies perform 
positively and at higher altitudes performed negatively in both biodiversity conservation 
and carbon storage. The CFP at lower altitudes, closed canopies and hills do not reflect a 
unique path to contribute to biodiversity and carbon stock. My findings provide critical 
methodological and substantive information in evaluating the communities’ contributions 
to global environmental initiatives such as CBD and REDD+ by providing impacts on 
biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration. In aggregate, evidence demonstrates 
that the CFP has the potential to conserve biodiversity and sequester carbon in forests, 
albeit differently across geography, topography and canopies. This indicates the 
possibility of CFP to support global environmental initiatives such as CBD and REDD+. 
However, dedicated, appropriate policies that motivate and capacitate communities to 
implement active forest management and enhance performance of forests in conserving 
more biodiversity and stocking more carbon is critical to realize this potential. 
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As the CFP is a viable approach towards incentivizing communities that spur effects in 
NCF as well, attempts to promote CFP are crucial for obtaining local communities’ real 
and authentic contributions for promoting biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration. Equally important is to create awareness of global environmental issues 
and build capacity to contribute to addressing those issues at the local level.  
Given that average effects of CFP at the national level may be misleading, heterogeneous 
effects of CFP across forest categories provide useful insights for regional or landscape-
level planning. Regional analyses provide critical insights about the factors responsible 
for different levels of effectiveness of CFP. A locally specific cautious approach to 
exploring key drivers of heterogeneity is crucial to help make policy and management 
plans of biodiversity- and carbon- focused forestry effective. Landscape-level 
assessments of CFP effectiveness may add value in informing locally suitable planning 
and management of forest resources.   
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Chapter 4: An Assessment of Causal Effects of the Nepalese Community Forestry 
Program on Equity in Benefit Sharing 
4.1 Introduction  
Equity reflects justice in day-to-day interactions primarily in relation to the distribution of 
social, political and economic goods and bads (Rawls, 1971). Equity implies “fair 
treatment or due reward” (Schroeder & Pisupati, 2013:13) and involves getting a “fair 
share” which is not biased by any personal stake and varies according to different 
situations and cultures (Fisher, 1989). Equity ideally refers a fair opportunity i.e., free 
from bias to everyone to participate in decision making processes and thus access 
resources with their full potential as they need (Luintel, 2006). However, the concept of 
equity is founded on the equality of liberty, opportunity, rights, welfare, utility and 
income (Sen, 1992:ix).   
In the context of environmental management, equity is related to resource access, 
livelihood security and social dignity of resource-managing communities. Equity 
motivates resource-managing communities and leads to economic and ecological gains 
(McDermott, 2009). Equity is increasingly considered to be a legitimate basis for the 
management of forest commons (e.g., Li, 1996); it affects credibility, acceptability and 
social and environmental outcomes of any environmental management initiative, and 
particularly those that emerge at the global level and trickle down to the local level. For 
instance, one such contemporary environmental initiative is the United Nations Program 
on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, conservation and 
enhancement of forest carbon and sustainable management of forest in developing 
countries (REDD+), in which equity is a paramount concern. REDD+ values “forest” as 
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an economic commodity (Arsel & Buscher, 2012; Mcafee, 2012), which affects historical 
and contemporary forms of resource distribution and appropriation (e.g. Fairhead et al., 
2012), leading to change in power and economic relations between different forestry 
actors. Researchers, policy makers and practitioners have raised concerns that REDD+ 
may lead to social conflict and environmental degradation if equity at the grassroots level 
is not addressed properly (e.g., Boyce et al., 2007; Patel et al., 2013; Paudel et al., 2015). 
Focusing on equity rather than on participation would allow more effective 
implementation of conservation initiatives (Smith & McDonough, 2001). However, 
equity remains a largely unresolved issue in the REDD+ development process.  
Many governments in tropical countries promote decentralized forestry to engage forest-
dependent communities and households in the conservation and management of local 
forests. Decentralized forestry formally provides forest rights and incentives to forest-
managing communities (Charnley & Poe, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008). However, studies 
have shown both positive and negative results of decentralized forestry on equity and 
thereby have invited debates. Advocates pitch decentralized forestry as an effective 
approach to increasing access to forest benefits and improving rural wellbeing. For 
instance, the Right and Resource Initiative (2014) indicates that decentralized forestry 
may reduce rural poverty and halt environmental degradation; it provides vital resources 
and safety nets to the rural poor for subsistence livelihoods, particularly when other 
sources of production and income are not available (Beck & Nesmith, 2001). 
Decentralized forestry devolves power to local communities fostering the evolution of 
equitable, fair and inclusive processes and outcomes (e.g., Luintel, 2006) and reduces 
   
104 
  
inequity by generating positive change at community and higher levels (e.g., McDermott 
& Schreckenberg, 2009). Persha and Anderson (2014) and Luintel (2006) argue that 
equity in decentralized forestry has improved primarily due to the support of forestry 
projects and civil society organizations. The World Bank (2001) also noted that legally 
recognized community forest user groups (CFUGs) receive required supports from a 
range of state and non-state actors to improve institutional practices and forest 
management.  
Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) point out that the equity outcome of forest commons, 
including decentralized forestry, may not necessarily meet this expectation. In line with 
this view, Adhikari (2005), Agarwal (2001), Iversen et al. (2006) and Thoms (2008) 
demonstrated that even much acclaimed decentralized forestry in South Asia is associated 
with communities’ unequal forest access. Because of the inequitable distribution of forest 
products, the gap between the rich and poor forest users is widening and the involvement 
of poor and marginalized communities in forest management activities has been 
decreasing in the hills of Nepal (Lamichhane & Parajuli, 2014). Mahanthy et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that inequity in benefit sharing is common due to differential power, assets 
and capacity among forest-managing community members. Inequities are reinforced by 
local as well as wider societal processes (Hobley, 2007) including unequal economic and 
cultural power relations (Bist, 1991), elite capture
6
 in decision-making and resources 
                                                          
6
 Elite capture refers to the process by which local elites – individuals with superior political status due to 
economic, educational, ethnic or other social characteristics – take advantage of their positions to amass a 
disproportionately large share of resources or a flow of benefits, curtaining the benefits of the larger 
population (Bardhan, 2002). 
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(Persha & Anderson, 2014) and exclusion of the poor in economic growth and 
commercialization processes (Beck & Nesmith, 2001).  
Robust empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of decentralized forestry on equity are 
lacking. This knowledge gap not only limits the credibility and legitimacy of the program 
but also constrains the contributions of forestry actors in implementing innovative, 
productive forest management systems in the context of newly emerging global 
environmental concerns: biodiversity loss and carbon emissions. Therefore, empirical 
research using robust analytical methods to conclusively evaluate the linkages between 
decentralized forestry and equity is critical.  
The Nepalese community forestry program (CFP), a form of decentralized forestry, is one 
of the most popular and extensive forestry programs to revitalize degraded forests in 
Nepal and fulfill the demand of subsistence forest products in rural areas. The CFP offers 
a unique opportunity for research to examine causal effects of CFP on equity; it has ~40 
years of history of managing ~1.8 million hectares of forest engaging ~ 42% of people 
from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds (Department of Forest [DoF], 2015). 
The CFP legally recognized ~19,000 CFUGs, as autonomous public bodies having 
perpetual succession that can acquire, possess, transfer or manage property (Ministry of 
Law and Justice [MoLJ], 1993). The sizes and compositions of forests and CFUGs vary 
across Nepal based on the distribution of forests and households. Diverse sizes and 
compositions of forests and households create opportunities to understand, and pose 
challenges to achieve, equity in forest-managing communities. In addition, many 
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communities across the country are traditionally informally engaged in forest 
management and bring a range of age-old benefit sharing practices.  
In this research, I specifically examined whether and how much the Nepalese CFP 
increases equity at the household level across the country, social groups (i.e., poor, dalit, 
indigenous peoples and women-headed households) and geographic regions (i.e., hill and 
Terai). I used cross-sectional data collected in 2013 from nationally representative 
random samples of community forest (CF) and corresponding non-CF (NCF). I used both 
survey data from 130 forests and perceptions of 1300 forest-managing households. I 
followed a quasi-experimental, matching method - a method that mimics randomized 
experiments - to analyze the data. The most prominent challenge in this research is to 
deduce an appropriate counterfactual i.e., estimating equity in the absence of the program 
(e.g., Hendrickson, 2008).  
By using only matched samples, I estimated the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) i.e., the average effect of CFP on equity (ATTe). As national-level estimates may 
mask a great deal of variation in the effectiveness of CFP across social groups and 
geographic regions, I estimated the ATTe across social groups and geographic regions. I 
also estimated whether, where and to what extent my ATTe can be affected by hidden 
bias caused by unobserved confounders by testing the sensitivity. My research broadens 
and deepens the scientific understanding on the effects of CFP on equity. The CFP effect 
on equity across social groups and geographic regions will provide crucial insights and 
evidence to researchers, policy makers and managers to plan future courses of action 
targeting different social groups and/or geographic regions. My results and methods are 
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applicable beyond Nepal to include countries that are practicing decentralized forestry. 
My results provide critical insight to assist REDD+ policy makers and planners in 
making REDD+ and CFP more compatible.  
4.2 Research methods: site, design and analytical model 
The data presented are part of an on-going multi-disciplinary research project funded by 
the World Bank and jointly implemented by Portland State University and ForestAction 
Nepal (Bluffstone et al., 2015). The primary aim of the project was to assess the potential 
synergies and/or tradeoffs between Nepalese forest commons and REDD+. 
4.2.1 Sampling methods, sample sites and data collection   
The researchers at ForestAction Nepal and I randomly selected 65 CFUGs from a pool of 
137 national random samples of CF impact from a study conducted by the Nepalese 
government during 2010-2012. We then randomly selected ten households from each 
CFUG to survey. The field team selected 65 non-CFs in such a way that they were 
analogous to CFs in a variety of characteristics. Such non-CFs were close, but not next to, 
CFs to avoid being used simultaneously by the same people. The selected CFs and non-
CFs were distributed in the tropical, sub-tropical and temperate climatic zones of 42 (out 
of 75) districts across the country (Figure 4.1). A total of 1300 households (i.e., 10 
households from each group) were surveyed.  
    
 
   
1
0
8
 
 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of sample plots 
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By considering research objectives, a set of structured questions were developed for 
household surveys. Questions were tested in two CFUGs for their appropriateness and 
finalized before conducting the survey. Both quantitative (e.g., resource availability, 
socio-economic profile) and qualitative (e.g., perspectives and experience) data were 
collected from the survey. The data were collected from March to May 2013.  
ForestAction recruited a team of 25 Nepalese field researchers with whom I closely 
worked to collect the data. Each of the field researchers had undergraduate degrees in 
forestry (12) and graduate degrees in social science (13), and ForestAction trained them 
to conduct forest surveys, forest inventories and household surveys. 
The training helped field researchers develop a common understanding of the research 
and use the questionnaires effectively and efficiently during the survey. Field surveyors 
were closely monitored and constantly supported by the ForestAction researchers to 
ensure effectiveness of the survey and quality of the data.   
4.2.2 Variable selection and measurement 
4.2.2.1 Treatment and control variable 
The treatment variable is the implementation of a formal CFP. Local communities and/or 
the Nepalese government opt into CF status and therefore the data are observational and 
non-random. On the other hand, the non-implementation of CFP, specifically the NCFs, 
are the control variable. The resources of the NCFs are formally owned by, and 
management responsibilities are vested on, the Nepalese government. However, they 
remain open access (i.e., depletable, rivalrous and non-excludable resources), and local 
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communities may protect and use the resources available in NCFs, particularly non-
timber forest products, for fulfilling subsistence needs.  
4.2.2.2 Outcome variable: the equity index 
Equity constitutes contextual, procedural and distributional dimensions (McDermott et al. 
2013). While contextual dimension refers to the overall capacity of different actors to 
participate and capture benefits; procedural dimension focuses on the equity in decision-
making processes; and the distributional dimension focuses on how costs, benefits and 
risks are distributed among actors across time and space (McDermott et al. 2013). All 
these dimensions are important to understand the dynamics of equity in forest commons. 
Households may use different substantive, context-specific criteria and indicators to 
view, and have different experience and perspectives on, these dimensions. Household 
perceptions on these dimensions help create a complete picture of the equity.   
Considering these dimensions, I constructed a composite measure of equity, equity index. 
Equity index here means an accumulation of scores from a variety of individual items 
that reflect above-mentioned three dimensions that together form households’ perceptions 
of equity. Such an index is intended to capture most of the underlying ethics and 
assumptions of ongoing processes of forest governance and management in relation to 
benefit sharing. I used four different variables that reflect fairness at different stages of 
benefit-sharing systems to construct equity index (Table 4.1). First, I used the fairness in 
benefit sharing rules that exist in the community. Such rules are normally prepared 
considering the socio-cultural and economic practices and resource condition of the 
community, which primarily reflect the contextual dimension of equity. Second, I used 
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the fairness in the processes of benefit sharing, which is generally guided by certain 
governance principles. Such principles construct the foundation of procedural dimension 
of equity that affect the level of acceptance of benefit sharing practice. Third, I used the 
fairness of benefit sharing practice, which reflects the distributive aspect of equity in 
benefit sharing. At last, I also used the existence of conflict related to benefit sharing. It is 
important indicator that captures the satisfaction of forest users at the post benefit sharing 
situation.  
Table 4.1 The description of indicators used to create the equity index and their measurement units. 
Variables Definition of variables Measurement unit 
Fair rule Existence of fair system of benefit sharing 
(e.g., selecting forest beneficiaries). 
1-5= Strongly disagree to 
strongly agree  
Fair process  Existence of fair and acceptable system of 
accessing and distributing forest benefits. 
1-5= Strongly disagree to 
strongly agree 
Fair practice  Existence of fair benefits distribution.  1-5= Strongly disagree to 
strongly agree 
Existence of 
conflicts 
Existence of conflicts and problems in 
benefit distribution. 
Yes= 1, Neutral= 3, No= 5 
 
The four variables had different weights depending on the data structure. I identified the 
weights of these variables considering variations explained by each variable through 
employing a principal component analysis (PCA)
7
 as described in Organization for the 
                                                          
7
 PCA is a simple and non-parametric method of extracting relevant information from confusing data sets 
that helps extenuate the problem of multicollinearity and identifies the weights for each factor in 
constructing an index. It reduces dimensionality of a data set by performing a covariance analysis between 
factors and maximizes the correlation between the original variables and new uncorrelated factors that are 
mutually orthogonal. Then the eigen technique, which transforms the original set of inter-correlated 
variables into a new set with an equal number of independent uncorrelated factors, is used for factor 
analysis. The principal factors are then classified in decreasing order according to the percentage of the 
variance they account for so that most of the variation in the data can be described by the first few factors 
that can be used to represent the original observations.  
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Economic Cooperation and Development (2008). In order to prevent any single variable 
having undue influence on the composite index, I standardized the variables by creating a 
correlation matrix, so as to have zero means and unit variance at the start of the analysis. 
Diagnostic checks of the data showed that the assumptions for PCA were met; 
specifically, all the variables were correlated or internally consistent with the principal 
components (Cronbach alpha = 0.71 (95% CI = 0.66-0.75)); sampling adequacy scored as 
“middling” to “meritorious” (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure = 0.64 - 0.85); and the data 
had different variance (Bartlett test of sphericity = 211.14, df = 3, p-value = < 0.000). As 
my interest is to determine the weights for each variable to construct an equity index (as 
opposed to minimizing the number of variables), I selected the principal components that 
have at least one of the following attributes: (i) factors that have associated eigen values 
larger than one commonly known as the Kaiser criteria (Lise, 2007; Manly, 2005), (ii) 
factors that contribute cumulatively to the explanation of the overall variance by > 60%, 
and (iii) factors that contribute at least 10% to the overall variance explanation. On these 
bases, I selected all four principal components for further analysis, which explain 100% 
of total variance (Table 4.2). Then I performed a varimax rotation of the original 
variables associated with each of the selected principal components and ensured that each 
variable is maximally correlated with one principal component (Jolliffe, 2002). The 
rotation provided component loadings for each variable. Components that have a greater 
than 0.5 loading were identified as important for further analysis. 
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Table 4.2 Eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix, factor pattern and weight factor.  
Principal 
components 
Eigen 
values 
Proportion 
of variance 
Cumulative proportion of variance 
1 1.60  0.40 0.40 
2 1.06 0.27 0.67 
3 0.77  0.19 0.86 
4 0.57 0.14 1 
Cronbach alpha = 0.71 
Variables/ 
components 
Compo 
nent 1 
Compo 
nent 2 
Compo 
nent 3 
Compo 
nent 4 
Component 
scores* 
Variable 
weights*
* 
Fair rule -0.47 0.43 -0.32 0.71 0.071 0.1080 
Fair process  -0.50 0.44   -0.25   -0.71 0.100 0.1518 
Practice  -0.33 0.23   0.92 0.05 0.161 0.2450 
Existence of conflict -0.66 -0.75 -0.04   0.01 0.327 0.4970 
Explained variance 1.60 1.06 0.77 0.57 0.659 1 
Proportion of 
explained variance 0.40 0.27  0.19 
 
0.14 
  
Note: Numbers in bold face denote a dominating indicator (factor loading ≥ 0.5 or ≤ -0.5). 
* Factor scores: square the significant loading factor (>0.5) and multiply by the proportion of explained 
variance. 
** Variable weights: Factor scores scaled to 1.    
Component 1 accounted for 40% of the common variance and received moderately 
negative loadings from process (-0.50) and conflict (-0.66). Component 2 explained 27% 
of the common variance and received moderately negative loadings from conflict (-0.75). 
Component 3 accounted for 19% of total variance and largely depended on the actual 
practice of benefit distribution (0.92). Component 4 accounted for 14% of the common 
variance and received positive leadings from rule (0.71) and negative leadings from 
conflict (-0.71). By using the factor loadings and the proportion of variance explained by 
principal factors, I calculated the weight for each indicator (Table 4.2). The weights for 
rule, process, practice and conflict-related indicators of equity are 0.1080, 0.1518, 0.2450 
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and 0.4970, respectively. I used these weights to construct the equity index for each 
household. The equity index ranges from 0 – 1, where 0 means no equity at all and 1 
means full equity. The descriptive statistics of equity index and the variables used are 
given in the Table 4.3 below. 
Table 4.3 The descriptive statistics of equity index and the variables used to construct index.  
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Equity index 0.75 0.16 0.2 1 
Fair rule 3.57 1.00 1 5 
Fair process  3.49 1.03 1 5 
Fair practice  3.62 0.91 1 5 
Existence of conflicts 4.27 1.32 1 5 
 
4.2.2.3 Confounding variables  
As communities opted into CFP or were persuaded by the Nepalese government to join, 
there were a number of confounders that affected treatment status and/or outcomes. 
Confounders may inflate bias in ATTe estimates (Heinrich et al., 2010). I controlled the 
confounding variables (“confounders”) through a matching process so as to minimize 
error and identify the optimum matches between CF and NCF households. Matching 
allowed me to develop a counterfactual control group from NCF households that 
provided information about what would have happened in regards to equity in the 
absence of CFP (Pattanayak, 2009). 
On the basis of the literature and focus group discussions with 10 different forest-
managing communities and one consultation meeting with experts at Kathmandu in the 
year 2012, I identified 14 observable confounders determined by forest/topographical  
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characteristics and communities. I analyzed the relationships between confounders and 
CFP assignment for social groups and geographic regions (Table 4.4). If treatments were 
randomly assigned, the coefficients should be statistically insignificant. 
Forest area: Forest area had a significant positive effect on the probability of a forest 
being selected under CFP; each additional hectare of forest adds to the expected log odds 
of selection by 0.0136, 0.0150 and 0.0260 in poor, indigenous people and women-headed 
households, respectively. This is reasonable as the local communities prefer to obtain 
larger-sized forests, which provide more resources. Also, the Nepalese government has a 
policy of handing over forest according to the community’s willingness and capacity to 
manage (MoLJ, 1995).  
Forest topography: Forest slope had a significant positive effect on the probability of a 
forest to be selected under CFP; each additional degree of slope adds to the expected log 
odds of selection by 0.2889 in poor communities and 0.3871 in indigenous populations. 
This is reasonable as the Nepalese government prioritized CFP in the hills.  
According to my data, some of the confounders such as the number of forest user 
households, travel time to the nearest road-head from the forest, altitude, moisture, soil 
erosion, presence of Shorea robusta, years of communities conserving the forest, 
broadleaf-conifer gradient, NDVI 1989, proportion of households living in the village for 
at least 2 generations, proportion of ethnic population and proportion of poor are not 
significantly related with the assignment into the CFP. However, these confounders are 
important decision criteria during the initial years of CFP and therefore I kept them in the 
analytical models (see Section 3.3.2.3). 
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Table 4.4 Observed confounders and their relationships with CFP assignment.  
The model of relationship is generated using the probit model considering probability of forest selected 
under CFP as the dependent variable and confounders as independent variables. The coefficients and the p-
values in parentheses are reported. A blank space indicates that the concerned confounder is not used in the 
model to achieve matching in the particular forest category. 
Confounders  Overall Poor  Dalit Indigen
ous 
people 
Women-
headed 
household 
Hill Terai 
Intercept - 4.7807 
(0.821) 
- 6.3900 
(0.5966) 
- 5.3460 
(0.563) 
- 3.2570 
(0.794) 
- 4.6678 
(0.641) 
- 9.3334 
(0.843) 
- 8.6736 
(0.782) 
Forest area  0.0229 
(0.201) 
0.0136  
(0.004) 
0.0125 
(0.177) 
0.0150 
(0.0427)  
0.0260 
(0.0454) 
 0.0185 
(0.225) 
Number of forest 
user households 
- 0.0003 
(0.921) 
0.0005  
(0.802)    
- 0.0023 
(0.687) 
0.0003 
(0.879)     
0.0013 
(0.626)   
0.0874 
(0.129) 
- 0.0008  
(0.799) 
Travel time to 
nearest road  
- 0.1290  
(0.965) 
0.0036   
(0.998)    
- 0.9081 
(0.529) 
- 0.9320  
(0.618)     
- 0.1298 
(0.915)   
- 0.5000 
(0.906) 
1.4275 
(0.761) 
Altitude  0.0043 
(0.552) 
0.0019  
(0.521)    
0.0028 
(0.435) 
 0.0010 
(0.774)     
0.0018 
(0.520)   
-0.0017 
(0.889) 
0.0024  
(0.834) 
Slope  0.4287 
(0.191) 
0.2889  
(0.041) 
0.2136   
(0.175) 
0.3871 
(0.000)  
0.1936 
(0.173)   
0.077 
(0.902) 
0.2785  
(0.581) 
Years of 
communities 
conserving forest 
- 0.0185  
(0.850) 
0.0095  
(0.875)    
…. - 0.0076 
(0.904)     
0.0698 
(0.533)   
0.0411 
(0.765) 
- 0.0533 
(0.693) 
Moisture gradient  - 0.5303 
(0.849) 
- 0.1289 
(0.930)    
…. 0.0171 
(0.991)     
- 0.0897 
(0.939)   
1.1895 
(0.845) 
- 0.2624 
(0.946) 
Broadleaf-conifer 
gradient 
- 0.0152 
(0.997) 
0.1528 
(0.951)    
1.2342 
(0.638) 
0.0857 
(0.979)     
- 0.5451 
(0.799)   
- 0.3970 
(0.961) 
- 
Presence of Shorea 
robusta  
- 2.4642 
(0.736) 
- 2.1250 
(0.537)    
- 1.4444 
(0.672) 
- 2.4325 
(0.570)     
- 2.2193 
(0.482)   
0.0166 
(0.999) 
- 6.5473  
(0.541) 
Presence of soil 
erosion 
- 2.3708 
(0.703) 
- 1.6544 
(0.6157)    
- 1.1956 
(0.714) 
- 2.3963 
(0.544)     
- 1.0150  
(0.703)   
0.5564 
(0.962) 
- 0.3563  
(0.969) 
NDVI 1989 - 5.0557 
(0.863) 
- 3.2999 
(0.817)    
- 4.6764 
(0.756) 
- 3.7593 
(0.833)     
- 5.8121 
(0.648)   
- 0.8161 
(0.989) 
7.0555 
(0.875) 
Proportion of 
ancestral household 
(≥ 2 generations) 
2.8127 
(0.775) 
3.8418 
(0.464)    
3.3199 
(0.578) 
2.1773 
(0.738)     
3.8504 
(0.464)   
3.8518 
(0.894) 
2.4360 
(0.855) 
Proportion of 
ethnic population 
0.6005 
(0.937) 
0.6275 
(0.838)    
0.0622 
(0.988) 
1.7862 
(0.267)     
- 0.2088 
(0.941)   
1.1531 
(0.915) 
2.5174 
(0.817) 
Proportion of poor 
population 
- 2.8359 
(0.749) 
…. - 2.6501 
(0.603) 
- 3.5630 
(0.528)     
- 1.9762 
(0.627)   
5.5278 
(0.791) 
- 8.1204 
(0.509) 
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4.2.3 Specification of analytical models  
4.2.3.1 Addressing confounding through matching 
Because my study is observational, the principal problem in the estimation of ATTe is 
identifying counterfactuals and dealing with confounders particularly due to selection 
bias. Selection bias arises when the household of a CFP is not randomly selected, and CF 
households differ from NCF households for reasons other than their status as CF or NCF 
per se. Differences of CF and NCF confounders can effect equity in benefit sharing even 
if the CFP had no effect. Therefore, confounders need to be controlled and 
counterfactuals need to be identified so as to make matched households as good as 
random or statistically equivalent. Matched CF and NCF households allow comparisons 
to achieve unbiased measures of ATTe.  
I used a two-step method -nonparametric matching and analysis- for identification of 
counterfactuals and estimation of ATTe. Matching, an ex post identification technique, 
reduces selection bias and generates a comparable set of NCF observations by controlling 
observed confounders (Ho et al., 2007; Imben, 2004; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; 
Sekhon, 2011). Appropriate matching asymptotically balances observed confounders by 
removing bias (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). However, there is no consensus on how 
exactly matching ought to be done, how to measure the success of the matching 
procedure, and whether matching estimators are sufficiently robust to misspecification 
(Heckman et al., 1998).  
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Matching reduces selection bias only if assumptions of ‘conditional independence or 
unconfoundedness’ and ‘common support’ are met (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
Conditional independence means that CFP status is independent of the confounders. 
Matching techniques control selection bias fully if all confounders determining CFP 
assignment are used, which is rare in practice as there could also be unobservable 
confounders. This is a strong assumption as it makes CF and NCF households 
comparable and must be justified by the data at hand. The “common support condition” 
refers to two important conditions – positive probability (i.e., existence of the positive 
probability of being both CF and NCF for values of each covariate) and overlap condition 
(i.e., finding adequate comparable matches that help reduce model dependence).   
I developed matching and propensity score models by including 10 to 14 observed 
confounders that affect the assignment into CFP and equity in benefit sharing (Table 4.4). 
As the confounders were measured at community and forest level, I applied a mixed-
effects probit model to estimate propensity scores at household level and fed the scores 
into the matching model. I found almost all variances (> 99%) of random effects were 
attributed to the community or forest level effect and the fixed effects of confounders are 
discussed in Section 3.3.2.3.  
I used ≤ 0.25 standardized mean difference (SMD), a common numerical balance 
diagnostic criterion to check whether matching is satisfactory and acceptable, as the cut-
off point for matching adjustment (Rubin, 2001). The SMD expresses the “standardized 
bias” and is similar to an effect size relative to the variability observed and estimated by 
dividing ‘difference in mean outcomes between CF and NCF households’ by “standard 
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deviation of outcome among CF households”. Reducing SMD minimizes the overt bias 
due to measured covariates in the ATTe estimates (Imai et al., 2008; Rubin & Thomas, 
1996).   
I matched CF and NCF households based on observed confounders by using the MatchIt 
package of R 3.2.2 (Ho et al., 2007). I used the matching with replacement approach, 
allowing each selected NCF household to be matched to ≥1 CF households, as this option 
provides the highest degree of balance and the lowest conditional bias (Abadie & Imbens, 
2006; Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). I used genetic matching, a multivariate matching method 
that optimizes the confounding balance between CF and NCF households by automating 
the process of finding good matches using an evolutionary search algorithm (Diamond & 
Sekhon, 2013). It is a generalization of propensity score and Mahalanobis distance 
matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985), which minimizes balance measures by using p-
values. Mahalanobis metric is considered a useful tool to determine similarities between 
CF and NCF households even when there are several correlated confounders 
(Mahalanobis, 1936; Rubin, 1980). 
In my dataset, I found that genetic matching was the best suited algorithm to balance the 
maximum number of confounders bringing the SMD below the acceptable limit 
(Appendix B). As the post-matching SMD for confounders is less than 0.25 standard 
deviations and the average SMD across all covariates are 0.11, 0.16, 0.14, 0.14, 0.12, 
0.09 and 0.15 for the overall CFUG and across poor, dalit, indigenous and women-
headed households, and households across hills and Terai respectively, I was able to find 
a sufficient number of NCF households that are similar to CF households based on the 
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covariates included in the matching process. It was not possible to bring SMD down to 
≤0.25 for travel time to the nearest road-head in poor and women-headed households and 
presence of Shorea robusta in the Terai while keeping as many covariates as possible in 
the matching models. However, I included those confounders in the matching models, as 
they contributed positively to achieving overall balance. A total of 20-63% NCF 
households are matched with CF households in overall CFUGs and across different social 
and geographic categories. The average ratios of matched NCF to CF households range 
from 1:2.43 to 1:4.69 across social and geographic categories.  
4.2.3.2 Comparing equity  
The ATTe is estimated on the basis of average difference of equity in benefit sharing 
between matched CF and NCF households. As the test of average difference relies on the 
distributions of such differences, I checked whether the distributions are normal by using 
graphical plots (e.g., histogram and qq-plot) and the Shapiro-Wilk test. I found that such 
differences were not normally distributed and therefore using a t-test was not possible. 
However, data were independently collected and randomized through the matching 
process, so I used the pairwise Wilcoxon signed rank sum test to identify the [median] 
ATTe by deducting NCF values from CF values. I compared equity at different levels and 
categories such as for overall national level and across poor, dalit, ingigenous people and 
women-headed households and households across hills and Terai regions. Such results 
are crucial to identify the disaggregated local impact of CFP on the basis of recipients of 
benefit sharing.  
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4.2.3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Matching methods are not robust against “hidden bias” arising from the existence of 
unobserved confounders that simultaneously affect assignment to CFP and outcomes. 
The legitimacy of matching is based on the assumption that the assignment to CFP is 
ignorable only when all the confounding covariates are employed in the analysis 
(Thoemmes & Kim, 2011). Testing this assumption is empirically impossible as 
measuring all confounders is practically not possible. Therefore, sensitivity analysis is 
essential in helping us understand the robustness of research findings to potential hidden 
bias.  
Following the model of sensitivity analysis approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002, ch. 
4) and using the sensitivitymv package in R 1.3, I explored how sustainable my ATTe 
estimates are in view of the potential effects of unobserved confounders. I quantified the 
degree to which a key model assumption - CFP assignment is effectively random 
conditional on the matches - must be violated in order for my results to be reversed. I 
estimated how strong the effects of unobserved confounders on the CFP would have to be 
to change the probability of assignment to CFP that significantly change my ATTe 
estimates. I used a sensitivity parameter, gamma – Γ, that shows critical levels of hidden 
bias as a quantity of difference in the odds of CFP assignment for two individuals with 
the same observed confounders but who diverge on unobserved confounders. A higher Γ 
implies that the estimated ATTe results are robust against a greater potential selection 
bias, while a low Γ implies that even a mild selection bias could make the estimate 
insignificant (where Γ = 1 indicates that no hidden bias exists). I determined the smallest 
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value of Γ that will change the p-value of the “true” ATTe to a non-significant level 
(>0.05). When the p-value exceeds 0.05, the Γ value indicates the CF to NCF odds ratio 
at which ATTe estimates are sensitive to hidden bias. Since the sensitivity analysis for 
insignificant ATTe is not meaningful, I computed the critical level of hidden bias only for 
the significant CFP effects (Hujer et al., 2004). 
4.3 Effect of the Community Forestry Program on equity in benefit sharing 
Table 4.3 depicts that the absolute value of average equity at the household level is 
consistently higher in CF than NCF in all social and geographic categories. In CF, the 
highest average equity is in the hill households (0.6591) and the lowest is in the dalit 
households (0.6044). In NCF, highest average equity is in the women-headed households 
(0.6032) and the lowest is in the indigenous households (0.5228). 
The ATTe depicted the varied estimates and levels of sensitivity of the effect of the CFP 
on equity across social groups and geographic regions (Table 4.5). Equity in CF and NCF 
households in the overall, hills, poor, dalit and indigenous households is significantly 
non-identical (p < 0.05), indicating the significant positive effects of the CFP on equity. 
The estimated ATTe in overall CFUGs, hills, poor, dalit, and indigenous households are 
0.0937, 0.0921, 0.0505, 0.1391 and 0.0794, respectively. The sensitivity analysis showed 
that these results can be nullified by the influence of unobserved confounders if the odds 
ratio of CF to NCF is changed by 2.01, 1.74, 1.91, 1.14 and 2.61 in overall, hill, poor, 
dalit, and indigenous households, respectively. In women-headed households (WHH) and 
households in the Terai, the results showed that CF and NCF households are identical and 
therefore the ATTe are insignificant (p > 0.05).  
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My national level ATTe estimates may mask variations in the effectiveness of the CFP on 
equity at household level across social categories and geographic locations. Therefore, I 
estimated ATTe separately for each social category. I found that ATTe estimates are 
overlapped within a 95% confidence interval in the overall, hill, poor, dalit and 
indigenous households. The higher CF to NCF odds ratio, narrower confidence interval 
and lowest SMD after matching indicate the less sensitive ATTe to unobserved 
confounders, the more precise ATTe estimate and the better match between CF and NCF 
households. These statistics reflect the more robust ATTe estimates.  
Table 4.5 Average effect of the CFP on equity at household level and the results of sensitivity analysis by 
social group and geographic region.            
Column 1 is the social and geographic categories of households. Columns 2 and 3 contain the number of 
CF/NCF plots and average SMD of confounders before and after matching across social and geographic 
categories. Columns 4 and 5 present the mean equity of CF and NCF, respectively. Columns 6, 7-8 and 9 
depict the ATTe, lower and upper confidence levels of ATTe and p-values, respectively. The last two 
columns provide information about the sensitivities of estimated ATTe to the unobserved confounders. For 
sensitivity estimation, trimming was carried out at 2.5 times the median of the absolute matched difference, 
which is analogous to a trimmed mean that trims 5% outliers from each tails. I computed the critical level 
of hidden bias only for the significant CFP effects at a 5% level of significance. 
Social 
category/geo
graphic 
regions 
No. of 
CF/ 
NCF 
Mean SMD 
of observed 
confounders 
(before/ after 
 
matching) 
ATTe Hidden bias 
Point 
estimate 
Lower 
confiden
ce limit-
95% 
Upper 
confiden
ce limit-
95% 
p-
value 
 Critical 
level of 
bias (Γ) 
P value 
Overall  650/199  0.40/0.11 0.0937 0.0705 0.1103 0.000  2.01 0.055 
Poor 253/73  0.41/0.16 0.0921 0.0577  0.1226 0.000  1.91 0.053 
Dalit 94/33    0.70/0.14 0.0505 0.0108  0.0974 0.017  1.14 0.054 
Indigenous 
people 
284/114  0.33/0.14 0.1391 0.1102  0.1699 0.000  2.61 0.051 
WHH 122/26 0.47/0.12 0.0324 -0.0000 0.0705 0.062  - - 
Hill  410/101  0.20/0.09 0.0794 
 
0.0505  
 
0.1066 0.000  1.74 0.051 
Terai 240/99 0.40/0.15 0.0215 -0.0108   0.0597 0.268  - - 
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4.4 Discussion  
My analysis contributes to the recently emerging literature on the impact of formal 
forestry decentralization on equity (e.g., Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Luintel, 2006; Naidu, 
2009; Thoms, 2008). By using nationally representative samples from formal community 
forest user groups and informal forest commons, and by utilizing robust analytical 
methods that reduced bias, I demonstrated the effect of CFP on equity. At the national 
level, different social groups such as poor, dalit, indigenous and women-headed 
households, and households in the hills, my results clearly demonstrated that the CFP has 
a positive effect on equity. However, the CFP has no statistically significant effects on 
equity at the household level in Terai region. My results showed the variations in ATTe 
across social and geographical groups of households. Such variations reflect the 
implementation of locally-suitable, equitable benefit sharing mechanisms in community 
forest user groups as provisioned by the Forest Act 1993, Forest Regulations 1995 and 
Community Forestry Directives 2008. 
My ATTe estimates reflect findings of earlier studies. My results are in line with a recent 
study by Khanal Chhetri et al. (2016), who demonstrated, by taking Gini decomposition 
approach in five community forest user groups, that the community forests have an 
equalizing effect on household income distribution in the Nepalese hills. Significant 
positive ATTe reflects the contribution of CFP in institutionalizing rules and practices of 
benefit sharing in an equitable way as provisioned by the Community Forestry Directives 
(Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation [MoFSC], 2008). The CFUGs receive support 
from a range of state and non-state actors (World Bank, 2001) that help reduce elite 
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capture of resources and promote more equitable benefit sharing (Luintel, 2006; Persha & 
Anderson, 2014). Larson et al. (2010) argued that the forest management regime is an 
important factor in determining the access and distribution of benefits from resources. 
Formal forest decentralization, e.g., CFP, delegates certain levels of forest rights to the 
CFUGs, resulting in increased opportunities to participate in forestry activities thereby 
increasing their ownership in decision making and equitable access to forest resources 
(Adhikari et al., 2014; Ribot & Peluso, 2003). The households participating in forestry 
activities are more likely to benefit from the forest’s resources because of their better 
access to information and ability to voice concerns (Agrawal & Gupta, 2005). 
Community and household surveys carried out as part of this research reflect that 80% of 
communities have written rules and >60% of households engage in forest management in 
NCF. Utilizing both traditional and scientific knowledge on forest ecosystem and socio-
cultural practices, local communities might have made and implemented locally 
appropriate forest management plans that increased forest productivity. Increased forest 
productivity generally increases the ability of communities to access higher quantities of 
products from the forest commons as indicated by Naidu (2011) in case of the Western 
Himalayas. The formally registered CFUGs regulate the extraction and distribution of 
forest products (Meynen & Dornboos, 2005), control the free-riding problem or control 
unauthorized resource extraction and establish equitable benefit sharing systems.  
The insignificant ATTe across Terai regions indicates a lack of dedicated institutional 
rules and practices on the part of communities and supporting agencies including 
government forest bureaucracy, civil society organizations, and donor funded projects. 
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The Nepalese government had (and still has) low priority in promoting community 
forestry in the Terai region (Bhattarai, 2006; MoFSC, 2000; World Bank, 2001). The 
local communities also have a tendency to sell forest products to increase their CFUG 
funds, which they generally spend in community development activities ignoring specific 
needs of households (Lamichhane & Parajuli, 2014). Elites generally dominate the CFP’s 
decision-making process in the Terai, which reinforces inequity in the communities. 
These elites often develop clandestine relations with timber traders and corrupt forest 
officials and misuse forest resources for their own benefits. They tend to homogenize the 
community and ignore socio-economic and cultural diversity, while trying to develop 
groupthink and reduce the freedom of members to make choices. At times, the elites and 
decision-makers do not make the CFUG transactions transparent but rather make them 
complex and ambiguous, so as to justify their exercise of discretionary power.   
Differential ATTe across households in social and geographic categories clearly indicates 
the inadequacy of evaluating the effect of CFP at the national scale to identify local 
effects. Such ATTe further indicate the need of flexible and social group- and area-
specific policies for promoting equitable benefit sharing. While the positive ATTe 
indicates the need to continue the existing CFP practices, the neutral ATTe signals the 
need of greater, targeted support at policy, monitoring and motivational levels for the 
forest-managing communities so as to ensure equitable benefit sharing. Neutral effects of 
CFP in the Terai indicate a clear need to review the current community practices on 
benefit sharing. As the population structure, socio-cultural diversities, and services and 
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input provided by government and non-government institutions vary across geographic 
area, reviewers need to carefully account such variables.  
It is less clear whether my ATTe estimates are driven by different factors and/or differing 
degrees of bias. These results point to the need for further research exploring why CFP is 
effective in promoting equity in different social groups and hills, but not in the Terai, 
how communities interpret and implement benefit-sharing provisions made in CFP, and 
what motivational and capacity building supports to forest-managing communities could 
be useful to ensure and strengthen equitable benefit sharing. Such research would 
contribute to amending the current CFP to improve intended outcomes of CBD and 
REDD+.  
My research indicates that the Nepalese CFP may provide groundworks and lessons for 
promoting equity in REDD+. However, a closer look at different factors affecting equity 
at national to local levels is crucial. Scientists may be required to empirically answer the 
questions regarding who should get REDD+ benefits, how, why, when and where. 
Equally important is the examination of broader political and economic forces at 
regional, national and international levels to understand the dynamics of equity at local 
level. Such forces influence the shaping of household perceptions about equity in benefit 
sharing and influence the quantity and flow of REDD+ benefits.  
My research is the first of its kind to take the case of Nepalese community forestry and 
bring insights into the less studied and complex issue of equity. The estimation of ATTe 
is challenging, particularly using cross-sectional data. However, by matching based on a 
large number of confounders I was able to overcome difficulties associated with non-
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random sampling. However, a certain level of imbalance in the observed confounders still 
exists, which might have added variation to my ATTe estimates. As there are competing 
multiple, applicable matching methods available, each of which has certain advantages 
and disadvantages, the methods I used may be debated. The use of SMD to check the 
match balance may capture only certain dimensions of balance. Challenges may remain 
in terms of understanding and communicating the results of the sensitivity analysis.  
4.5 Conclusion  
With the commencement of incentive-based forest management, including decentralized 
forestry and REDD+, equity has been one of the critical outcomes of concern and is 
therefore gaining momentum for examination and promotion. Equity has been crucial in 
motivating forest-managing communities and in gaining their support for effective 
management of forest commons. Using cross-sectional data and robust analytical 
methods for evaluating ATTe estimates, I demonstrated the unique path and positive 
causal effect of Nepalese CFP on household level equity except in the Terai. My results 
indicated the need for review of benefit sharing practices in the Terai and continue (or 
further improve or strengthen) such practices at the national level and across households 
in the hills, and poor, dalit, indigenous and women-headed households.   
My findings demonstrated the CFP’s potential to support CBD and REDD+ initiatives. 
However, dedicated, appropriate policies promoting equity in the Terai are critical for 
motivating communities in managing forests. A cautious approach in exploring key 
drivers of heterogeneity in equity is important to helping policies and institutions 
contribute to the objectives of CBD and REDD+. One policy initiative may be the 
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promotion of CFP in non-CFP areas so as to promote equitable benefit sharing and 
therefore incentivizing those communities. My research indicates that government in 
tropical countries may need to devote more attention to decentralization policies to make 
the CBD and REDD+ initiatives more equitable, legitimate, credible, acceptable and 
effective in the long run. By addressing equity, CBD and REDD+ may be better 
positioned to achieve their conservation, carbon sequestration and poverty reduction 
goals.      
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Chapter 5: An assessment of collective action drivers of carbon storage in Nepalese 
forest commons 
5.1 Introduction 
The institutional practices governing conservation and management of forests in tropical 
countries are defined by national and/or sub-national policies and regulations (Constance 
et al., 2010). Over the last four decades, governments in many tropical countries have put 
significant efforts into promoting “collective action”8 of local communities to stop 
deforestation and manage forests sustainably by recognizing traditional forest 
management practices and introducing formal decentralization reforms (Charnley & Poe, 
2007; Larson & Soto, 2008). Approximately 15.5% of global forests (and 25% of 
developing country forests) are under the control of communities (“forest commons”) and 
the trend of community control through decentralization reforms is increasing (Rights 
and Resources Initiatives [RRI], 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008; World Bank, 2009). Local 
communities’ primary objective in the management of forest commons is to access 
essential subsistence forest products such as fuelwood, timber and grass (e.g., MoFSC, 
1988).  
Understanding the role of forest commons in mitigating climate change is important due 
to their potential roles as both sinks and sources of carbon (Dixon et al., 1994) and 
contributions to both rural livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. These roles are now 
even more valued following the emergence of the Reducing Emissions from 
                                                          
8
 Collective actions are activities carried out together or jointly by a specified community or a group of 
people that share the same or similar objectives so that all individuals enhance their socio-economic, 
cultural or political status as a group or community. 
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Deforestation and Forest Degradation, Conservation and enhancement of forest carbon 
and sustainable management of forest in developing countries (REDD+) program. Past 
studies show potentially mixed results from communities’ conservation efforts in relation 
to carbon storage and emissions. For instance, Nepalese forest commons have contributed 
to reducing deforestation and forest degradation and restoring degraded forest ecological 
systems (Chapagain & Banjade, 2009; Department of Forest Research and Survey 
[DFRS], 2015; Gautam et al., 2002). On the other hand, local communities’ practices of 
harvest and use of forest products (e.g., timber, fuelwood, and fodder), grazing and 
burning can result in a significant loss of biomass carbon (Brown et al., 1991; Flint & 
Richards, 1994; Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 1993; Goldammer, 1990).  
This paradox results from the diverse array of communities, and their actions governing 
the management and use of local forests. 
The REDD+ program should incentivize forest-dependent communities (Phelps et al., 
2010a) and follow common property design principles or collective action drivers 
(Agrawal & Angelsen, 2009) to achieve its objectives, particularly in the forest 
commons. Using a worldwide data set, Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) demonstrated the 
possibility of both tradeoffs and/or synergies between climate and livelihood benefits of 
forest commons. Other scholars have also indicated both the opportunities and challenges 
of REDD+ to forest commons management. For instance, REDD+ brings unconventional 
forestry investment to developing countries (Eliasch, 2008), which can improve forest 
governance and bolster global conservation efforts (Wollenberg & Springate-Baginski, 
2010), promote low carbon paths to development, generate livelihoods and reduce 
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poverty. On the contrary, it may overlook livelihood related outcomes for local 
communities (Campbell, 2009; Coomes et al., 2008; Putz & Redford, 2009; 
Ratsimbazafy et al., 2011) and gradually alienate local people from accessing resource in 
the future (Khatri, 2012; Phelps et al., 2010b). REDD+ will not necessarily serve to help 
local community-managed forests (Ostrom, 2010). Dyer and Counsel (2010) warned that 
the local people in developing countries may need to shoulder the cost of emissions 
reduction instead of benefiting from REDD+.  
Shyamsundar (2008) demonstrated that effective forest commons contribute to better 
forest management particularly through promoting fairness in rules and sanctions and in 
participation and monitoring (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2000, 2001). Beyene et al. (2013) 
indicated that the collective action of forest-managing communities is one of the most 
important determinants of carbon storage within forest commons. However, there is 
limited empirical evidence that indicates whether better collective action practices lead 
forests to sequester more carbon (Beyene et al., 2013; Chazdon, 2008; Jodha, 2008; 
Ranganathan et al., 2008). Without empirical evidence of such relationships, it is difficult 
to decide whether and how to implement REDD+ in forest commons effectively i.e., by 
synergizing carbon and livelihood outcomes.       
To understand the relationship between collective action drivers and carbon storage, I 
conducted research on Nepalese forest commons. I took empirical data collected in the 
year 2013 from a nationally representative random sample of 130 forest commons (both 
forests and communities) and 1300 households. Nepal is one of the pioneer countries into 
the practice of different legally supported models of forest commons over the last 40 
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years. Approximately 42% of the population from a wide range of socio-economic 
groups are formally organized in ~19,000 Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs), 
which are engaged in managing ~1.8 million hectares of forests (Department of Forest, 
2015). The high level of diversity of forests and communities in Nepal has posed 
challenges, and created opportunities, to understanding the varied relationships between 
collective action drivers and carbon storage.  
Using a multivariate regression analysis, I analyzed the relationship between different 
collective action drivers of Nepalese forest commons and forest carbon. Specifically, I 
considered the communities’ (i) forest conservation history, (ii) engagement in forest 
management, (iii) ability to modify rules, (iv) ability to enforce sanctions, (v) social 
capital and (vi) transparency of forestry affairs as part of collective action drivers, as they 
constitute critical elements of common property design principles (Agrawal & Chhatre, 
2006; Agrawal, 2001, 2000; Anderson & Agrawal, 2011; Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2009, 
2000, 1990; Shyamsundar, 2008). Reflecting most findings of the collective action 
literature, I hypothesize that these drivers are positively associated with more carbon 
storage in forest commons.  I discuss the research findings in view of literature and 
emerging REDD+ program. Finally, I suggest analytical areas for consideration while 
designing and implementing REDD+ at the local level so as to increase carbon storage in 
forest commons.  
5.2 Methods 
The data presented are part of an on-going multi-disciplinary research project funded by 
the World Bank and jointly implemented by Portland State University (PSU) and 
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ForestAction Nepal (Bluffstone et al., 2015), a non-governmental, non-profit 
organization that works on issues related to forestry, agriculture and climate change in 
Nepal. The primary aim of the project was to assess the potential synergies and/or 
tradeoffs between Nepalese forest commons and REDD+. 
5.2.1 Samples and data collection 
We (ForestAction researcher and I) selected a total of 130 forests and forest user groups 
(FUGs), both CFUGs and non-CFUGs, for data collection (Figure 5.1). We randomly 
selected 65 CFUGs from a pool of 137 national random samples from the CF impact 
study conducted by the Nepalese government during 2010-2012. We randomly selected 
ten households from each CFUG to be surveyed. The field team selected 65 non-CFUGs 
in such a way that they shared a variety of characteristics with the CFUGs. Such non-
CFUGs were close, but not next to CFUGs to avoid being used simultaneously by the 
same people. The field researchers randomly selected 10 households in each non-CFUG 
to be surveyed following same methods to those used in selecting CFUGs. Data were 
collected by the field team from February to May 2013.  
     
 
    
1
3
5
 
 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of sample plots 
     
136 
    
5.2.1.1 Forest data collection  
We conducted a pilot survey in 2012 to estimate the required number of sample plots for 
forest data collection. We selected 45 sample plots from nine community forests (CFs) 
across physiographic regions to capture the greatest possible heterogeneity in plot basal 
area, a proxy of forest biomass. We deployed a field team to measure the diameter at 
breast height (DBH) of trees and saplings and estimated the basal area for each plot. 
Considering variance of basal area, we calculated the number of required sample plots to 
obtain results within 10% error and 95% confidence level using the standard formula (1) 
(Saxena & Singh, 1987).   
N = Cv
2
t
2
/E
2…………………………….(1)  
Where,  
N = Required number of sample plots; 
Cv = Coefficient of variation, s/µ (s = standard deviation and µ = sample mean); 
E = Standard error, s/√n (n = sample number); 
t = Value of student-t distribution for (n-1) degree of freedom and 95% 
confidence level. 
A total of 325 plots were estimated to be required for sampling in the CFs. Sample plots 
were distributed among the 65 CFs, which were selected from the random samples 
chosen for the national community forestry impact study conducted by the Nepalese 
government during 2010-2012. ForestAction recruited a team of field researchers, with 
whom I closely worked to collect the data. Each of the field researchers had 
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undergraduate degrees in forestry, and ForestAction trained them to conduct forest 
surveys and inventories. 
As the size of CF varies, we allocated 3-7 sample plots in each forest based on the 
quintile distribution of forest size. As the forest size in the hill and Terai markedly differ, 
we considered different quintile ranges for hill and Terai (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 Distribution of sample plots in community forests. 
Quintile     
distribution 
Forest size (ha) Sample 
plots/forest 
No. of 
forest 
No. of 
plots 
Hill Terai 
1
st
 quintile <18 <113 3 13 39 
2
nd
 quintile 18-64 113-154 4 13 52 
3
rd
 quintile 64-91 154-335 5 13 65 
4
th
 quintile 91-183 335-526 6 13 78 
5
th
 quintile ≥183 ≥526 7 13 91 
 
The field team carried out forest boundary surveys using a geographic positioning system 
(GPS), prepared forest maps on graph paper and estimated forest areas. The maps of CFs 
from the forest operational plans were copied onto the graph paper, so as to divide areas 
into smaller grid cells. To identify the sample plots, the cells were selected randomly and 
X and Y coordinates of the center of selected cells were identified. The coordinates were 
then fed into the GPS unit to locate the plots in the forests. Due to differences in non-CF 
size, it was possible to allocate 295 plots following forest size criteria and standards 
given in Table 5.1. The distribution of sample plots is also given in Figure 5.1. 
A circular plot with a radius of 8.92m was selected for collecting environmental data and 
measuring trees (>5cm DBH), which is suitable for moderate to dense vegetation and has 
been used widely (MacDicken, 1997).  Using the same center, second and third plots with 
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radii of 5.64m and 1m were established to measure saplings (1-5cm DBH) and count 
seedlings, respectively (Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2 Size and shape of sample plot 
 
The team measured height and circumference of each tree and sapling by using a 
clinometer and linear tape, respectively. The team also recorded the vernacular name of 
each species and collected data on canopy, slope, altitude, aspect, soil color, soil depth, 
fire occurrence, forest encroachment, forest product collection, soil erosion and grazing 
for each plot. Other data include forest area and management regime, number of 
households using the forest and distances of forest from the nearest road and district 
headquarters. Some data such as households in the CFUG were obtained from the CF 
impact study conducted by the Nepalese government in 2010 (in which I trained field 
enumerators and conducted preliminary data analysis).     
5.2.1.2 Institutional data collection  
The PSU and ForestAction researchers (including myself) developed a set of structured  
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questions for community and household surveys by considering research objectives, and 
input from focus group discussions with CFUG members, and consultations with national 
level experts. We then tested the questionnaires in two CFUGs for their appropriateness 
and finalized them before conducting the survey. We collected both quantitative (e.g., 
resource availability, socio-economic profile) and qualitative (e.g., perspectives and 
experience) data from the survey.  
I closely worked with the ForestAction-recruited team of field researchers to conduct the 
household surveys. ForestAction recruited 12 field researchers having masters degrees in 
social sciences and trained them to develop a common understanding of the research and 
to use the questionnaires effectively and efficiently during the survey. We closely and 
constantly monitored the field researchers and supported them to ensure effectiveness of 
data collection and quality of data.  
5.2.2 Analytical framework: variables, hypotheses and model specifications  
I used a multivariate regression model to assess the relationships among collective action 
drivers and carbon storage in Nepalese forest commons. I constructed a two-stage model. 
First, I estimated the above ground tree and sapling carbon (AGTSC) for each forest. 
Second, I constructed a regression model with carbon storage as the continuous 
dependent variable and collective action drivers as the explanatory variables. I also 
included some of the critical conditioning variables in the model.  
5.2.2.1 Variable selection and hypotheses setting 
I carefully selected dependent, explanatory and conditioning variables to accomplish my 
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 research. Table 5.2 presents these variables and how I operationalized them, and Table 
 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics of each variable. I collected forest data at tree and 
plot levels, and social data at community and household levels as appropriate. I 
transformed all tree and plot data to the forest level, and all household data to the 
community level so as to match the data at common levels for further analysis. As the 
forest commons are held in common and are primarily influenced by community-level 
decisions, I focused my analysis at the forest common level.  
Dependent variable: My dependent variable is carbon storage, which is measured in tons 
per hectare. I used the equations (1) and (2) proposed by Chave et al. (2005) to estimate 
Above Ground Biomass (AGB), which were prepared by using a large dataset of trees 
across different climatic conditions of global sites. Equations (1) and (2) were used to 
estimate AGB in dry (<1500mm average annual rainfall) and moist (1500-4000mm 
average annual rainfall) forests respectively. These equations were used by several 
researchers and recommended by the Nepalese government (Ministry of Forest and Soil 
Conservation [MoFSC], 2010). Approximately 5% of sample plots in my study were in 
dry forests.  
AGB (kg) = 0.112*( D
2
H)
0.916
 ………………….………. (1)  
AGB (kg) = 0.0509* D
2H ………………………………..(2) 
Where,     = Specific gravity of wood (g cm
-3
); 
     D = DBH; 
     H = Tree height 
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Table 5.2 Descriptions of dependent, explanatory and conditioning variables and their measurement units.  
All data collected at household level are aggregated at the community level and data collected at tree and/or 
forest plot levels are aggregated at the forest level for analysis.  
Notation Variables  Measurement unit 
A. Dependent variable 
Carbon Average estimated carbon per hectare of a forest Metric ton per hectare 
B. Explanatory variables 
Conservation 
duration 
Number of years households in a community have 
been engaged in the conservation of forest  
Number of years 
Participating 
households  
Proportion of households in a community that 
participate in forest management activities  
Proportion 
Rules 
modification  
Community members can modify the rules of forest 
management and benefit sharing as per their interest  
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Penalty 
system 
Forest-managing community has a system of 
punishment for forest offenders  
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Public audit  Existence of public audit practice in the forest-
managing community  
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Mutual trust Average level of mutual trust among forest-
managing community members  
Yes = 2, Neutral = 1, No = 0 
C. Conditioning variables 
Terai The forest is in the plainland (“Terai”) of the country Yes = 1, No = 0 
Forest area The total area of a forest  Hectare  
NDVI 1989 NDVI was calculated for the month of November 
1989 
Index 
Indigenous 
population 
Proportion of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups 
in a forest-managing community  
Proportion  
Group 
household 
The total number of households in a forest-managing 
community  
Number  
Road distance Time required for two-way travel to the nearest road  1= <2 hours, 2 = 2 hours - < 
half-day, 3 =  half-day, 4 = > 
half-day 
Altitude The average altitude of a forest  Meter  
Slope The average slope of a forest  Degree 
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I used species-based wood specific gravity recommended by Jackson (1994) to calculate 
biomass. Where such information was not available, I used a general value derived from 
average specific gravity of associated species (same genus and family) within a forest 
type (Baker et al., 2004; Ngugi et al., 2011). I used Nepal-specific biomass equations 
developed by Tamrakar (2000) to estimate the green biomass of individual saplings, 
which was converted into dry biomass by multiplying with species-wise fractions or the 
average of the associated species as identified in the literature. I used the fractions 0.627, 
0.613, 0.58, 0.57, 0.545, 0.517, 0.5 and 0.45 for Quercus species, Lyonia ovalifolia, 
Pinus roxburghii, Alnus nepalensis, Schima wallichii, Shorea robusta, Terminalia 
tomentosa and Pinus wallichiana, respectively (Bhatt & Tomar, 2002; Jain & Singh, 
1999; Kataki & Konwer, 2002; Shrestha et al., 2006; Wihersaari, 2005). For unidentified 
species, or where wood density information was not available for the species, genus or 
family, I used the overall mean wood density obtained from the database of species 
compiled for this study (Baker et al., 2004). I converted AGB into carbon stock by 
multiplying by 0.50 (IPCC, 2006), which I used as a proxy for carbon storage for further 
analysis.  
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of variables.  
The total number of observations is 130. 
Notation Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Carbon 92.53 76.06 0.1685 362.09 
Conservation duration 13.63 4.98 1 23 
Participating households 0.74 0.33 0 1 
Rules modification  0.87 0.28 0 1 
Penalty system 0.91 0.20 0 1 
Public audit  0.37 0.48 0 1 
Mutual trust 1.65 0.46 0.1 2 
Terai 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Forest area 129.05 161.72 1.1 1088 
NDVI 1989 0.4253 0.0887 0.1216 0.5775 
Indigenous population 0.40 0.30 0 1 
Group household 295.82 588.09 12 6081 
Road distance 1.42 0.80 1 4 
Altitude 774.14 633.38 75 2410.6 
Slope 15.79 12.63 0 46.25 
 
Explanatory variables: I selected six critical collective action drivers that constitute 
critical elements of common property design principles and used them to explain carbon 
storage. These are the communities’ (i) forest conservation history, (ii) engagement in 
forest management, (iii) ability to modify rules, (iv) ability to enforce sanctions, (v) 
social capital and (vi) transparency of forestry affairs. I selected these variables on the 
basis of the existing literature and theoretical expectations in explaining management 
outcomes of forest commons (e.g., Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; Agrawal, 2001, 2000; 
Anderson & Agrawal, 2011; Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2009, 2000, 1990; Shyamsundar, 
2008).  Specially, I considered design principles for better collective action as proposed 
by Ostrom (1990), which includes (i) clear group boundaries, (ii) match rules governing 
the forest commons to the local needs and conditions, (iii) ensure the ability of  
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communities to modify rules, (iv) ensure monitoring and graduated sanctions, (v) resolve 
disputes and (vi) strengthen bottom up planning and partnership. Examination of these 
collective action drivers helps explain variation in forest management outcomes including 
carbon storage (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Andersson & Gibson, 2007; Gibson et 
al., 2005).  
On the basis of the literature, I hypothesized that my explanatory variables are positively 
associated with carbon storage. For instance, the history of communities’ conservation 
efforts reflects the outcomes of forest commons such as biomass and/or carbon. 
Generally, more years of conservation result in larger-sized trees and more carbon 
storage (Luyssaert et al., 2008). For instance, forest carbon stocks in mid-hill Shorea 
robusta forest proportionally increased with management duration at the rate of 2.6 Mg 
ha
-1
yr
-1
 (Thapa-Magar & Shrestha, 2015). Researchers have reported that an increased 
number of households participating in the management of forest resulted in better 
management outcomes or forest quality. For instance, as the number of households 
increased in the management of community forests in the hills of Nepal, the quality of 
forest in terms of cover and area also increased over time (DFRS, 2015). Increases in the 
proportion of participating households in a community may lead to consolidation of 
efforts towards better management of forests. Participation of more people may increase 
the acceptability of decisions at the community level, and also increase the number of 
community members who embrace a wide variety of traditional knowledge that helps 
enhance the productivity of forests (Posey, 2008 [1985]).     
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The ability of forest-managing communities to modify forest management rules and 
practices may have positive implications in forest quality. This is particularly true as local 
communities can effectively use their locally-specific traditional knowledge about forest 
resource management even during times of unanticipated change (Berkes & Folke, 1994; 
Turner et al., 2003). The practice of enforcement of rules including penalties at the 
community level is a necessary condition for the better management of forests (Gibson et 
al., 2005). Enforcement increased the probability of regeneration and decreased the 
chance of degradation of forests (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008). Community forest 
managers have identified transparency as a key element of forest governance that 
positively contributes to better management of forests. Realizing this, the Nepalese 
government has been promoting public audit practices at the community level to increase 
transparency in decisions, activities and financial transactions of forest-managing 
communities (MoFSC, 2008). It is intuitive that mutual trust among the members of 
forest-managing communities reduces conflicts in managing forests and thereby may 
likely improve forest management outcomes.    
Conditioning variables: I selected eight conditioning variables that have frequently been 
cited in the literature as influencing collective actions and forest conditions including 
carbon (Andersen & Agrawal, 2011; Beyene et al., 2013; Chaiyo et al., 2011; Chhatre & 
Agrawal, 2009). I controlled the effects of these variables so as to address the problem of 
potential spurious effects on the association between collective action drivers and carbon 
storage. These conditioning variables primarily characterize the ecological region (e.g., 
Terai), resource endowment (e.g., forest area, NDVI), community attribute (e.g., total 
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number of households and proportion of indigenous population), geographic distance 
(i.e., time taken to travel to and from the road, a proxy of market pressure), and 
topographic features (e.g., altitude and slope) in which the forest-managing communities 
operate.  
Nepalese Terai forests are more diverse than those of the hills, and are dominated by one 
of the most commercially valuable species – Shorea robusta. Due to their accessibility to 
roads combined with a high demand for timber and a high rate of internal migration, 
these forests are under high pressures from forest product extraction and land use change. 
The area and quality of forest commons may have effect on the total as well as the 
average (i.e., per hectare) carbon in the forest. When all else remain equal, larger and/or 
better quality forests may have more carbon and fewer livelihood tradeoffs. Altitude and 
slope also affect the productivity and carbon of the forest. The variations in altitude and 
slope may affect the availability of temperature, rainfall and nutrients, resulting in varied 
rate and quantity of increment in tree sizes, densities, cover and species composition 
(e.g., Chapter 2). As Nepal is a mountainous country with a wide range of altitudes (i.e., 
70 - 8848 meters) and slopes (i.e., 0 - ~70 degree), Nepalese forest commons are highly 
affected by such variations.   
Time required for two-way travel from a community to the nearest road is a critical 
measure of remoteness that affects a community’s transportation costs and market access. 
Remoteness of forest may therefore be negatively associated with harvest level of forest 
products particularly for commercial purposes, leading to greater carbon storage. Due to 
     
147 
    
differences in geography and market access, collective actions in remote communities 
may be different than in those closer to the roads or markets.   
Larger numbers of households in a forest-managing community demand a greater 
quantity of forest products and therefore exert higher pressures on forest resources. Also, 
more competition for forest products due to high demand makes collective action more 
challenging, particularly when the resources are limited. Such situations may result in 
lower levels of carbon stocks in the forest commons. Different groups of indigenous 
people may have different levels of forest product consumption due to their differential 
forest-related socio-cultural practices and economic and livelihood strategies. It is evident 
that certain indigenous groups such as Tamang, Rai and Magar consume more fuelwood 
than the average community (e.g., Pokharel, 2003). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
that the effect of indigenous populations on carbon storage may be negative.      
5.2.2.2 Model specification 
The literature considers better collective actions to be crucial for effective, productive 
management of forest-commons resources such as carbon (e.g., Agrawal & Chhatre, 
2006; Agrawal, 2001; Anderson & Agrawal, 2011; Ostrom, 1990). I drew my analytical 
framework from this literature and hypothesized that better collective actions at the 
community level lead to the development of appropriate, productive forest-management 
plans, leading to higher levels of carbon storage. As several factors drive collective 
actions, we can observe some of the critical ones and interpret their relationships to the 
quality of forest with the support of empirical evidence and literature. Many of the 
collective action drivers generally do not lend themselves to more robust causal, 
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analytical methods such as matching. Therefore, I carried out multiple regression analysis 
to understand the relationship between collective action drivers and carbon storage.   
Collective actions are likely more complex than simply having a unidirectional influence 
on forest quality measures such as carbon storage. Collective actions in forest commons 
management constitute the main feature of common property rights, which emerge from 
endogenous institutional processes (Heltberg, 2001). Such processes are defined, 
developed and perpetuated by socio-cultural values and traditional practices of forest 
managing communities through time. Ostrom (1990) highlighted that such processes 
have been critical to long-term, stable and successful management of forest resources at 
the local scale. Gautam (1991) also identified that local socio-cultural values and 
traditional practices have been critical to the emergence and sustenance of Nepalese 
forest commons including community forestry. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
a certain level of endogenous institutional process is inevitable in shaping relationships 
between collective actions and forest resources in Nepal.  
Endogenous institutional processes may introduce potential confounders causing 
problems in the identification of the effects of collective action on carbon storage. Such 
processes may affect the communities’ decisions to opt into forest commons (causing 
selection bias) and to adopt collective actions considering the condition of forest 
resources (causing reverse causality). In addition, omission of critical variables in the 
model may also cause problems in identification. This problem exists particularly when 
we use cross-sectional, observational data. However, based on the literature and data at 
hand, my model is almost free from identification problems. 
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Selection bias: Different researches such as Alcorn (1981), Barth (2008 [1956]), Posey 
(2008 [1985]), and Rappaport (2008 [1967]) have shown that the forest management 
behaviors of local communities are affected by multi-generational evolution of socio-
cultural, economic, environmental and livelihood values, knowledge and practices. The 
practice of forest commons management in Nepal has a long history (Gautam, 1991) and 
therefore is affected by different socio-cultural, economic and environmental values and 
practices over time. Such values and perspectives are generally developed and refined by 
the processes occurring at longer temporal and wider spatial scales. Therefore, the current 
forest management behaviors of communities in Nepal are path dependent and not chosen 
by the communities themselves. The distribution of forests and collective action features 
across the communities can be considered as random, as this does not consider outcomes 
of interest. Such a situation does not allow selection bias taking place in the collective 
action behavior of local communities.  
Omitted variables: My model does not suffer from omission of critical variables. As my 
sample forest commons are located in human-dominated landscapes, population and 
institution related variables are important to include in the model (Chhatre & Agrawal 
2009). Therefore, as mentioned in the conditioning variable section (5.2.2.1) I included 
critical population and institution related variables in my model (Table 5.2). However, I 
did not include community monitoring, equity, clarity in rule, forest management plan 
and conflict in my model as they were correlated with the variables included in the 
model. For instance, communities’ ability to change rules is positively correlated with 
community monitoring practices (ρ = 0.37, p = 0.000), equity in benefit sharing (ρ = 0.58, 
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p = 0.000) and clarity in rules (ρ = 0.46, p = 0.000). Similarly, the proportion of 
households engaged in forest management practices is associated with the existence of a 
forest management plan (ρ = 0.28, p = 0.002); and mutual trust among households is 
negatively correlated with conflict in the community (ρ = -0.29, p = 0.001).  
Reverse causality: There is a possibility that forest managing communities adopt 
collective actions through considering the condition of forest resources. Communities’ 
collective actions help them restrict access of outsiders to forest resources through their 
management as shared private property (McKean & Ostrom, 1995). Therefore, there is 
high likelihood that communities take more organized collective actions where higher 
forest quantity and better forest quality exist where they perceive that benefits from 
collective actions outweigh the costs of such efforts.      
As such a situation has not been prevalent in Nepal, reverse causality is either absent or 
negligible in my model. The Nepalese government prioritized community forestry, a 
robust and formal version of forest commons (Table 5.4), in the hill region (Gilmour & 
Fisher, 1991; World Bank, 2001).  Most of the forests handed over to the communities as 
community forests were degraded (Kanel & Shrestha, 2001). The government has 
maintained its control and has been reluctant to hand over forests to communities in the 
Terai due to the presence of good quality forests that have high commercial value and 
revenue potential (Bhattarai, 2006; Gilmour & Fisher, 1991). Only small to medium sized 
barren forests in the vicinity of settlements were handed over to communities in the 
Terai.  
My data also show that community forestry status has neither positive nor negative 
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association with forest quality matrices such as forest area and NDVI 1989 (Table 5.4). 
By comparing community and non-community forests, Bluffstone et al. (2015) showed 
that community forests do not possess a unique path to store more carbon. Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation provides evidence that community forests, in fact, have less carbon 
storage than non-community forests. This evidence strongly suggests that better forest 
quality did not drive more robust formal community forestry that depicts better collective 
action in Nepal. I also checked the correlation between the independent variables and 
residual error of my regression model and found that they were not associated (p = 1), 
indicating that there is not endogeneity. 
Table 5.4 Regression of community forestry status and collective action drivers and resource variables.  
Data show that community forestry is statistically, positively associated with five (out of six) collective 
action drivers under study reflecting the dominant forest commons literature. 
Variables Coefficient (p-value)  
Conservation duration   0.03(0.001) 
Participating  HH  0.53 (0.000) 
Rule change 0.83 (0.000) 
Penalty system  0.43 (0.053) 
Public audit  0.36 (0.000) 
Mutual trust  0.06 (0.590) 
Forest area  0.0004 (0.161) 
NDVI1989  - 0.77 (0.121) 
 
In recent years, the Nepalese government amended their earlier decision and began 
handing over large sized, good quality natural forests to the communities throughout the 
country including Terai. However, as Hyde et al. (1996) demonstrated, reverse causality 
could be unlikely to be present as the forest-managing communities have no or little 
incentive to invest in better collective action in case of abundant forest resources.  
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Though I cannot exclude all possibilities of endogeneity, I view that the presence of 
common exogenous factors that affect both collective action drivers and forest carbon 
storage is unlikely in Nepalese forest commons. Such a logical view is not uncommon 
and is shared by Beyene et al. (2013) who also used this assumption in an Ethiopian 
forest commons study. Initiatives for effective collective action and forest commons 
management are difficult to initiate from the outside but often emerge from complex 
processes (Ostrom, 2009; Agrawal; 2007), indicating the possibility of no or very low 
level of effect in both collective actions and forest resources. Agrawal and Yadama 
(1997) also suggest that collective action mediates the implication of exogenous factors. 
In fact, it is difficult to even think of a reasonably likely exogenous shock affecting both 
forest commons and collective action drivers. This finding is applicable to Nepal as 
Nepalese community forestry policy recognized the community forest user group as an 
autonomous body for perpetual succession (MoLJ, 1995). Such a legal provision 
strengthened the role of communities, and constrained the role of external factors, in 
bringing changes in local level collective actions and forest management outcomes 
simultaneously.  
Model development and diagnostics: I checked Spearman correlations of carbon storage 
with six explanatory variables to assess the strength of their relationships. I also checked 
the relationships among the independent variables by using regression. I then built a 
multiple regression model using equation (3) to assess the significance of explanatory 
variables i.e., to estimate the unbiased coefficient. 
Y = β0 + βi(Xi) + ε ............................................................(3) 
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   Where,  
Y Carbon stock in tons 
β0 Value of the function when Xi = 0 
Βi  Rate of change in carbon stock for unit change in respective explanatory variables  
Xi Explanatory and conditioning variables used in the model 
i  1, 2, ……, n 
ε Stochastic error not accounted for in the relationship between explanatory and 
dependent variables assumed to follow a standard normal distribution across 
observations, and the mean and variance are normalized to zero and one, 
respectively.  
I carried out the diagnostic check of my regression model by looking at both residual 
plots and statistics. First, I graphically checked residual versus fitted values and carried 
out the Ramsay Regression Specification Error test to examine for the possibility of non-
linearities of residuals. The p-value >0.05 in the Ramsey test indicates the linearity of 
residuals. Second, I looked at the normal Q-Q plot for the possibility of a non-normal 
distribution of residuals. Third, I graphically checked the standardized versus fitted 
values of residuals and carried out the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test (p-value > 0.05) to 
examine the heteroscedasticity, i.e., to test whether the variance of residuals change as 
the function of observation. The p-value >0.05 in the Breusch-Pagan test indicates the 
homoscedasticity of residuals. Using Cook’s Distance, I also examined whether 
individual observations have a strong influence in the model. Observations having < 1 
Cook’s Distance value are considered to not have a strong influence in the model. 
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Finally, I calculated Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for each variable to check for 
multicollinearity. When a value of VIF is >4 for a variable, it is considered as causing 
multicollinearity.  
5.3 Results and Discussion 
Spearman correlations of explanatory and conditional variables with carbon storage are 
shown in Table 5.5. The practice of public audit, Terai, forest area, NDVI 1989 and the 
number of households in forest-managing communities were positively correlated with 
carbon storage (ρ = 0.25 to 0.42), indicating moderately strong correlations between these 
variables and carbon storage. On the contrary, the conservation duration, altitude and 
slope of forest were negatively correlated with carbon storage. These negative 
correlations ranged from -0.15 to -0.25, indicating weak associations between these 
variables and carbon storage. Six other variables including proportion of household 
engaged in forest management, communities’ ability to modify rules, communities’ 
practice of penalty system, existence of mutual trust among the forest-managing 
households in a community, proportion of indigenous population in a community and 
distance of forest from the district headquarters were insignificantly correlated to carbon 
storage.   
My main interest is in the collective action drivers as listed out as exogenous variables in 
the Table 5.2. My exogenous variables in general are not significantly associated; though 
there were certain level of association between some of them.  
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I developed a multiple regression models to estimate the unbiased coefficients and 
significance of collective action drivers to explain carbon storage (Table 5.6). Model 1 
that uses only collective action drivers represents indicative results, as the effects could 
be spurious. Therefore, I presented six additional regression models (e.g., Models 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6 and 7), which contain all collective action drivers and different sets of conditional 
variables that dampen spurious effects. 
Table 5.5 Spearman correlations of explanatory variables with carbon stocks.  
Variables Correlation (p-values) 
Conservation duration -0.15 (0.081) 
Participating households 0.14 (0.122) 
Rules modification -0.02 (0.842) 
Penalty system -0.08 (0.338) 
Public audit  0.25 (0.004) 
Mutual trust  0.06 (0.474) 
Terai 0.27 (0.002) 
Forest area 0.42 (0.000) 
NDVI 1989 0.38 (0.000) 
Indigenous population -0.14 (0.103)    
Group household 0.37 (0.000) 
Headquarter distance -0.09 (0.330) 
Altitude -0.22 (0.011) 
Slope -0.25 (0.004) 
 
Model 2 adds Terai; Model 3 further adds forest area; Model 4 further adds NDVI 1989; 
Model 5 further adds number of group households and proportion of indigenous people; 
Model 6 further adds distance of forest from the district headquarters; and Model 7 
finally adds altitude and slope. All models were highly statistically significant (p = 0.000) 
and explain 12 – 35% of the variance of carbon storage. My models were well-specified 
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as no violation of multiple regression assumptions were reported through residual 
diagnostic tests. The Ramsay Regression Specification Error test showed that there was 
no possibility of non-linearity of the residuals (p ≥ 0.540); the Breusch-Pagan test ruled 
out the possibility of heteroscedasticity (p ≥ 0.309); Cook’s Distance indicated the lack of 
strong influence of any observation (values range from 0.00 to 0.17); and the values of 
VIF range from 1.06 – 2.53, which rejects the possibility of multicollinearity.  
My models demonstrated mixed results in relation to my hypotheses. Results showed that 
collective action drivers either positively or negatively explained or did not explain 
carbon storage in Nepalese forest commons, indicating that better collective action does 
not store additional carbon in the current setting. This result is in line with other study 
results using the same data but different methods (e.g., Bluffstone et al. 2015; Chapter 3). 
Models 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate that the public audit positively explains carbon storage; 
change of community’s practice of public audit from “no” to “yes” increased carbon 
storage by 41.54 tons per hectare. However, this result is true in the case of the absence 
of conditional variables particularly NDVI 1989, which, when included in the model, 
dampened the significant relationship of public audit and carbon storage.  
As hypothesized, the proportion of households engaged in the management of forest 
commons were consistently and positively correlated with carbon storage in four models 
only when I included NDVI 1998 (i.e., Models 4, 5, 6 and 7). These models showed an 
increase in each proportion of households participating in the management of forest 
commons increased carbon storage by 37.18 – 41.14 tons per hectare. 
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Table 5.6 Multivariate regression explaining carbon stock. 
Coefficients and standard errors are given in the parentheses. Significance codes are – “***” = 0.01; “**” = 0.05 and “*” = 0.1. I checked the regression 
results replacing “distance to district headquarter” to “distance to roadhead”, but I found that the regression results are still insignificant. 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Conservation duration -3.63 *** (1.30)    -3.17**(1.28) -2.97***(1.19)  -2.22* (1.19)  -2.43**(1.17)  -2.48**(1.19)  -2.48* (1.27) 
Participating households 41.26 (25.28)    37.79 (24.58) 37.63 (22.87)  37.18
*
 (22.29)  41.14*(22.27)
 
 40.89*(22.38)  40.43*(22.75) 
Rules modification -28.34 (25.50)       -19.03(24.98) -38.59 (23.65)    -36.89 (23.06)    -38.47*(22.59)   -38.20*(22.71)   -37.98(22.89) 
Penalty system -70.52** 
(33.37)     
-54.20 
(32.90) 
-50.82 
(30.62)  
-71.43** 
(30.79)  
-74.18** 
(30.21)  
-74.61** 
(30.38)   
-74.30** 
(30.63) 
Public audit 41.54*** (13.83)    42.47***(13.43) 22.26*(13.29)     21.33 (12.96)     18.69 (13.11)     19.15 (13.31)    19.63 (13.46) 
Mutual trust  4.59 (15.43)       6.29 (15.00) 6.63 (13.96)     5. 97 (13.60)     9.92 (13.41)    10.38  (13.60)     10.26   (13.72) 
Terai  36.53***(12.65) 17.52 (12.52) 9.85 (12.52 10.41 (12.27) 11.21 (12.75) 4.86 (19.76) 
Forest area   0.19***(0.04) 0.16***(0.04) 0.17***(0.04)  0. 17***(0.04)  0.17***(0.04) 
NDVI1990    191.81*** 
(70.50) 
161.68** 
(70.03) 
161.01** 
(70.37) 
160.94** 
(70.94) 
Indigenous population     -47.58**(18.34) -48. 16**(18.90) -48.42**(19.07) 
Group household     0.01 (0.01)    0.01 (0.01)    0.00 (0.01) 
Headquarter distance      1.26 (5.24)     1.81 (5.63) 
Altitude       -0.002 (0.02) 
Slope       -0.26 (0.77) 
Constant 177.74 ***      
(43.50)   
127.25 (12.65) 133.13 ***    
(42.57)  
67.45    
(48.00)  
94.08* (48.08) 91.50*  
(49.45) 
99.48*   (53.04) 
Residual standard error 71.08 69.04 64.24 62.61 61.29 61.54 62.02 
Adjusted R-squared   0.1268 0.1759 0.2866 0.3226 0.3506 0.3454 0.3352 
F statistic 4.121  4.935 7.479  7.822  7.332  6.672  5.645 
Degree of freedom 123 122 121 120 118 117 115 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Ramsey test (p-value) 0.34 (0.711) 0.62 (0.540) 0.22 (0.806) 0.42 (0.661) 0.27 (0.763) 0.25 (0.781) 0.17(0.843) 
BP test   (p-value) 4.71 (0.582) 6.90 (0.439) 9.07 (0.336) 10.06 (0.346) 12.29 (0.342) 13.21 (0.354) 16.07 (0.309) 
Cook’s D 0.00-0.13 0.00-0.12 0.00-0.14 0.00-0.17 0.00-0.13 0.00-0.12 0.00-0.11 
VIF 1.07-1.81 1.07-1.81 1.09-1.81 1.15-1.82 1.06-1.89 1.12-1.90 1.12-3.25 
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Surprisingly, in opposition to my hypotheses, the number of years communities managed 
the forest was negatively correlated with carbon storage both in the case of absence or 
presence of conditioning variables. My estimates of 2.22 to 3.63 ton carbon per hectare 
reduction with each year of increase in community engagement in forest conservation 
was significant (p = < 0.1, <0.05). This result is in line with the finding of Anderson and 
Agrawal (2011) who showed, by taking cross-country data, a negative association of 
forest quality with the number of years communities engaged in forest conservation. This 
result reflects the unique historical context of Nepalese community forestry program in 
that degraded forests were formally handed over to local communities for management 
(Kanel & Shrestha, 2001). 
The communities’ ability to change the rules did not have significant effect on carbon 
storage while controlling Terai and forest area. However, when I controlled the NDVI 
1989, unexpectedly the effect became negative (i.e., reduction of 36.89 to 38.47 tons of 
carbon per hectare for each point increase in NDVI 1989). This indicates the possibility 
of spurious effects.  
The existence of penalty systems in the community was consistently negatively 
correlated with carbon storage (except Model 2); once a community adopted a penalty 
system, the quantity of carbon was reduced from 50.82 to 74.18 tons per hectare. The 
reduction was lower when controlling for the effects of Terai and forest area. The 
reductions increase either without conditioning variables (i.e., Model 1) or with the 
presence of more conditioning variables (i.e., Models 4, 5, 6 and 7). The negative 
association of penalty systems with carbon storage contradicts the findings of Chhatre 
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and Agrawal (2008), who demonstrated a positive association between local enforcement 
and forest quality. This result also indicates the possibility of spurious effects.   
Mutual trust among the households within a forest-managing community did not explain 
the variation in carbon storage. This finding is consistent with and without conditioning 
variables and probably contradicts the finding of Gibson et al. (1999) and Alcorn & 
Toledo (1998) who argued that different measures of social capital explain the condition 
and management success of local forests. I included mutual trust in the models because of 
its theoretical significance for future analysis.  
Seven out of eight conditioning variables (i.e., Terai, forest area, NDVI1989, proportion 
of indigenous population, distance from district headquarters, altitude and slope) had the 
expected sign, confirming the hypothesized direction of relationship between these 
variables and carbon storage. However, their estimate of unbiased coefficients and level 
of significance markedly vary. For instance, the estimated coefficients of forest area were 
significant; it was evident that each additional hectare of forest area increased carbon 
storage by 0.17 - 0.19 tons per hectare. Similarly, the estimated coefficients of NDVI 
1989 were significant and evident that each additional number in index increased carbon 
storage by 160.94 – 191.81 tons per hectare. These results of forest area and NDVI reflect 
that carbon storage is increased as the quality of forest increased. Similar results were 
reported by Beyene et al. (2013). My results showed that carbon storage was sensitive to 
the presence of indigenous populations, with each additional proportion of indigenous 
population decreasing carbon by 47.16 - 47.58 tons per hectare. The effects of two-way 
travel time to district headquarters, altitude and slope were not significant in explaining 
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the variation in carbon storage. The total number of households had an unexpected sign, 
but this variable was also not significant in explaining carbon storage.  
Per hectare carbon storage is primarily driven by baseline ecological conditions reflected 
by forest area and NDVI. Ecological conditions influence the biological potential and 
physical space for carbon storage. For instance, a higher carbon baseline enhances the 
biological potential of carbon storage while providing smaller physical space for carbon 
storage. The larger forest commons could have more undisturbed or less-disturbed forest 
that potentially saved larger sized trees. Such larger trees are highly correlated with 
carbon storage.      
My models showed that conditioning variables such as Terai, forest area, NDVI and 
proportion of indigenous population are significantly correlated with carbon (Table 5.5). 
This indicates that these variables captured the unobserved effects of collective action 
drivers that explain their relations with carbon storage. In addition, these variables also 
explain other factors unrelated to collective action such as climate. As I am not interested 
in analyzing these details, I do not view this issue as a problem. However, I cannot rule 
out the possibility of empirical effects of the potential confounders that affect my 
conditioning variables. As I mentioned earlier in the model specification section (5.2.2.2), 
it is very difficult to envision exogenous factors that strongly affect both collective 
actions and carbon storage.  
While comparing different models, I found that conditioning variables have important 
implications. It could be because they were associated with both carbon and collective 
action (Appendix C). This indicates that there are some unobserved aspects of collective 
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action captured by conditioning variables that explain these correlations. For instance, all 
community forest user groups (CFUGs) need to carry out public audits (MoFSC, 2008); 
the forestry officials closely monitor and ensure that the larger CFUGs comply with the 
rule. This is also evident in my data that the public audit has positive, significant 
associations with forest area (ρ = 0.27, p = 0.002) and number of households in the 
community (ρ = 0.29, p = 0.001). 
5.4 Conclusion  
My study contributes to the recently emerging literature on understanding the relationship 
between collective action drivers and carbon storage (e.g., Beyene et al., 2013; Chazdon 
2008; Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Ranganathan et al., 2008) where several aspects are still 
unknown. As collective action can be contextual and measured in different ways, 
understanding its relationship with carbon storage may vary considerably. By using the 
data from nationally representative samples of formal community forests, informal forest 
commons and their corresponding forest user groups and households, I specifically 
analyzed the relationships between key collective action drivers and carbon storage both 
in the absence and presence of conditioning variables.    
I found that different collective action drivers of Nepalese forest commons have both 
favorable and constraining implications for carbon storage. For instance, proportion of 
household participation in forest management activities and the existence of public audit 
have positive, and the number of years communities conserved the forest, the ability of 
communities to modify the rules and the existence of penalty systems have surprisingly  
     
162 
    
negative, implications on carbon storage. I also found that the conditioning variables had 
differential impacts on the coefficient and significance of collective action drivers. They 
either enhanced or dampened or had a neutral effect on the coefficients and significance 
of collective action drivers. In aggregate, collective action in Nepalese forest commons is 
not going to explain or yield carbon. However, my results are indicative and they should 
be considered preliminary because of potential endogeneity, which was not possible to 
rule out completely. 
My results also indicate the possibility of weak and ineffective implementation and 
monitoring of collective actions in the management of forest carbon in the Nepalese 
forest commons. Results also indicate that explicit policies and programs that seek to 
enhance carbon by steering collective action in a direction that lead to carbon storage are 
critical.  In other words, the Nepalese government may need to pay more attention to 
strengthen collective action towards enhancing carbon storage so as to make the REDD+ 
program a success.   
My study does not identify specific causal mechanisms although the relationships 
between collective action drivers and carbon storage were examined. Rather, it clearly 
points out the urgency of attention for further in-depth research, incorporating other 
collective action drivers and controlling possible bias due to endogeneity. It also suggests 
the need to rethink and improve collective action practices in Nepalese forest commons 
in order to contribute to the global environment through emission reduction and carbon 
storage. 
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Chapter 6: A synthesis of the research 
6.1 Introduction 
With an aim to inform emerging forest policies that contribute to mitigate climate change, 
promote biodiversity conservation and support local scale ecosystem services, I draw 
overall conclusions to my research in this chapter. I specifically highlight the ways that 
forest commons could ecologically and socio-economically contribute to and/or constrain 
the contemporary global environmental initiatives such as REDD+. I synthesize the main 
arguments of my research, demonstrate their linkages with the REDD+ initiatives in 
Nepal and forest commons literature, and indicate the areas for future inquiry. 
Specifically, I examined Nepalese forest commons for their contributions to carbon 
sequestration, biodiversity conservation, equity in benefit sharing, policy provisions and 
institutional practices. I examined these aspects of forest commons taking an 
interdisciplinary and multi-scale approach. My research offers important insights into 
both ongoing policy processes regarding REDD+ in Nepal and the theory and action of 
forest commons in general.   
This chapter is divided into five sections. The next section outlines how the research 
problem is contextualized within Nepal’s forest commons. Section three talks about 
chapter-wise main findings of the research.  Section four highlights the broader 
relevance, theoretical and methodological contributions, and policy and management 
implications of findings. Finally, section five signals the future direction of inquiry.  
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6.2 Contextualizing the research  
The global community has put in place agreements to address environmental challenges. 
For instance, the global community designed and agreed on the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) to address climate change and biodiversity loss, respectively. These 
initiatives clearly recognize the importance of tropical forests to sequester carbon and 
conserve biodiversity (Clark et al., 2001; Mittermeier et al., 2004; Pan et al., 2011; 
Parmentier et al., 2007; Philips et al., 1998). These agreements need to operate in a 
context where over a billion local forest users control approximately 15.5% of global 
forests for the supply of forest products and local ecosystem services, and the trend of 
community control is increasing as a result of decentralization reforms, particularly in 
tropical, developing countries (Charnley & Poe, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008; RRI, 2014; 
Sunderlin et al., 2008). Scholars have indicated that equity in benefit sharing, appropriate 
policy provisions and acceptable institutional practices of forest management and carbon 
sequestration are critical to ensure forest commons contribute to global environmental 
initiatives. 
There is an acute shortage of empirical, evidence-based knowledge that informs practical 
policies, management plans and incentive mechanisms to support global environmental 
initiatives at national and local scales. For instance, inadequate empirical knowledge of 
the relationship between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation in tropical 
forests (Midgley et al., 2010; Szwagrzyk & Gazda, 2007; Talbot, 2010; Thompson et al., 
2011) raised questions about the potential contribution of biodiversity conservation (or 
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CBD) to carbon sequestration (or REDD+) and vice versa (Miles & Dickson, 2010; 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011). Similarly, potential 
contributions of formal, more-organized forest commons (i.e., community forestry) to 
REDD+ and CBD have been unknown due to a lack of robust knowledge on the 
effectiveness of such forestry on carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and 
equitable benefit sharing. Past studies have identified inconclusive and conflicting results 
in understanding the relationships between decentralization policies and institutions on 
local socio-ecological systems, including collective actions and carbon sequestration. 
I assessed the ecological, socio-economic and institutional dynamics of Nepalese forest 
commons to inform contemporary Nepal’s international environmental initiatives, 
particularly REDD+. The Nepalese government has decided to adopt the REDD+ 
program to contribute to climate change mitigation. It also expects to achieve co-benefits, 
including biodiversity conservation and socio-economic benefits, from the REDD+ 
initiative. A range of international non-governmental organizations and donors have been 
supporting the country’s preparations for REDD+ including formulating REDD+ 
strategy, developing institutional mechanisms, and building capacity of grassroots 
stakeholders and forest-managing communities. Nepalese forest commons provided 
excellent research sites and offered a unique learning ground to bring wide ranges of 
ecological and socio-economic issues into the analysis, as Nepal hosts a wide range of 
geographic locations, climatic patterns, forest types, socio-cultural practices, economic 
status, and policy and institutional provisions. Also, Nepal provides a long history of 
forest commons, both formal and informal, where nearly half of the country’s population 
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is directly engaged in the management of forest commons. Nepalese forest commons are 
critical components of subsistence livelihoods of local communities and local 
environmental services. Despite high pressure for land use change and D&D, they have 
potential to contribute to the global environmental initiatives in different ways such as 
sequestering carbon, conserving biodiversity, and accumulating lessons that can be used 
in similar contexts beyond the country.  
6.3 Main findings  
My research confirmed and expanded upon previous studies within the interdisciplinary 
arena of human-environment interactions. My findings demonstrated the importance of 
interdisciplinary (e.g., through an ecological, econometric, social and institutional) and 
multi-scale (e.g., local, landscape and national) approaches of inquiry in examining and 
explaining the ecological and socio-economic contributions of forest commons such as 
carbon storage, biodiversity conservation, equity in benefit sharing and collective action 
drivers. My findings expanded the current qualitatively-researched knowledge through 
quantitative research on the (i) relationships of carbon and biodiversity, (ii) effects of 
formal forestry decentralization on carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and 
benefit sharing, and (iii) relationships between carbon sequestration and drivers of 
collective action including policy and institution.  
My findings clearly indicated that the Nepalese forest commons have potential to 
contribute to global environmental initiatives including REDD+ and CBD. However, the 
level of contribution may be different based on the geographic and topographic contexts, 
management regimes and forest qualities.    
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6.3.1 Relationships between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation  
In chapter Two I assessed biodiversity, carbon and their relationships. My assessments 
bring critical insights for researchers, policy makers and practitioners working at global, 
national and local levels. My results demonstrated that Nepalese forests have potential to 
increase carbon storage and biodiversity conservation. As carbon and biodiversity 
fluctuate across altitude, slope and canopy cover, these are critical factors for planning 
and implementing forestry projects including REDD+.   
My results showed comparable carbon sequestration (98.34±4.19 Mg C ha
-1
) with other 
field-based regional studies (e.g., Baral et al., 2009; Gurung et al., 2015; Pandey et al., 
2014;), which is higher than the IPCC default value (90 Mg ha
-1
). Variations in carbon 
sequestration across geographic and topographic regions reflected differential site quality, 
climatic factors, topographic conditions and past disturbances. Variations also indicated 
the possibility of increased carbon sequestration with dedicated forest management 
interventions in the future. I found that carbon sequestration decreased with increased 
altitude and slopes. The opposite is true for canopy cover, which has a positive 
relationship with carbon sequestration. My results showed that biodiversity increased 
with canopy cover but there was no change across altitudes and slopes. Plot-level 
biodiversity variations indicated the existence of a wide range of variables 
simultaneously affecting the distribution of biodiversity.  
I found complex and varied relationships of carbon with different indices of biodiversity 
at the national level and across geographic and topographic regions and in forests with 
different canopy covers. Such results primarily reflected the existence of a complex 
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network of interactions between wide ranges of co-varying abiotic and biotic 
environmental factors that affect different dimensions of both biodiversity and carbon. 
However, my study indicated the possibility of synergies between carbon-forestry and 
biodiversity conservation. It is evident from the fact that species richness and effective 
number of species were weakly positively correlated with carbon sequestration. This 
finding reflected earlier findings (e.g., Nadrowski et al., 2010; Potvin et al., 2011; 
Thompson et al., 2009) and showed the relevance of interspecific complementarity 
through niche differentiations or moisture conservation between species.  However, I 
found negative or no correlations of carbon with equitability index. I also found skewed 
carbon sequestration on some species (i.e., 3% of species contain 84% of the carbon).  
6.3.2 Effectiveness of formal forest decentralization on carbon sequestration and 
biodiversity conservation  
In chapter Three I examined the effectiveness of formal forest commons, the CFP, on 
biodiversity conservation and carbon storage. My results indicated that the CFP has a 
positive effect on biodiversity at the national level. However, I found mixed and 
differential - positive, negative and no- effects of CFP on biodiversity conservation 
across geographic and topographic regions and in forests with different canopy covers. 
The CF in lower and higher slopes, in Terai districts, and in open canopies had positive 
effects on biodiversity conservation. However, the CF had a negative effect on the higher 
altitudes and an insignificant effect in the hills, lower altitudes and closed canopies. My 
positive biodiversity estimates reflect the contribution of CFP in revitalizing degraded 
forestlands (Gautam et al., 2002; Luintel et al., 2009), while negative biodiversity 
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indicates the communities’ preference for valuable species and selective harvesting 
(Acharya, 2004) and higher pressure in the CFs.  
In terms of carbon sequestration, my results indicated that the CFP has a negative effect 
on carbon at the national level. However, I found mixed and differential - positive, 
negative and no- effects of CFP on carbon storage across geographic and topographic 
regions and in forests with different canopy covers. There were significant positive 
effects of CFP in the open canopies and the lower slopes. On the contrary, there were 
negative effects of CFP in the higher slopes and the higher altitudes. My carbon estimates 
were unexpected and complex, both reflecting and contradicting the earlier findings of 
Bluffstone et al. (2015), which concluded that the CFP effect was not significant. All the 
results for both biodiversity and carbon were sensitive to the unobserved confounders. 
However, the level of sensitivity was higher for the negative results.   
My results should be viewed in the context of the objectives and management practices in 
CF, the disturbance regime, the base carbon stock in CF and NCF, and spillover effect of 
CFP on NCF, all of which might not have been well captured in the observed 
confounders. My results demonstrated that the CFP can be an effective forest 
management strategy to contribute to global ecosystem services including biodiversity 
conservation and carbon sequestration. They also pointed out the inadequacy of 
evaluating the effect of CFP at the national scale to identify local effects.  
6.3.3 Effectiveness of formal forest decentralization on equity in benefit sharing 
In chapter Four I examined the effectiveness of formal forest commons, the CFP, on 
equity in benefit sharing at the household level. My results indicated that the CFP has a 
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positive effect on equity at the national level, across social groups (i.e., poor, dalit, 
women-headed households, indigenous peoples) and hills. However, I found no effect of 
CFP on equity in Terai. My positive equity estimates reflect the contribution of CFP to 
better governance and equitable benefits (Luintel et al., 2009, Luintel 2006; McDermott 
& Schreckenberg, 2009; Persha & Anderson, 2014; Pokharel & Nurse 2004; Pokharel et 
al., 2007;) and the implementation of community forestry guidelines (Ministry of Forest 
and Soil Conservation, 2008), while no effect on equity in Terai indicates the lack of 
effort on the part of communities managing community forests and support agencies in 
the region in adequately addressing benefit-sharing issues (Bhattarai, 2006; Birendra et 
al., 2014). All results were moderately to highly sensitive to unobserved confounders. 
The level of sensitivity to unobserved variables was higher for dalits and lower for 
indigenous peoples.   
My results should be viewed in the context of the socio-cultural practice of resource 
sharing in Nepalese society and the spillover effect of CFP on NCF. My results strongly 
demonstrate that the CFP can be an effective forest management strategy to contribute to 
making REDD+ benefit sharing equitable across the country and social groups such as 
poor, dalit, indigenous and women-headed households and households in the hills. They 
also point to the relevance of evaluating the effect of CFP at the national scale as well as 
across geographic regions and social groups to identify local effects.  
6.3.4 Examination of policy and institutional drivers of carbon sequestration  
In chapter Five I assessed the relationships between collective action drivers and carbon 
sequestration. My assessments bring critical insight for researchers, policy makers and 
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practitioners, and particularly to those who are working at national and local levels. My 
results demonstrate that collective action drivers may have positive, neutral or negative 
relationships with carbon sequestration. The conditioning variables may have 
considerable (either statistically significant or insignificant) effects in shaping those 
relationships. They either enhance or dampen the relationships between collective action 
drivers and carbon sequestration to a certain degree.   
My results suggest that theoretical expectations and earlier findings of forest commons 
governance research may not always be true in all cases. My findings also indicate the 
possibility of weak and ineffective implementation and monitoring of collective action in 
the management of forest carbon in Nepalese forest commons. My study suggests the 
need for context-specific in-depth research that considers additional dimensions of 
collective action to aid in the practical relevance of my research. It also suggests the need 
for rethinking and improving collective action practices in Nepalese forest commons to 
contribute to the global environment through emissions reduction and carbon 
sequestration.       
6.4 Relevance, contributions and implications of findings  
6.4.1 Broader relevance  
My research findings have broader relevance from both spatial and temporal 
perspectives. Although my research was based on Nepalese forest commons, results from 
this work are applicable to other regions, particularly in the tropical, developing countries 
where formal and/or informal forest commons are in practice. In such countries, the 
governments are also adopting formal decentralization of forest, and therefore, better 
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understanding of the relationships among the driving processes becomes crucial. I 
suggest careful adaptation of my findings by extracting the idea to suit particular 
ecological and socio-economic contexts. My aggregated national results and 
disaggregated results from across the geographic and topographic regions and forests of 
different canopy covers provide a broad range of lessons for adaptation in different 
spatial contexts. By providing detailed descriptions of the study regions, future 
comparisons of my results can also be made. My results will be valuable to others 
evaluating forest management alternatives in the face of climate change currently and/or 
in the future.   
My research findings suggest the possibility of synergy between two global 
environmental initiatives, CBD and REDD+. However, care should be taken at the 
national and local levels while formulating policies, preparing management plans and 
implementing the plans. Dedicated policy provisions, management plans and actions are 
critical to achieve synergistic effects of these two global initiatives.  
6.4.2 Theoretical and methodological contributions 
My research is intended to add to the slowly growing interdisciplinary and multi-scale 
research approaches to socio-ecological systems building on multiple disciplines and 
scales to examine larger human-environment relationships (e.g., Berkes & Folke, 1998, 
1994). Principally, it adds to the emerging literature and theoretical propositions 
regarding forest commons management in the context of climate change (Beyene et al., 
2013; Chazdon 2008; Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Ranganathan et al., 2008). It specifically 
demonstrates the use of biophysical, socio-economic, policy and institutional information 
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to broaden understanding of human actions on forest resources. My research integrates 
the biophysical information from the tree, plot, forest and larger spatial scales and socio-
economic and institutional information from the household and community levels. It 
empirically demonstrates that decentralized forestry and/or communities’ engagement in 
the management of forest could have positive impacts on global environmental outcomes 
such as biodiversity and carbon sequestration, while fulfilling local forest product needs. 
It also strengthens the possibility of differential environmental outcomes across space, 
management regimes and forest qualities, and therefore supports the arguments made for 
sub-national policies and landscape-level management of forests. In the context of the 
slowly growing literature on the impact of forestry decentralization, my research brings 
robust findings and therefore provides strong evidence for policy effectiveness.  
My research provides novel methods for evaluating the communities’ contributions to 
global environmental initiatives. I employed robust methods to reduce the bias in 
estimates and strengthened the claim that I have measured the causal effects of formal 
decentralization of Nepalese forests. My research is one of the pioneer studies in 
examining the impact of formal forest decentralization. In particular, the evaluation of 
global environmental outcomes such as biodiversity conservation and carbon storage, 
instead of socio-economic benefits at the local level, is a novel idea that I brought into the 
analysis. A mix of data across scales (e.g., tree to landscape level and household to 
national level) and disciplines (e.g., ecology, socio-economic and policy) brought 
methodological insights to using multi-scale and interdisciplinary data in examining 
complex relationships of humans and nature. I demonstrated the complementarities and 
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synergy of interdisciplinary, multi-scale and multi-source data of quantitative and 
qualitative natures. The disaggregated analysis across geographic and topographic 
regions, management regimes and forest qualities demonstrated the relevance of policy 
and management of forest commons across spatial scales. It also showed how national-
level aggregated results can mislead regional or sub-national findings. My research is one 
of the first studies to examine the impact of formal decentralization of Nepalese forestry 
by using nationally representative data and robust analytical analysis. Therefore, it 
contributes by setting the stage for further studies on natural resource policy evaluation in 
Nepal and beyond.   
6.4.3 Policy and management implications 
My estimates of carbon are conservative (i.e., they include only above ground live tree 
and sapling) and therefore may be used to guide future research. These estimates may 
need to be revised for the purpose of incentivizing forest-managing communities under 
REDD+. The existing biodiversity and possible increase of carbon in the Nepalese forest 
commons clearly indicates the ability of forest-managing communities to contribute 
positively to the CBD and REDD+ initiatives. The higher estimates of carbon while using 
field-based methods than that of the IPCC’s biome average indicated the possibilities of 
more financial incentives for forest-managing communities through REDD+ program if 
they use field-based methods. Nepalese forest-managing communities could gain more 
benefits, including local employment opportunities by mobilizing their field-level 
resource persons to monitor carbon sequestration at the forest level.     
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The weak, positive correlations between biodiversity and carbon show the possibility of 
increasing the number and abundance of species by carbon-forestry, indicating the 
possibility of synergy between CBD and REDD+. However, my finding of skewed 
biodiversity in some species and negative associations of carbon with species evenness 
warns of the possibility of constraining biodiversity conservation and promotion. 
Therefore, dedicated and appropriate policy provisions and institutional mechanisms and 
management interventions will be critical to safeguard biodiversity conservation in 
carbon-forestry. Forest-managing communities may need to adapt their forest 
management decisions and interventions to make both REDD+ and CBD effective in 
achieving their goals. Careful and site-specific planning, proper implementation and 
periodic monitoring of silvicultural activities are critical to ensure synergy between 
carbon and biodiversity outcomes and thereby promote climate mitigation, biodiversity 
conservation and other ecosystem services in the long-run. The differential relations of 
carbon with biodiversity indices indicate that the policy makers and forest-managing 
communities need to clarify which components of biodiversity (e.g., richness, abundance 
or evenness) they are prioritizing.  
As the formal forest commons is a viable approach towards incentivizing communities 
(Agrawal, 2007; Agrawal & Gupta, 2005; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2008, 2001), policy 
makers and planners can promote formal decentralization in order to solicit local 
communities’ contributions for promoting biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration. Disaggregated data would provide useful insights for regional or landscape 
level planning for community forest management. The forest-managing communities 
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may strengthen and/or revise the already tested landscape approach to forest management 
to promote carbon sequestration without compromising biodiversity conservation 
potentials.  
6.5 Future areas of inquiry  
There are several unresolved research questions that would increase the scientific 
understanding of environmental outcomes of forest commons in tropical, developing 
countries. I suggest some of the critical research areas that stemmed from, but remained 
outside the scope of, my research. The high variabilities of biodiversity, carbon and their 
relationships warrant further in-depth research to understand their dynamics (e.g., Day et 
al., 2013; Thompson et al., 2012). Such research at different spatial and temporal scales 
would enhance our scientific understanding to a great extent. Use of information about 
functional and evolutionary diversities, adaptive capacity of forests, impact of forest 
management modalities and all pools of carbon may help refine understanding of 
relationships between biodiversity and carbon.   
A locally specific approach to explore key drivers of heterogeneity in ecological 
outcomes of forest commons is crucial to help make policy and management plans of 
biodiversity- and carbon-focused forestry effective. Landscape level assessments of CFP 
effectiveness may add value in informing locally suitable planning and management. The 
examination of the effects of different management interventions and/or silvicultural 
practices is another prime area for future research. Equally important is to explore the 
connection of forest resources with livelihood adaptation. Locally specific forest-based 
adaptation could be helpful to promote resource conservation and livelihoods for which 
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study about cross-cultural comparison and traditional ecological knowledge becomes 
crucial (Spoon, 2013, 2014).    
Long-term, ongoing data collection and research may need to be institutionalized to 
resolve the issues of perplexing changes in biodiversity and carbon. Researchers can 
continue to test, validate and review the findings of my research over time and with 
increasing amounts of data. A good mix of biophysical and social surveys, in-depth 
qualitative interviews, and robust statistical analyses may help elucidate critical 
relationships between local forest management practices and global environmental 
initiatives.  
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Appendix A. Covariate wise before and after matching standardized difference of mean 
Covariates Overall 
forest 
Lower 
altitude 
Higher 
altitude 
Lower slope Higher 
slope 
Terai Hill Open 
canopy 
Closed 
canopy 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M  
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SD
M 
Forest size 0.31 0.12 0.52 0.28 …. …. 0.48 0.21 49 0.20 0.52 0.16 …. …. …. …. 0.37 0.19 
Forest per 
household 
…. …. …. …. 0.04 0.08 …. …. …. …. …. …. 0.31 0.26 0.14 0.15 …. …. 
Travel time 
to nearest 
road  
0.17 0.25 …. …. -0.08 0.13 0.28 0.12 …. …. 0.12 -0.24 …. …. 0.20 0.10 0.16 0.16 
Travel time 
to district 
headquarter 
…. …. 0.37 0.14 …. …. …. …. -0.07 0.28 …. …. 0.06 -0.04 …. …. …. …. 
Slope  0.86 0.18 0.72 0.23 -0.09 0.01 0.70 0.01 0.24 0.14 0.56 0.15 -0.1 -0.00 0.85 -0.03 0.89 0.17 
Altitude  0.82 0.23 0.85 0.30 -0.01 0.01 0.63 0.20 0.35 0.25 0.68 0.15 -0.23 -0.18 0.88 0.16 0.77 0.11 
Moisture 
gradient  
-0.41 0.04 -0.55 -0.06 0.5 0.12 -0.53 0.16 0.24 0.12 -0.38 0.02 0.24 0.03 -0.23 0.24 -0.56 -
0.03 
Broadleaved
-conifer 
gradient 
0.54 0.19 …. …. -0.23 -0.02 …. …. 0.15 0.11 …. …. -0.21 -0.06 0.51 -0.03 0.56 0.25 
Sal  -0.42 0.05 -0.14 -0.13 …. …. -0.43 0.00 -0.09 0.11 -0.20 -0.04 0.22 0.21 -0.39 -0.05 -0.43 -0.02 
Soil erosion -0.07 0.03 0.09 0.09 …. …. -0.03 0.06 -0.34 0.04 -0.15 0.11 -0.20 0.11 0.26 0.03 -0.32 0.09 
NDVI 1990 -0.32 -0.09 -0.25 -0.18 0.14 0.04 -0.27 -0.03 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 0.03 0.11 0.04 -0.37 -0.09 -0.27 -0.14 
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Covariates Overall 
forest 
Lower 
altitude 
Higher 
altitude 
Lower slope Higher 
slope 
Terai Hill Open 
canopy 
Closed 
canopy 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M 
BM 
SD
M 
AM 
SD
M  
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SD
M 
Community 
conserving 
forest 
0.92 0.02 0.54 0.18 …. …. 0.65 0.25 1.01 0.48 0.58 0.25 …. …. …. …. …. .... 
Forest users 
households 
0.01 0.10 0.10 0.14 .... …. 0.18 0.25 0.34 0.07 0.17 0.20 …. .... …. …. 0.03 0.14 
Ancestral 
home 
0.60 0.11 0.27 -0.11 0.65 0.12 0.30 -0.04 0.15 0.08 0.32 -0.08 0.01 0.08 0.76 -0.10 0.48 0.15 
Ethnic 
population 
0.13 0.10 0.38 -0.03 -0.28 -0.05 0.23 -0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.35 0.14 …. …. 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.02 
Poor 
population 
-0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.39 0.22 …. …. -0.02 0.23 -0.57 -0.11 0.09 0.04 -0.25 0.02 0.11 0.23 
Note: overall= overall forest of the country, lower altitude = <1000m, higher altitude = ≥1000m, lower slope = <15 degree, higher slope = ≥15 degree, open 
canopy=<50%, closed canopy= ≥50%, Terai= political districts of southern plain land, hill= political districts except southern plain land.  
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Appendix B. Covariate wise before and after matching standardized difference of mean  
Covariates Overall  Poor Dalit Indigenous 
peoples 
Women-
headed 
household 
Hill Terai 
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SDM 
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SDM 
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SDM 
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SDM 
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SDM 
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SDM 
BM 
SDM 
AM 
SDM 
Forest size 0.25 0.17 0.09 0.15 -0.17 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.48 0.19 …. …. 0.50 0.17 
Forest users 
households 
-0.00 0.09 0.03 0.11 -0.68 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.57 0.11 0.14 0.10 
Travel time to 
nearest road  
0.14 0.23 0.06 0.31 0.21 0.20 0.01 0.17 0.10 0.26 -0.09 0.19 0.22 0.25 
Altitude  0.88 0.14 0.86 0.12 1.42 -0.00 0.57 0.24 1.00 0.20 0.07 0.05 0.72 0.24 
Slope  1.01 0.17 1.09 0.21 1.72 -0.13 0.83 0.24 1.15 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.74 0.21 
Community 
conserving forest 
0.48 0.04 0.42 0.11 …. …. 0.61 0.06 0.78 0.17 0.60 -0.03 0.26 0.04 
Moisture gradient  -0.53 0.05 -0.45 0.20 …. …. -0.41 0.11 -0.62 0.09 0.28 0.13 -0.61 0.02 
Broadleaved-
conifer gradient 
0.48 0.05 0.43 0.16 0.73 0.19 0.29 0.03 0.41 0.15 -0.08 0.00 …. …. 
Sal  -0.53 -0.07 -0.56 -0.14 -0.80 0.17 -0.34 -0.01 -0.59 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.24 -0.26 
Soil erosion -0.10 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.38 -0.18 -0.15 -0.14 -0.07 -0.05 -0.24 0.09 -0.13 0.19 
NDVI 1989 -0.29 -0.24 -0.22 -0.22 -0.63 -0.25 -0.20 0.12 -0.22 -0.14 0.04 -0.21 -0.18 -0.22 
Proportion of 
ancestral house 
0.77 0.06 0.84 0.09 1.46 0.07 0.51 0.18 0.78 0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.58 0.16 
Proportion of 
ethnic population 
0.14 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.30 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.29 0.08 
Proportion of 
poor population 
0.05 0.12 …. …. -0.16 0.09 -0.03 0.20 -0.10 0.23 0.28 0.22 -0.56 0.04 
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Appendix C. Exploratory regression of independent variables.  
Variables in the top row were considered as dependent (Y) and in the first column as independent (X). Coefficient (p- values) are reported.  
 House
hold 
partici
pation 
Rule 
change 
Penalty 
system 
Public 
audit 
Mutual 
trust 
Terai Forest 
area  
NDVI 
1989 
Indigen
ous 
populat
ion  
Group 
HH 
Headqua
rter 
distance  
Altitude  Slope 
Conservation 
duration   
0.001 
(0.91) 
0.01 
(0.058) 
-0.00 
(0.241) 
0.01 
(0.097) 
0.002 
(0.795) 
-0.01 
(0.118) 
0.1452 
(0.960) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.00 
(0.682) 
-1.83 
(0.861) 
0.03 
(0.089) 
33.94 
(0.002) 
0.17 
(0.435) 
Household 
participation   
-- 0.38 
(0.000) 
0.18 
(0.000) 
0.44 
(0.000) 
0.63 
(0.000) 
-0.13 
(0.304) 
74.97 
(0.079) 
0.02 
(0.29) 
0.07 
(0.409) 
-209.6 
(0.178) 
0.10 
(0.742) 
234. 1 
(0.163) 
0.92 
(0.784) 
Rule change  -- 0.05 
(0.389) 
0.12 
(0.413) 
0.41 
(0.003) 
-0.29 
(0.064) 
88.51 
(0.079) 
-0.01 
(0.614) 
0.04 
(0.712) 
-131.2 
(0.477) 
0.19 
(0.590) 
369.6 
(0.061) 
4.51 
(0.254) 
Penalty system   -- 0.32 
(0.137) 
0.08 
(0.700) 
-0.40 
(0.065) 
-11.38 
(0.874) 
0.10 
(0.008) 
-0.08 
(0.563) 
127.5 
(0.624) 
0.368 
(0.468) 
389.1 
(0.164) 
8.56 
(0.124) 
Public audit  
 
  -- 0.11 
(0.205 
-0.06 
(0.478) 
108.35 
(0.000) 
0.02 
(0.371) 
0.01 
(0.913) 
295.42 
(0.005) 
-0.16 
(0.455) 
112.54 
(0.33) 
0.95 
(0.679) 
Mutual trust      -- 0.07 
(0.484) 
20.90 
(0.501) 
0.004 
(0.799) 
0.09 
(0.115) 
-96.72 
(0.392) 
-0.19 
(0.387) 
108.2 
(0.374) 
-0.14 
(0.955) 
Terai      -- 92.42 
(0.001) 
0.05 
(0.002) 
0.02 
(0.727) 
96.35 
(0.356) 
-0.50** 
(0. 013) 
-967.52 
(0.000) 
-19.10 
(0.000) 
Forest area        -- 0.0001 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.236) 
0.68 
(0.034) 
0.001 
(0.372) 
-1.02 
(0.003) 
-0.02 
(0.013) 
NDVI1989         -- -0.36 
(0.239) 
980.2 
(0.093) 
-0.81 
(0.481) 
-1689.2 
(0.007) 
-29.17 
(0.019) 
Indigenous 
population  
        -- -153.04 
(0.372) 
0.78 
(0.019) 
-104.18 
(0.573) 
1.69 
(0.646) 
Group 
Household  
         -- -0.0003 
(0.086) 
-0.13 
(0.173) 
0.003 
(0.143) 
Headquarter 
distance  
          -- 76.96 
(0.114) 
3.96 
(0.000) 
Altitude             -- 0.01 
(0.000) 
 
